Social niche construction: evolutionary explanations for cooperative group formation by Powers, Simon T.
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.ukUNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING, SCIENCE AND
MATHEMATICS
School of Electronics and Computer Science
Social Niche Construction: Evolutionary
Explanations for Cooperative Group
Formation
by
Simon T. Powers
Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
October 2010UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING, SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS
SCHOOL OF ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
Doctor of Philosophy
SOCIAL NICHE CONSTRUCTION: EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATIONS FOR
COOPERATIVE GROUP FORMATION
by Simon T. Powers
Cooperative behaviours can be dened as those that benet others at an apparent cost
to self. How these kinds of behaviours can evolve has been a topic of great interest
in evolutionary biology, for at rst sight we would not expect one organism to evolve
to help another. Explanations for cooperation rely on the presence of a population
structure that clusters cooperators together, such that they enjoy the benets of each
others' actions. But, the question that has been left largely unaddressed is, how does
this structure itself evolve? If we want to really explain why organisms cooperate, then
we need to explain not just their adaptation to their social environment, but why they
live in that environment.
It is well-known that individual genetic traits can aect population structure; an example
is extracellular matrix production by bacteria in a biolm. Yet, the concurrent evolu-
tion of such traits with social behaviour is very rarely considered. We show here that
social behaviour can exert indirect selection pressure on population structure-modifying
traits, causing individuals to adaptively modify their population structure to support
greater cooperation. Moreover, we argue that any component of selection on structure-
modifying traits that is due to social behaviour must be in the direction of increased
cooperation; that component of selection cannot be in favour of the conditions for greater
selshness. We then examine the conditions under which this component of selection
on population structure exists. Thus, we argue that not only can population structure
drive the evolution of cooperation, as in classical models, but that the benets of greater
cooperation can in turn drive the evolution of population structure { a positive feedback
process that we call social niche construction.
We argue that this process is necessary in providing an adaptive explanation for some of
the major transitions in evolution (such as from single- to multi- celled organisms, and
from solitary insects to eusocial colonies). Any satisfactory account of these transitions
must explain how the individuals came to live in a population structure that supported
high degrees of cooperation, as well as showing that cooperation is individually advan-
tageous given that structure.Contents
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Introduction
The question of how cooperative social behaviours between organisms can evolve has
troubled evolutionary biologists since Darwin. If the maxim of natural selection is \sur-
vival of the ttest", then why should one organism perform an act that helps, and
therefore increases the tness of, another?1 This accords with the popular view of \na-
ture red in tooth and claw", with raw competition as the driving force in evolution.
Despite this, however, examples of organisms cooperating and helping each other can
readily be found in nature across all taxa. For example, microbes share public goods that
they produce (Buckling et al., 2007; Gore et al., 2009), such as enzymes, vampire bats
share blood with those in their nest that failed to feed themselves (Wilkinson, 1984),
and many mammals look after each others young. Moreover, while these macroscopic
examples of cooperation can easily be observed, cooperation has also been the key driver
for the creation of all new levels of organisation in the biological hierarchy, from pro-
tocells through to modern day multicellular organisms and social insect colonies (Buss,
1988; Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995; Michod, 1999). Cooperation has, therefore,
played a fundamental role in the creation of all life on earth, despite its prima facie
incompatibility with Darwinian logic, and is still at work inside of all modern day or-
ganisms. As an example, animals have a separation between germ-line and somatic cells:
only the germ-line cells are passed on to the ospring multicellular organism; the somatic
cells, such as skin, cooperate by forgoing their own direct reproduction to contribute to
the success of the group of cells (i.e., the multicellular organism) as a whole.
The key diculty in explaining all of the examples of cooperation above is the problem of
selsh cheats. These are individuals that do not themselves cooperate, but that do still
benet from the help of those around them. Thus if cooperating carries a tness cost,
such as time or energy that could have been spent directly on survival or reproduction,
then cheats should be tter than cooperators, leading natural selection to ultimately
drive the cooperative type extinct. Referring back to the above examples, instances
1We give more precise denitions of cooperative social behaviours later in this chapter.
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of cheating would be microbes that do not produce enzymes themselves but just use
those supplied by others, vampire bats that do not share blood but still receive it from
others, or mammals that do not care for others' young, but allow others to care for their
own. In the case of cooperation within multicellular organisms, examples of cheating
are particularly vivid: they are cancerous somatic cells that do not curtail their own
replication rate for the good of the other cells in the organism. All of these kinds of
cheating behaviour could readily arise in nature as new mutations. In particular, it
is often suggested that it is easier to lose a cooperative behaviour than to gain one,
since cheating behaviour may arise simply by the loss of a gene that codes for the
cooperative act. The possibility of cheating creates a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980) in
which absolute tness would be higher if all individuals cooperated, but cheating confers
a relative advantage, even though it leads to an overall decline in mean tness.
In this chapter, we rst consider the range of cooperative behaviours that occur in
nature, and then look at what is already known about the conditions under which
they can evolve. Essentially, these conditions boil down to aspects of the organisms'
population structure, such as the mating system (Wade and Breden, 1981), the distance
ospring disperse from their parents (West et al., 2002), and the size of social groups
(Wilson, 1983b). What is very rarely considered though, is how this population structure
itself evolves, for it is usually just assumed to be a part of the organisms' physical
environment. Thus, cooperation is then simply the adaptation of an organism's social
behaviour to its current environment. But, population structure can evolve over time,
and so the selection pressures on social behaviour can in fact change. Moreover, we
contend that this change can happen in an adaptive manner, for individual genetic traits
can aect population structure, and can themselves be subject to selection alongside
social behaviour. Thus, the joint equilibrium of structure and behaviour that a given
population has reached needs an explanation over and above classical explanations for
the level of cooperation in a xed structure, once we treat the structure as a factor
endogenous to evolution. That is, why is the equilibrium at a structure that supports x
level of cooperation rather than y? Our thesis seeks to provide an adaptive explanation
for why this equilibrium is where it is on the axes of both behaviour and structure.
We will advance the thesis that any selection pressure on population structure, derived
through its eect on social behaviour, must be towards the creation of selective envi-
ronments favouring cooperation; the conditions for greater selsh behaviour cannot be
selectively favoured per se. While most work on social evolution shows that popula-
tion structure can drive the evolution of cooperation, we argue that cooperation will
also tend to drive the evolution of population structure. In particular, our work can
explain the origin of groups that support cooperation, for while most models assume
a group structure, we show how the concurrent evolution of population structure and
social behaviour leads to the creation of social groups. This speaks directly to the group
selection controversy, that is, on whether groups can be subject to natural selectionChapter 1 Introduction 3
in the same way that individual organisms are (Darwin, 1871; Haldane, 1932; Wright,
1945; Wynne-Edwards, 1962; Wilson, 1980; Sober and Wilson, 1998). There exists a
strong individualist tendency in the literature, dating back to the 1960s, that sidelines
the evolutionary role of groups (Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976, 1994; West et al., 2008).
Yet, we show here how individuals create the very conditions in which group selection
becomes an eective force. Our thesis suggests that when the groups are being adap-
tively created by the organisms themselves, then they should not simply be viewed as
part of the selective background, for their very creation can change both the sign and
magnitude of selection pressure on social behaviour.
Our thesis is also particularly relevant to the major transitions in evolution (Maynard
Smith and Szathm ary, 1995), such as from single- to multi- celled organisms, and from
solitary organisms to societies. These transitions involved the creation of groups whose
members exhibit a high degree of cooperation, so much so that the group becomes so
well integrated that we call it an evolutionary individual in its own right (Maynard
Smith and Szathm ary, 1995; Michod, 1999). That is, the equilibrium of behaviour
and structure moves towards the extreme end of both axes during a transition. For
example, the population of cells in a multicellular organism is so well structured that
the individual cells cannot now live a solitary existence, and the level of cooperation
is consequently exceptionally high. Our thesis can provide a high level explanation for
how the equilibrium can move from being one of loosely associated groups with little
cooperation, to one where the groups are so rigid that their members cannot reproduce
outside of them, and cooperation is very high. Moreover, we explain how this movement
of the equilibrium is the result of natural selection, and hence is individually adaptive.
In light of this, we can provide the basis of a systematic selective account that is general
to several of the transitions.
In a sense, our thesis can explain the evolution of cooperation in a more fundamental way
than most previous works. This is because a behaviour is only \cooperative" relative to
something. In most models, that something is the null hypothesis that the behaviour
would not evolve in a freely-mixed population. But if it is a fact of life that the organisms
under consideration do not live in a freely-mixed population, then this is something
of a meaningless comparison. The evolution of cooperation shown in such models is
then simply the cooperative allele reaching its equilibrium frequency under the given
population structure. Thus, the organisms are not really becoming more cooperative,
for social behaviour is just reaching its equilibrium. But if the population structure
can itself evolve, then we can have a meaningful measure of cooperation increase. This
measure is how far the equilibrium of behaviour has moved as a result of movement
in population structure. We can therefore say that the organisms are more cooperative
relative to the original population structure that they actually used to live in, rather than
to the hypothetical freely-mixed case. In that sense, we show a meaningful evolutionary
increase in cooperation.4 Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Dening cooperation
The term \cooperation" has a variety of dierent meanings in the evolutionary biology
literature. All denitions generally agree that cooperative behaviours should have a
positive eect on the tness of recipients. A fundamental issue is then whether or not
this positive eect on the recipient comes at some cost to the actor. In this dissertation,
we mainly consider cooperative behaviours that carry a relative tness cost to the actor,
that is, they increase the tness of the recipient(s) by more than they increase the
tness of the actor. As discussed below, these traits include \public goods production",
whereby an individual provides a benet to its whole group (including itself), such as an
extracellular enzyme or an alarm call that a predator is approaching. Such public goods,
however, are typically costly for the individual to produce, and hence put the actor at a
tness disadvantage compared to non-producers in the same group. These kinds of traits
have been termed \weakly altruistic" by Wilson (1979, 1980, 1990), since the tness cost
incurred by the actor is relative to other group members, rather than absolute (i.e., the
trait may increase the absolute number of ospring of the actor, whilst increasing the
number of ospring of other group members by even more)2. The models presented in
chapters 3, 4 and 6 are all concerned with these kinds of traits that are benecial to the
whole group, but at a relative cost to the actor. In Chapter 5 we consider other forms
of social behaviour, which have also been called cooperative in the literature. In these
cases, cooperation involves coordination of behaviour in order to achieve a task that
cannot be completed alone. An example of such behaviour is \cooperative" hunting in
packs of lions (Packer and Ruttan, 1988). By contrast, the \weakly altruistic" traits
that we consider represent activities which can be done alone, but that benet other
group members.
1.1.1 Examples of cooperative behaviour: public goods and the Tragedy
of the Commons
What kinds of behaviour are cooperative, then, in the sense that they carry a tness cost
for the actor? Perhaps the pinnacle examples of behaviours that increase the immediate
tness of recipients by more than the actor are those altruistic traits that involve either
suicide or sterility on the part of the bearer. Indeed, it was the sterility of workers in
social insect colonies that rst troubled Darwin (1859). A similar sterility is also seen
in most of the cells in multicellular organisms that have a germ-soma separation (Buss,
1988; Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995), for the somatic cells (skin,liver,etc.) are
not passed on to the next generation of multicellular organisms. The suicidal sting of
2Strongly altruistic traits are those that decrease the absolute tness of the actor, whilst increasing
that of other group members. However, the distinction between strong and weak altruism is not funda-
mental if groups stay together for multiple organismic generations, since in that case both types of trait
exhibit qualitatively similar selective dynamics (Fletcher and Zwick, 2004; Fletcher et al., 2006; Fletcher
and Zwick, 2007). We discuss this point in detail in Chapter 2.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
a honey bee provides another example of altruism, and such extreme cooperative acts
as sterility and suicide has prompted some to view social insect colonies as \superor-
ganisms" (Wheeler, 1911; Wilson and Sober, 1989; H olldobler and Wilson, 2009). All
of these behaviours can benet other individuals: by foregoing longterm reproductive
prospects, somatic cells are able to specialise in maintaining the survival of the multi-
cellular organism (Michod, 1997); by attacking an intruder to the nest, a suicidal bee is
protecting his nest mates. It is also clear how all of these behaviours could be exploited
by selsh cheats: cheats would be otherwise identical organisms that did not perform
the suicidal act or that did not forego their own reproduction, but that still received the
benets from others doing so.
In this dissertation, we focus on less extreme behaviours than sterility and suicide,
for these are at the end of a tness cost-to-self versus tness benet-to-others scale
of cooperativeness. One example of the kind of cooperation that we consider is an
organism's resource exploitation strategy. In particular, we consider cases where there
exists a trade-o between growth rate and yield, i.e., the faster an organism consumes
a resource, the lower the biomass produced per unit consumed. Such a scenario is more
generally a case of the \Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin, 1968; Rankin et al., 2007), or
the problem of prudent predation (Slobodkin, 1964; Gilpin, 1975). This is because it is of
immediate benet to the individual to grow as fast as possible, and hence to consume the
resource as fast as possible. Doing so, however, decreases yield such that the organism,
and all others sharing the same resource, are worse o in the long term. Decreasing
consumption rate would increase the total amount of biomass that the resource could
support, but would require an organism to grow at a slower rate, which would put it at a
tness disadvantage compared to unrestrained resource users. In other words, although
restrained resource usage is the optimal outcome for both the group, and the individual
in the long term, it can be hard to see how unrestrained users can be kept in check,
since they enjoy a local competitive advantage. It then follows that unrestrained users
can be seen as \selsh", because they maximise their own short-term benet to the
detriment of the long-term well-being of the group, while restrained users can be seen as
\cooperative", because they forgo this immediate short-term benet in order to provide
more resource for the group as a whole.
Under the classical model of natural selection in a freely-mixed population (Fisher, 1930;
Haldane, 1932) selsh individuals must win out, for natural selection is sensitive only
to immediate benets - it does not have \foresight" and so cannot be sensitive to the
long-term benets of eciency (Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976). Examples of where
such resource utilisation trade-os occur in nature include the virulence with which
parasites attack their hosts (Bull et al., 1991; Williams and Nesse, 1991; Frank, 1996;
Kerr et al., 2006), competition for water amongst plants (Zea-Cabrera et al., 2006), and
the opportunity for production of adenosine triphosphate in heterotrophic organisms
(Pfeier et al., 2001; Kreft, 2004; MacLean, 2008) through either respiration alone (slow6 Chapter 1 Introduction
but ecient), or through fermentation in addition to respiration (fast but inecient).
In all of these cases, short-term individual interests clash with the long-term interests
of the group.
Another example of cooperative behaviours considered here concerns the production of
public goods, that is, benecial products that are manufactured by one individual but
that are shared with all those nearby. For example, bacteria need iron to be able to grow,
and in harsh environments they can sequester iron by producing scavenging molecules
known as siderophores, that bind to iron and assist with its uptake (West and Buck-
ling, 2003; Varma and Chincholkar, 2007). These siderophores are costly to produce,
in terms of time and energy, yet are external substances that can be used by not just
the producers, but by all bacteria that are nearby. As a result, a selection pressure for
cheating behaviour exists, whereby individuals simply make use of the siderophores pro-
vided by their neighbours, without themselves incurring the metabolic costs (Buckling
et al., 2007). Such cheats are therefore tter than producers in the same locality, even
though the whole group will do better the more producers are present (Grin et al.,
2004). Cooperation (producing) might therefore again be expected to break down in
face of the immediate individual benets of selsh behaviours.
It should be noted that public goods do not have to be physical substances, as in this
example; they could be information. For example, in schools of guppy sh, one guppy
will often swim up to and inspect a potential predator, and in so doing warn the whole
school of danger (Dugatkin, 1990); similar behaviour can also be found in ocks of birds
(Charnov and Krebs, 1975). There is, however, a crucial dierence between sharing in-
formation and sharing physical substances such as food. This is that when an individual
shares a physical substance, it loses precisely the amount that it shares. By contrast
when an individual shares information, such as the location of a predator, that informa-
tion does not immediately loose value to the sharer (Lachmann et al., 2000). That is,
the per capita value of information does not decrease as the number of individuals it is
shared with increases, in the way that the value of a physical substance does. Thus, we
might expect the selective dynamics of information sharing within groups to be dier-
ent from the dynamics of sharing physical substances. Indeed, Lachmann et al. (2000)
suggest that the evolution of mechanisms for sharing information could drive the evolu-
tion of dierentiation and specialisation during the creation of new levels of biological
organisation, such as multicellular organisms and eusocial insect colonies.
A resource consumption strategy might at rst sight seem to be a quite dierent problem
to that of public goods production. However, the scenarios are in fact equivalent from
the point of view of social evolution theory. Specically, both types involve public goods:
the rst type involves their exploitation, the second their production. Likewise, both
scenarios can lead to a Tragedy of the Commons: in the rst case, the resource becomes
overexploited and its benet declines, in the second case, the manufactured public good
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selsh non-producers. Also common is the fact a cooperative act by one individual is
assumed to benet the whole group, for the group is nearly always dened in social
evolution models as the set of individuals that share the public good. Finally, in both
cases, the actor also receives some benet from its action; these are what Pepper (2000)
has called \whole-group traits".
1.1.2 An evolutionary game theory perspective
The types of cooperation discussed above create a social dilemma that can be concep-
tualised by a payo matrix. Such a matrix considers the interaction between a pair of
individuals, and shows the tness modier that an individual will receive based on its
own social strategy (cooperative or selsh) and that of its partner. The public goods
scenarios that we have described above can be modelled using the payo matrix shown
in Table 1.1. In this matrix, b represents the benet of cooperating, and c the cost. The
equilibrium frequency of behaviours that will be reached depends upon the relationship
between b and c. If 0:5 < b=c < 1 then the game is a Prisoner's Dilemma (Doebeli and
Hauert, 2005). This means that in a freely-mixed population, where individuals interact
randomly, then the equilibrium is every individual adopting selsh behaviour. On the
other hand, if b=c > 1 then the social interaction is a Snowdrift game (Sugden, 1986;
Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). In that case, some stable ratio of cooperative and selsh
individuals is reached at equilibrium in a freely-mixed population. The public goods sce-
narios that we have discussed can take either of these forms. Which they take depends
on whether or not there is some unilateral benet to the individual for cooperating,
rather than all of the benet being shared equally with others. If there is some direct
benet then public goods production or utilisation is a Snowdrift game, if not then it
is a Prisoner's Dilemma. It should be stressed, though, that the Snowdrift game still
represents a social dilemma (Sugden, 1986; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005), since the level
of cooperation that is reached is still suboptimal in terms of mean tness.
Table 1.1: A payo matrix for social interactions (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005).
Cooperate Selsh
Payo to Cooperate b   c=2 b   c
Payo to Selsh b 0
A crucial assumption of the game theoretic approach is that it considers interactions in
the population to be freely-mixed, as if the population was continuously being stirred
so that who an individual interacts with at each time step is completely random, and
not inuenced by population structure. That is, the population is assumed to be un-
structured with respect to social interactions. However, many social interactions will
take place in groups that represent a subset of the population (Wilson, 1975a, 1980).
We discuss in the next section how such interaction structure can allow greater levels of
cooperation to evolve. In Chapter 5 we discuss the appropriateness of di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game for modelling dierent kinds of ecological interaction, and for modelling the tran-
sitions to new levels of organisation in the biological hierarchy. We then demonstrate
that the type of game aects the ecacy of the population structure-modifying process
that we show in this dissertation to be an explanation for the origin of cooperation.
1.2 What is already known about how cooperation can
evolve?
Much theoretical work in the last half century has examined how cooperative behaviours
can evolve and be maintained in a population, despite their apparent individual cost
(Hamilton, 1964a,b; Trivers, 1971; Wilson, 1975b,a; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; May-
nard Smith, 1982; Frank, 1998; Hammerstein, 2003; Lehmann and Keller, 2006; West
et al., 2007b; Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009). This work has shown that the answer lies
in interaction structure3. Specically, the population must be structured such that co-
operative individuals tend to interact more frequently with each other than they would
under free-mixing conditions. When this happens, the benets of cooperation fall prefer-
entially on other cooperators, and exploitation by cheating individuals is reduced. This
can make cooperation the tter behaviour, since cooperators enjoy the majority of the
tness benets of cooperative behaviour, while cheats mainly interact with each other
and hence forego this benet. It can, therefore, be individually advantageous to coop-
erate, if doing so means that you will receive more of the benets of others' cooperation
yourself.
A vast body of literature (reviewed in Chapter 2) has explored the kinds of population
that can give rise to such an interaction structure. The crucial aspects of population
structure are those that aect an organism's interaction group { the subset of the popu-
lation in which social interactions take place (Hamilton, 1975; Wilson, 1975a). Examples
of aspects aecting cooperation include group size (Wilson and Colwell, 1981; Wilson,
1983a; Avil es, 1993, 2002), the degree of kinship between the interacting individuals
(Hamilton, 1964a; Maynard Smith, 1964), and how frequently individuals disperse and
interact with others outside of their local group (Taylor, 1992; West et al., 2002). All of
these factors, and others, inuence the degree to which the benets of cooperation fall
upon other cooperators.
Figure 1.1 shows an example population structure that makes cooperation advantageous,
even when selsh cheats are present and can exploit cooperation. Individuals form
groups and reproduce within them for a number of generations, t. Individuals then
disperse from their groups, and mix freely in a migrant pool before founding the next
generation of groups. Within groups, social interactions take place and aect individual
tness. Cooperative individuals can be exploited by selsh cheats within their group.
3This term is used by Michod and Sanderson (1985)Chapter 1 Introduction 9
Thus, within each group, the proportion of cooperative individuals declines. However,
after t generations the groups that were founded by a greater proportion of cooperators
have grown to a larger size. Because of this dierential group growth, cooperation can
potentially increase in frequency globally when the groups are mixed and reformed. This
is an instance of the statistical phenomenon known as Simpson's Paradox (Simpson,
1951), since the local decline in frequency of cooperators within each group does not
preclude their global increase in frequency, since dierential group productivity also has
an eect (Sober and Wilson, 1998). The fact that the mechanism relies on dierential
group productivity means that it can be viewed as a process of natural selection acting
between groups, i.e., group selection.
Crucial to this process is the presence of between-group variance: the groups must dier
in their proportion of cooperators if some are to grow to a larger size than others, and
hence if Simpson's Paradox is to operate (Sober and Wilson, 1998). Any mechanism that
increases between-group variance will be more favourable to the evolution of cooperation
(Wilson, 1975a; Hamilton, 1975). One such mechanism is kinship, for if the groups are
composed of genealogical kin then they will tend to be more homogeneous, so group
members will tend to be more similar to each other, but less like those from other
groups (Hamilton, 1964a,b, 1975; Wade, 1980).
The particular population structure in Figure 1.1 is based on the classic \Haystack"
model proposed by Maynard Smith (1964), and subsequently developed further by Wil-
son and Colwell (1981), Wilson (1987), and Sober and Wilson (1998). Such models are
framed in terms of organisms that live on an ephemeral resource patch for a number of
generations, before resource depletion triggers the dispersal stage and global mixing. It
is often regarded as a classic example of a group selection model (Sober and Wilson,
1998). This population structure forms the basis of the models in this dissertation, and
is discussed further in Chapter 3.
Population structuring, then, can allow cooperation to evolve. But we also need to
understand how, exactly, to formulate the role of this structure in terms of a process
of natural selection, for two reasons. The rst is that from a pragmatic point of view,
we need to know how to incorporate population structure into models of natural se-
lection. For example if a population is subdivided into groups, how do we incorporate
the eects of this group structure into the equations describing the dynamics of overall
gene frequency change? The second reason is that how we describe the role of popula-
tion structuring is fundamental to how we understand the process of natural selection
itself. If, for example, a cooperative behaviour that benets a whole group evolves, do
we say this is an adaptation of the individuals, or of the group? Likewise, if that trait
evolved because some groups had a greater proportion of cooperative individuals than
others, did it evolve by selection at the level of the group, the individual, or even the
gene? These issues have been much debated in both the biological literature (Williams,
1966; Dawkins, 1976; Wilson, 1975a, 1980; Hamilton, 1964a, 1975; Maynard Smith, 1987;10 Chapter 1 Introduction
3. Reproduction and selection within groups for
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t
2. Group formation (aggregation)
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4. Increased growth of groups founded by a greater
proportion of cooperators can outweigh selection against
cooperation each group, causing a global increase
in cooperation in the new migrant pool.
within
Cooperative Selfish
Figure 1.1: Cooperation can increase in frequency in the migrant pool due to
dierential group contributions, even though it decreases in frequency within
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West et al., 2007a) and the philosophical literature (Sober, 1984; Sterelny and Kitcher,
1988; Sterelny, 1996; Okasha, 2006), for many authors prefer to see natural selection
acting only at the individual or genic level, while others are happy to ascribe processes
of selection and adaptation to whole groups. This has led to dierent kinds of model,
for example kin or group selection, providing dierent accounts of the role of the same
population structure in selection. We address this issue in detail in Chapter 2, where we
aim to resolve misunderstandings that are present in the literature, and argue that social
niche construction helps to bridge the gap between group- and individual- selection.
1.2.1 The problem with our current understanding of how cooperation
evolves
A plethora of models have shown the precise eects of various population structures
on the evolution of cooperation (Williams and Williams, 1957; Hamilton, 1972, 1975;
Wilson, 1975a, 1980, 1987, 1992; Wilson et al., 1992; Bull et al., 1991; Goodnight, 1992;
Nowak and May, 1992; Doebeli et al., 2004; Fletcher and Zwick, 2004; Kreft, 2004; Peck,
2004; Kerr et al., 2006; Ross-Gillespie et al., 2007; Pepper, 2007). This means that for
a given population structure, we can use this theory to predict how much cooperation
can be supported. What these models can say very little about, however, is the origin
of cooperation. That is, why is the population structured in such a way that selects
for x amount of cooperation, rather than in a way that selects for y amount? If the
structure was just a part of the selective environment, and could not change, then this
would not matter. This is the simplifying assumption that most models of the evolution
of cooperation make. However in reality population structure can evolve, for it is the
product not only of environmental conditions, but also of individual behaviours. Many
of these behaviours that aect population structure have a genetic basis, and so are
themselves subject to natural selection. That this is the case is uncontroversial amongst
evolutionary biologists, for the evolution of aspects such as the mating system (Orians,
1969; Emlen and Oring, 1977), group size (Rodman, 1981; Koenig, 1981), and dispersal
rate (Johnson and Gaines, 1990) have all been considered. Despite this, however, there
have been very few treatments that consider how their evolution is aected by selection
pressures on (individually-costly) cooperative behaviour. A very small number of works
do consider this in specic cases, for example, Peck and Feldman (1988),Breden and
Wade (1991), and Avil es (2002). Here we generalise such works, and show how the
creation of selection pressures on social behaviour is a fundamental and overlooked
driving force in the evolution of population structure.12 Chapter 1 Introduction
1.3 Cooperative behaviour originates from social niche con-
struction
We develop here a theory that explains why organisms live in a social environment
that supports a certain level of cooperation. To do so, we consider the joint equilib-
rium of population structure and social behaviour, by allowing both to be inuenced by
heritable genetic traits and hence to evolve in an adaptive manner. It is well appreci-
ated that genetic traits can aect the pertinent aspects of population structure, just as
other genetic traits can aect social behaviour. Examples of genetic traits that modify
population structure include those aecting group size (McCauley, 1994), the degree
of kin discrimination in social interactions (Grin and West, 2003), and the dispersal
rate (Olivieri et al., 1995). Such traits exist across all taxa; for example, bacteria in
a biolm may be able to inuence the size of their micro-colony through the amount
of extracellular polymeric substances that they secrete (Flemming et al., 2007), plants
can evolve the dispersal distance of their seeds (Levin et al., 2003), and some sh can
choose with whom they interact with respect to certain social behaviours such as for-
aging or predator avoidance (Dugatkin and Wilson, 1993; Griths, 2003). Moreover,
such changes in population structure directly aect the selection pressures on social be-
haviour that their bearers experience. For example, the creation of a cell membrane
by the early replicators locked them into a group selection process that selected against
competitive exclusion, and allowed for coexistence of dierent types, as shown in the
Stochastic Corrector model (Szathm ary and Demeter, 1987). Likewise, the evolution of
vertical transmission of symbionts, as in eukaryotic cells and their organells (Margulis,
1970), selects for cooperation between host and symbiont.
Niche construction is a term for the process by which individuals modify their envi-
ronment, and in so doing change the selection pressures that they experience on other
traits (Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Laland and Sterelny, 2006). In this way organisms can
actively create their own selection pressures (Lewontin, 1982, 1983), rather than simply
being the passive recipients of those brought about by environmental conditions. We
argue here that a type of niche construction process can operate on population struc-
ture, whereby the evolving individuals create the conditions for more or less cooperation.
Most models of social evolution assume that the population structure of the evolving
organisms is a static aspect of the environment, but the niche construction paradigm
suggests that this can in fact change, and will do so in an adaptive manner. That is,
organisms create their own social niches in which either cooperation or selshness thrive.
This concept of social niche construction is illustrated in Box 1.1. Conventional models
of social evolution show the equilibrium frequency of cooperation that is reached under
a given population structure. But given that population structure can itself evolve, the
fundamental question is: what is the equilibrium that is reached in the combined space of
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structure that creates a certain equilibrium frequency of cooperation. Classical models
do not consider this, for they make a simplifying assumption which amounts to saying
that the structural equilibrium is provided by at, and not in any way aected by the
opportunity for more or less cooperation to evolve. Thus, these models provide an
unsatisfactory explanation for the true origin of cooperation, as they cannot explain
why organisms live in a structure that supports a certain amount of social behaviour.
It should be noted that the term \social niche construction" has also been used in a
more limited sense to refer to the construction of social networks by evolving individuals,
particularly in humans and primates (see, for example, Flack et al. 2006). This work
typically assumes cognitive abilities on the parts of the organisms, and considers how
direct relationships between individuals can evolve. However we argue that in general,
social niche construction can be much simpler, and does not require cognitive abilities.
Rather, it just requires that organisms can modify their population structure, which
applies even at the origins of life, for example, with the creation of a cell membrane
by the early replicators (Szathm ary, 1999). Thus, organisms aecting their social niche
can be a much more general dynamic than studies focussing on higher organisms have
suggested.
We demonstrate here that social niche construction can drive the evolution of cooper-
ation and explain its origin. Specically, we show that organisms will actively modify
their population structure to create social selection pressures favouring greater cooper-
ation. Furthermore, we will argue that the direction of any component of selection on
population structure, that is due to social behaviour, must be towards a structure that
supports cooperation, rather than selshness.
Niche construction = organisms modify their environment and hence the selection
pressures they and future generations experience.
+
Social evolution = the evolution of cooperative or selsh behaviours as determined by
the population structure.
Social niche construction = Organisms modify their population structure and hence
the selection pressures they and future generations experience on the evolution of social
traits.
Box 1.1: Social niche construction explains the equilibrium of structure and
social behaviour that a population reaches.
We illustrate this argument by constructing a model for the origin of both coopera-
tion, and the population structures that support it. One trait in our model controls
social behaviour (where we take a social trait to mean behaving either cooperatively or
selshly towards other group members) as in conventional models of social evolution,
while another inuences an aspect of population structure, such as the initial size of the
bearer's group. In this model we have shown how a population can start out with either
no or little cooperation between its members at the initial behavioural equilibrium, but14 Chapter 1 Introduction
can, through the evolution of population structure, end up in an equilibrium state where
cooperation dominates.
It should be noted that whilst we consider two separate traits, one of which aects
social behaviour and the other population structure, it is the case that the same trait
could aect both of these. For example, extracellular matrix production by bacteria in
a biolm aects population structure, but is also a social trait since the extracellular
matrix is a public good that is costly to produce. Thus, although we consider separate
traits to illustrate our argument, the consideration of single traits that aect both social
behaviour and population structure is an important avenue for future research.
1.4 Claims of the thesis
In this dissertation, we provide evidence for the following claims:
 We show that social behaviour can exert selection pressure on population structure-
modifying traits, causing individuals to adaptively modify their population struc-
ture to support greater cooperation. We investigate conditions under which this
occurs, and nd the dynamic to operate from a much larger range of initial con-
ditions when selection on a socio-behavioural trait supports a protected polymor-
phism of behaviours, as in the Snowdrift game.
 Any component of selection on structure-modifying traits that is due to social
behaviour must be in the direction of increased cooperation, rather than increased
selshness.
1.5 Logical argument for social niche construction
The logical argument in Box 1.2 shows that any component of selection on popula-
tion structure due to social behaviour must be in the direction of that which supports
increased cooperation.
Our argument states that if individuals have a trait that causes them to preferentially live
in a certain structure, and that structure exerts a dierent selection pressure on social
behaviour, then linkage disequilibrium must evolve between the socio-behavioural and
population structuring-traits. The mean tness of individuals in a structure that selects
for cooperation will be greater, all other factors being equal, and this direct selection
on social behaviour drives indirect selection on the structure-modifying trait. Thus, if
structure A creates selection pressures on social behaviour favouring more cooperation,
and structure B creates selection pressures favouring more sel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Denition Cooperation increases the mean tness of population members (Wilson,
1975a; Dawes, 1980).
Premises
1. Population structure aects selection pressure on social behaviour, as proved by
Hamilton (1964a, 1975) and Price (1972).
2. Structure A selects for greater cooperation, structure B for greater selsh be-
haviour (made logically possible by premise 1).
3. Individuals have a heritable trait that produces population structure A or B.
Individuals also posses a heritable social behaviour (cooperative or selsh).
Assumption Individuals with trait A tend to nd themselves in structure A more
frequently than individuals that do not posses the trait. Likewise with trait and structure
B.
Argument
1. Linkage disequilibrium evolves between behavioural and structural traits, since
the cooperative trait increases in frequency more in structure A than structure
B (premise 2), and the individuals in structure A are more likely to have the
A structural trait (due to the assumption above). Conversely, the selsh trait
increases in frequency more in structure B by the same logic.
2. Since by denition cooperation increases mean tness, and cooperation has become
linked with the A structural trait, individuals with the A structural trait have the
component of their tness that is due to social behaviour (i.e., tness aects from
interactions with others) increased, on average, compared to individuals with the
B trait.
Box 1.2: Logical argument that any component of selection pressure on popula-
tion structure, that exists due to social behaviour, must be towards a structure
that increases cooperation.
component of individual tness that comes from social behaviour will be increased by
more in the individuals that live in structure A. If these are the same individuals that
have the A structure-creating trait (assumption in Box 1.2), then that structure-creating
trait will be tter than its rival allele, assuming all other selective forces remain the same
across both structures.
This argument relies on the assumption in Box 1.2, that individuals with trait A tend
to nd themselves in structure A more frequently than individuals that do not posses
the trait. Without this assumption, linkage disequilibrium would not be generated
between the socio-behavioural and structure-modifying traits. This is because although
individuals that happened to live in structure A would be tter, due to enjoying a greater
frequency of cooperation, this increase in tness would not be linked with the A trait,
but would fall upon both structure-modifying traits equally. Essentially, there needs
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the B trait. This then entails assortativity on the structure-modifying trait, such that
individuals with a particular structural trait tend to be segregated to some degree from
the rest of the population. This can clearly occur if individuals actively modify their own
structure, for example, by changing their habitat preference. What happens, however,
if the trait changes the structure of other individuals, but does not aect the structure
of self? A structure dierential would still be created in this case, and the A trait would
still be selectively advantageous if it made other individuals less cooperative. That
is, what matters is the frequency of cooperation experienced by bearers of the A trait
relative to non-bearers. So any trait that increases the relative frequency of cooperation
in its bearers will be favoured by a component of selection, even if that relative increase
is achieved by decreasing the level of cooperation in non-bearers. On the other hand,
if the trait made other individuals live in a structure that was more cooperative, then
it would be selected against, because it would increase the tness of non-bearers. A
component of selection on a structure-modifying trait, that is due to social behaviour,
must therefore increase the level of cooperation in its bearers relative to non-bearers.
The fact that there is a dierential in cooperation between bearers and non-bearers
of the structure-modifying trait allows linkage disequilibrium to evolve, and hence the
structure-modifying trait to be selectively advantageous due to it becoming linked with
relatively more cooperation.
The evolution of population structures that support cooperation by this mechanism
takes the form of a positive feedback process between selection for cooperation, and
selection for the structure that supports cooperation. Specically, if greater cooperation
is selected for in a structure, then the individuals that have a trait which creates that
structure have a component of their tness increased. Thus, that structure-creating
trait increases in frequency in the population, so that even more individuals will then
create and live in the structure, which in turn selects for even more cooperation globally.
Hence, cooperation selects for the population structures that support it, and selection
for these structures creates a selective environment that favours even more cooperation.
A similar positive feedback argument was made by Breden and Wade (1991) for the
specic case of inbreeding evolving concurrently with cooperation. They termed such a
positive feedback process \Runaway Social Selection". Our thesis builds on such work
by constructing a general logical argument that is not specic to mating structure,
and investigating the eects of other (direct) components of selection on structuring
traits that can oppose those due to social behaviour. We thus generalise works such
as this and Peck and Feldman (1988), which considered the concurrent evolution of
monogamy of social behaviour, and draw out the general implications of such processes
for social evolution through our social niche construction hypothesis. In particular,
it is argued here that such processes are fundamental to explaining the evolutionary
origin of cooperation, and in providing an adaptive explanation for the creation of new
levels of individuality, as in the major transitions to new levels of biological organisation
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1.6 What are the factors aecting whether social niche
construction will occur?
The logical argument presented above will hold if the premises are true. The rst of these,
that population structure aects selection pressure on social behaviour, has been proved
by Hamilton (1964a) and Price (1972). We argue that the third, that individuals posses
heritable traits aecting population structure, is also likely to hold in most organisms
across all taxa, as discussed in Section 1.3. The remaining premise in the social niche
construction argument is that structure A induces selection for greater cooperation, and
structure B conversely selects for greater selsh behaviour. If new structures arise as a
result of mutations, then structure B could just be the current structure, which selects
for greater selshness relative to the new mutant structure. For structure A to select for
greater cooperation, it must increase the assortment of cooperators (Hamilton, 1964a), or
equivalently, the between-group variance in social behaviour (Wilson, 1975a; Hamilton,
1975), by a sucient amount to change the selection pressure on the socio-behavioural
trait. If the new structure arises by genetic mutation, the dierence between it and
the current structure can be expected to be small. Thus, in order for the premise to
be satised, a small change in structure needs to increase between-group variance by
a sucient amount for greater cooperation to be selected for. We have investigated in
detail one factor that aects this, which is whether a polymorphism of social behaviours
is supported within groups, as in the Snowdrift game. It is shown here in chapters 4 and
5 that such a polymorphism, as can result from negative frequency-dependent selection
on social behaviour, greatly increases the range of conditions over which a small change
in structure increases cooperation. Essentially, this is because the amount of between-
group variance that is possible depends on the frequency of the least common type in
the population (Wilson, 1980, 1983a), and this can tend to zero over a large range of
parameter space under directional selection. If there is a polymorphism of behaviours,
however, then the possibility of between-group variance being generated is preserved, so
a small change in structure can lead to an increase (Powers et al., 2008).
Our logical argument concludes that any component of selection on population structure
due to social behaviour must be in the direction of increased cooperation. There can,
however, be other components of selection on structural traits that are in opposition to
this. The direction in which population structure evolves, if at all, then depends on the
balance of these dierent forces. We investigate this by, as an example, modelling the
concurrent evolution of initial group size preference and social behaviour, as described in
chapters 3 and 6. In these models, smaller initial group size supports greater cooperation,
through greater between-group variance, but a larger initial group size provides intrinsic
benets due to an Allee eect (Allee, 1938; Avil es, 1999).18 Chapter 1 Introduction
1.7 Original contributions presented in this dissertation
The broad original contributions produced in the development of the thesis are as follows:
 The argument that social niche construction provides an explanation for the origin
of cooperation, by showing how the population structures that select for coopera-
tion evolve as a result of individual adaptation.
 The argument that any component of selection on population structure-modifying
traits, that is due to social behaviour, must be in the direction of a structure that
selects for greater cooperation.
 The argument that social niche construction can help to resolve the tension that
exists between group- and individual- selectionists in the social evolution literature.
Individualists often see group selection as just a case of individuals adapting their
social behaviour to the group structure that they nd themselves in. That is, the
groups are treated as part of the context for individual selection, like any other
environmental factor. However, when individuals can modify their group structure,
this changes the selection pressures they experience on social behaviour. In that
case, we cannot view group selection as just individuals adapting their behaviour
to their social environment.
 An examination of the conditions under which selection on population structure-
modifying traits, due to social behaviour, occurs. If social niche construction is
to occur by small mutations on structure-modifying traits, then a small change
in population structure must result in an increase in between-group variance. We
show that this occurs from a much larger range of initial conditions where a pro-
tected polymorphism of social behaviours occurs within groups, for example, as a
result of negative frequency-dependent selection.
 The argument that social niche construction can help to provide a systematic
adaptive explanation for some of the major transitions in evolution.
 A new understanding of the importance and role of dierent types of evolutionary
games when considering social evolution in general, and the major transitions in
particular.
The following original contributions were also developed during the supporting modelling
work:
 Demonstration that when social behaviour and population structure-modifying
traits are concurrently subject to selection, non-monotonic dynamics on the al-
lele frequencies of both traits can arise. In particular, selsh behaviour, and theChapter 1 Introduction 19
structure-modifying traits that support it, can initially increase in frequency, yet
cooperative behaviour and its supporting structure can eventually x in the pop-
ulation.
 The understanding that where within-group selection supports a polymorphism of
behaviours (e.g., due to negative frequency-dependent selection), then some eect
of group selection can be seen over a much larger range of parameters. We nd
that this also holds even under assortative group formation, hence is relevant to
traditional kin selection models.
 A model comparing the ecacy of group selection when cooperation takes the
form of a Snowdrift rather than Prisoner's Dilemma game, illustrating the above
understanding.
1.8 Published research contributions
The following rst author publications have been produced during the period of candi-
dature:
 Powers, S. T., Penn, A. S., and Watson, R. A. (2007). Individual selection for
cooperative group formation. In Almeida e Costa, F., Rocha, L. M., Costa, E.,
Harvey, I., and Coutinho, A., editors, Advances in Articial Life: Proceedings of
the 9th European Conference on Articial Life, volume 4648/2007 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 585594. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
 Powers, S. T. and Watson, R. A. (2007). Preliminary investigations into the evolu-
tion of cooperative strategies in a minimally spatial model (poster). In Proceedings
of the 9th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation, page 343.
ACM Press.
 Powers, S. T. and Watson, R. A. (2007). Investigating the evolution of cooperative
behaviour in a minimally spatial model. In Almeida e Costa, F., Rocha, L. M.,
Costa, E., Harvey, I., and Coutinho, A., editors, Advances in Articial Life: Pro-
ceedings of the 9th European Conference on Articial Life, volume 4648/2007 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 605614. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
 Powers, S. T., Penn, A. S., and Watson, R. A. (2008). The ecacy of group
selection is increased by coexistence dynamics within groups. In Bullock, S., No-
ble, J., Watson, R., and Bedau, M. A., editors, Articial Life XI: Proceedings of
the Eleventh International Conference on the Simulation and Synthesis of Living
Systems, pages 498505, Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.20 Chapter 1 Introduction
 Powers, S. T. and Watson, R. A. (2008). The group selection debate and ALife:
Weak altruism, strong altruism, and inclusive tness (abstract). In Bullock, S.,
Noble, J., Watson, R., and Bedau, M. A., editors, Articial Life XI: Proceedings of
the Eleventh International Conference on the Simulation and Synthesis of Living
Systems, page 796, Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.
 Powers, S. T. and Watson, R. A. (2009). Evolution of individual group size prefer-
ences can increase group-level selection and cooperation. In Advances in Articial
Life: Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Articial Life, volume 5777,
5778 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
 Powers, S. T., Mills, R., Penn, A. S., and Watson, R. A. (2009). Social environment
construction provides an adaptive explanation for new levels of individuality. In
Proceedings of the ECAL 2009 Workshop on Levels of Selection and Individuality
in Evolution: Conceptual Issues and the Role of Articial Life Models.
 Powers, S. T., Penn, A. S., and Watson, R. A. (in prep.). The concurrent evolution
of cooperation and the population structures that support it.
The following contributing author publications were also produced:
 Penn, A. S., Powers, S. T., Conibear, T., Kraaijeveld, A., Watson, R., Bigg, Z.
and Webb, J. (2008). Co-operation and Group structure in Bacterial Biolms. In:
Society for General Microbiology, Autumn meeting. Trinity College, Dublin.
 Watson, R. A., Mills, R., Penn, A. S. and Powers, S. T. (2008) Can individual
selection favour signicant higher-level selection? (abstract). In Bullock, S., No-
ble, J., Watson, R., and Bedau, M. A., editors, Articial Life XI: Proceedings of
the Eleventh International Conference on the Simulation and Synthesis of Living
Systems, page 818, Cambridge, MA. MIT Press.
 Penn, A. S., Watson, R., Powers, S. T., Webb, J., Kraaijeveld, A., Conibear, T.
and Bigg, Z. (2008). Mechanisms for the initiation of multicellularity in bacterial
biolms (abstract). In Bullock, S., Noble, J., Watson, R., and Bedau, M. A.,
editors, Articial Life XI: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference
on the Simulation and Synthesis of Living Systems, page 794, Cambridge, MA.
MIT Press.
 Snowdon, J. R., Powers, S. T. and Watson, R. A. (2009). Moderate contact
between sub-populations promotes evolved assortativity enabling group selection.
In Advances in Articial Life: Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on
Articial Life, volume 5777, 5778 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg.Chapter 1 Introduction 21
 Watson, R. A., Palmius, N., Mills, R., Powers, S. T. and Penn, A. S. (2009). Can
Selsh Symbioses Eect Higher-level Selection?. In Advances in Articial Life:
Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Articial Life, volume 5777, 5778
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
1.9 The implications of the thesis for our understanding
of cooperation and group selection
It is already widely appreciated that it can, in certain situations, be individually advan-
tageous for an organism to cooperate, even if this comes at an apparent direct tness
cost. What has largely been left unaddressed, however, is why such situations exist in
nature. One answer is that they come purely from the environment, and hence do not
need an evolutionary explanation. We would argue that this is an implicit assumption
in most social evolution models, for aspects of population structure that directly aect
social evolution are assumed to be static. However given that organisms can modify
their environment, then surely we should consider evolution operating on environment
as well as behaviour. Using the arguments developed here, we can explain how organ-
isms come to nd themselves in a situation where it pays to cooperate: they create the
conditions favouring increased cooperation themselves, because this increases their t-
ness compared to individuals that do not create those conditions. Our argument implies
that feedback between environment and behaviour can be a fundamental driver in social
evolution, which we have demonstrated in a model of the concurrent evolution of initial
group size and social behaviour.
The argument that we develop is fully compatible with the \selsh gene" view of evolu-
tion (Dawkins, 1976). This is because at all times in our argument, population structure
changes because the individuals who change it are tter than those that do not, hence
the allele for changing the structure is tter in the population. Thus, we can provide a
systematic account fully compatible with natural selection. However, the fact that we
show how organisms themselves create the conditions for cooperation casts new light
on what we really mean by \cooperation" and \selshness". In particular, what is the
cooperation relative to? When the environment is xed, the individuals are simply do-
ing the social behaviour that increases their tness in that particular environment. It
is thus hard to see such behaviours as anything but selsh, regardless of whether they
end up also helping others. One only labels behaviours as cooperative in this context
because they help others more than they would do so in a freely-mixed population. But,
this freely-mixed situation is entirely hypothetical. The reality is that individuals live
in a certain population structure and selshly help each other more or less depending
on how much population structure there is.22 Chapter 1 Introduction
To illustrate this, consider a typical model for the evolution of social behaviour in a
structured population, such as that introduced previously in Figure 1.1. In such models,
the authors show conditions under which a rare mutant cooperative allele can increase
in frequency. The conclusion is then that they have shown the evolution of cooperative
behaviour. However, they have not shown an increase in equilibrium cooperation, be-
cause the frequency at which they started out the cooperative allele was never stable
under selection in that population. Rather, the models typically start out close to the
frequency that would be stable in a hypothetical freely-mixed population (i.e., close to
zero). Thus any evolution of cooperation in such a model is relative only to that which
would occur in a hypothetical world. In particular, the cooperative allele is started out
of equilibrium for the population structure that is present.
When we consider that the population structure can itself evolve, however, then matters
are dierent. This is because we do then have a meaningful baseline case to compare
the level of cooperation that the population evolves to - it is the initial population struc-
ture that previous generations of the organisms actually did live in. Thus, we are not
comparing the degree of cooperation present in the current population structure with
a hypothetical case, we can compare it with the equilibrium level of cooperation in the
structures that the organisms used to live in. We therefore have an actual initial level
of cooperation to compare any subsequent evolution to. In that sense, we can say that
organisms are evolving to become more cooperative, rather than just adapting to their
current environment, for we start the cooperative allele in equilibrium for the current
environment. Of course, when organisms create the conditions for greater cooperation,
they are doing so because it selshly increases their (or their genes) tness. But, when
considering social behaviour, we can see a meaningful increase in cooperation because
the equilibrium frequency of cooperation changes over time. Thus, the evolution of coop-
eration is not just a cooperative allele reaching its equilibrium frequency, as in standard
models. Rather, we show how feedback between changes in environment and changes
in social behaviour move the equilibrium. This can, of course, be viewed as population
structure being started out of equilibrium, and social behaviour and population struc-
ture then moving to their joint equilibrium. However, while the vast majority of models
assume that structure starts in equilibrium, our thesis explains how this equilibrium
is reached by individual adaptation. We are thus able to address a question that most
models cannot: how do the conditions that support cooperation arise? Whereas previous
approaches view the origin of cooperation as a mutant cooperative allele being selected
for, we argue that the only satisfactory explanation for the origin of cooperation is one
that explains the evolution of an interaction group structure that selects for cooperative
behaviour.
This argument bears on the role of groups in group selection and kin selection models.
In models where the group structure does not itself evolve, it is easy to sideline the
role of groups. In particular, it is easy to treat groups as just part of the context inChapter 1 Introduction 23
which individual selection occurs (Dugatkin and Reeve, 1994; Sterelny, 1996; Kerr and
Godfrey-Smith, 2002), since the individuals are just adapting their behaviour to the
group structure that exists, why invoke notions of group selection? The philosophy of
individualists (e.g. Foster et al. 2006a; West et al. 2007a, 2008) is implicitly that it is
a fact of life that some organisms live in groups, and that they adapt their behaviour
accordingly in order to selshly increase their individual tness. For example, inclusive
tness equations (Hamilton, 1964a) recognise group structure, but the groups are only
implicitly dened by the coecient of relatedness between actor and recipient of coop-
eration. But when considering the creation of this group structure, it is not so easy
to sideline the role of groups in the selective process. If the organisms are themselves
creating the groups then surely the groups cannot be seen as just part of the selective
context, for that context is itself changing in an adaptive manner. Nearly all group se-
lection models just consider how social behaviour adapts to the current group structure.
That is, they show how an equilibrium frequency of a social allele, under the selection
pressure from the current group structure, is reached. By contrast, in this dissertation
we show how a group-level selection pressure on social behaviour is created, making any
explanation that views groups as being something that organisms merely adapt their
social behaviour to much less satisfactory.
1.10 The implications of social niche construction for the
major transitions in evolution
Table 1.2 lists the events in the history of life on earth that Maynard Smith and Sza-
thm ary (1995) mark out as the \major transitions in evolution". Essentially, several of
these transitions involved formerly free-living individuals aggregating into cooperative
groups. For example, replicating molecules aggregated into compartments, independent
replicators joined together to form chromosomes, and solitary insects aggregated into
colonies. A striking feature of these transitions is that the groups became reproductively
inseparable, such that their members became only able to reproduce by reproducing the
group as a whole (Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995). Such a reproductive strategy
is a pinnacle example of cooperation, in particular, of strong altruism.
The transitions can be conceptualised very naturally in terms of multi-level selection
(Buss, 1988; Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995; Michod, 1999). This is because se-
lection within the aggregations will favour cheating behaviour, for example, individuals
that do not forego their own reproduction in order to reproduce the group as a whole.
However, selection between groups will favour those with greater cooperation amongst
their members. Moreover, a transition could be said to occur when within-group se-
lection becomes (almost) completely suppressed, leaving between-group selection as the
driving force in evolution. For example, it is between cell-group selection, and the virtual24 Chapter 1 Introduction
Pre-transition Post-transition
Replicating molecules Populations of molecules in compartments
Independent replicators Chromosomes
RNA as gene and enzyme DNA + protein
Prokaryotes Eukaryotes
Asexual clones Sexual populations
Protists Animals, plants, fungi (cell dierentiation)
Solitary individuals Colonies (non-reproductive castes)
Primate societies Human societies (language)
Table 1.2: The major transitions in evolution (as dened in Maynard Smith and
Szathm ary 1995, p.6).
absence of within-group selection, that allows multicellular organisms to evolve adapta-
tions and hence be evolutionary individuals in their own right (Michod, 1999). That is,
the complete dominance of between- over within-group selection allows the groups to be
\units of evolution", sensu Maynard Smith (1987). How between-group selection comes
to dominate within-group selection is, therefore, something that an adaptive theory for
the major transitions must address.
The transitions can also be further classied into what Queller (1997) calls fraternal
and egalitarian4. In the fraternal transitions, the pre-transitional entities are of the
same type, and so there is the potential for a reproductive division of labour in which
one individual can reproduce the whole group (Queller, 1997). In particular, kinship
amongst the cells can provide a high between-group variance and eliminate within-
group variance, as occurs when multicellular organisms develop from a single zygote,
for example (Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995; Grosberg and Strathmann, 1998;
Queller, 2000). On the other hand, in the egalitarian transitions the pre-transitional
entities are of dierent species, hence a reproductive division of labour cannot occur
because the pre-transitional individuals do not share genes (Queller, 1997). However,
the fact that they are of dierent types means that there can be a combination of dierent
functions from the outset (Queller, 1997), for the types will naturally perform dierent
functions. Thus, while division of labour must be evolved in the fraternal transitions,
the pre-transitional entities already performed dierent (complementary) functions in
the egalitarian transitions. For example, it has been suggested that dierent types of
replicator provided dierent but essential contributions to a common metabolism in the
rst protocells (Szathm ary, 1999). So, the initial advantage in forming groups in the
egalitarian transitions may have been a combination of functions, while in the fraternal
transitions such a division of labour would have to be evolved and so the initial advantage
must have been something else, such as economies of scale through larger size (Queller,
1997).
4Although some transitions do not t into the fraternal / egalitarian distinction, for example, the
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Explaining the major transitions essentially involves explaining the evolutionary origin
of highly cooperative groups. That is, how and why did the individuals change their
population structure to create a selective environment favouring cooperation? This is
the very problem that our thesis of social niche construction addresses. In particular,
we are able to show how individuals evolve to create groups that exhibit ever greater
degrees of cooperation, for the benets of greater cooperation can drive the evolution
of population structure and vice versa. Crucially, this happens gradually by selection
on a series of small mutations. As a result, we can provide a systematic explanation
for the creation of some of the prerequisite conditions for a transition that relies only
on the selection of small mutations. This gives support to the notion that there is a
common and systematic selective process behind several of the major transitions, such
that while the details of any one transition are contingent on natural history5, there are
unifying selective forces at work across transitions. It is worth noting that transitions can
sometimes be reversed6, for example, some sexual organisms also facultatively reproduce
asexually by parthenogenesis, and multicellularity is thought to have evolved and then
been reversed back to unicellularity in some taxa (King, 2004). When this happens, we
suggest that other components of selection pressure on population structure, apart from
those resulting from social behaviour, must become stronger, such that the benets of
cooperative group living are no longer strong enough to keep the group together. That
is, ecological factors may change such that they weaken the benets of cooperation, and
hence weaken the component of selection pressure on population-structure modifying
traits that derives from cooperation. When this happens, population structure may
evolve in a direction opposite to that which supports cooperation, thereby undoing the
transition. Thus, both the creation and reversal of transitions ts into the social niche
construction framework.
Our model for the evolution of initial group size is particularly relevant to some of
the fraternal transitions (sensu Queller). In particular, the transitions from single- to
multi- celled organisms, and from solitary insects to eusocial colonies. In each of these
cases, the initial group size is low: most multicellular organisms develop from a single
fertilised egg, while eusocial insect colonies develop from one or a few queens. This
raises the question: if there is advantage in numbers, as there must be if the evolution
of cell-groups and insect colonies was adaptive, then why is the population structure
such that they periodically return to one or a few cells or queens (Maynard Smith and
Szathm ary, 1995; Grosberg and Strathmann, 1998; Roze and Michod, 2001; Wolpert
and Szathm ary, 2002)? It has been hypothesised that this occurs in order to increase
cooperation between members of the cell-group or colony, for if development is from a
5Transitions can be contingent either on the necessary genetic variation being present in the pop-
ulation (variation limited, e.g., the origin of the eukaryotic cell), or on the presence of an appropriate
ecological context for that variation to be selected (e.g., the origin of multi-cellular organisms; King
2004) (Szamado and Szathmary, 2006).
6Some of the transitions happened multiple times independently, e.g., multicellularity, whereas other
happened only once, e.g., the origin of the eukaryotic cell. The transitions that happened only once,
which were therefore hard for selection to recreate, are interestingly the ones that have not been reversed.26 Chapter 1 Introduction
small number of founders then cooperators are more likely to be clustered together. In
other words, the variance on social behaviour within groups will be decreased, while that
between groups will be increased, leading to a statistical clustering of social behaviours.
Such clustering is, as we know, essential for the evolution of cooperation. Our thesis
can explicitly explain how this clustering itself evolves. Moreover, on some accounts
of natural history, initial group size gradually decreased as in the models presented
here. For example, it has been suggested that the multicellular ancestors of modern day
metazoans reproduced not by sending out single cells but rather by sending out fragments
of many cells (Michod and Roze, 2000). Indeed, some loose examples of multicellularity
do not develop from a single cell at all, but form by the aggregation of many cells, as
is the case with cellular slime moulds. The \multicellular" forms that do this appear
less well functionally integrated, and show greater cheating behaviour (P al and Papp,
2000). The advantages of suppressing cheating may therefore create selection pressure
for a bottleneck during development, whereby a cell-group or insect colony is founded
by one or a few individuals (Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995; Michod and Roze,
2000; Roze and Michod, 2001; Queller, 2000; Godfrey-Smith, 2009). Our thesis suggests
how such a bottleneck can arise adaptively and gradually, by selection on a series of
mutations that control initial group size and hence the degree of the developmental
bottleneck.
1.11 Outline of dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows:
 Chapter 2 considers the tension between group selection and inclusive tness per-
spectives on social evolution, that has been the source of much controversy in the
literature since the 1960s. We consider arguments for and against regarding the
role of groups in evolution as being merely the context in which individual selection
occurs. We conclude that social niche construction posits a much more signicant
role for groups in social evolution than authors with an individualist philosophy
have previously suggested. Part of this argument was presented in a talk at the
11th International Conference on the Simulation and Synthesis of Living Systems
(Powers and Watson, 2008).
 Chapter 3 presents a minimal model of social niche construction, where a trait
of cooperative or selsh behaviour evolves alongside a trait that produces a pop-
ulation structure where groups are either founded by many (low between-group
variance) or few (high between-group variance) individuals. We show that smaller
groups, which select for greater cooperation, evolve. We nd conditions under
which this occurs despite there being an opposing component of selection on pop-
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of the logical argument in Box 1.2. The model from this chapter is presented in
Powers et al. (2007).
 Chapter 4 investigates the eect of negative frequency-dependent selection on so-
cial behaviour, with respect to the range of conditions over which an eect of group
selection can be seen. We nd that a stable coexistence of social types, modelled by
the Lotka-Volterra competition equations (May, 1976), greatly increases the range
of group sizes over which some eect of group selection can be seen, and hence
the range over which a small change in group size selects for greater cooperation.
This is important for social niche construction, since selection on population struc-
ture, that is due to social behaviour, requires that a change in structure induces a
change in social selection pressure (premise 2 of the logical argument in Box 1.2).
Our results suggest that this is more likely to occur under coexistence dynamics.
This chapter is based on material in Powers et al. (2008).
 Chapter 5 argues that the Prisoner's Dilemma game, which represents directional
selection favouring the most selsh type, has dominated the social evolution lit-
erature, despite the fact that many types of biological social interaction are not
best modelled by this game. We discuss 4 classes of game, and introduce a scale
as to how conducive they are to group selection. We also discuss the appropriate-
ness of dierent types of game for modelling dierent kinds of major evolutionary
transition, particularly regarding the fraternal versus egalitarian split of the tran-
sitions proposed by Queller (1997). We conclude that types of game apart from
the Prisoner's Dilemma have been unduly under-considered, are more conducive
to be acted on by group selection, and are a more appropriate model for some of
the transitions.
 Chapter 6 builds on the illustrative model of social niche construction presented
in Chapter 3 by considering the introduction of new group size preference alleles
by mutation, rather than all possible genotypes being present from the outset.
This model illustrates how selection on a series of small mutations on population
structure can create the conditions for cooperation. We nd that this is more likely
to occur where selection on social behaviour is negative frequency-dependent, as
predicted by our results from Chapter 4. The model from this chapter, and parts
of the analysis, are presented in Powers and Watson (2009).
 Chapter 7 argues that social niche construction is fundamental to providing an
adaptive explanation for many of the major transitions. We discuss how whether
a transition is of the fraternal or egalitarian kind constrains the type of social niche
construction that can occur. Part of this argument is based on material presented
in Powers et al. (2009).
 Chapter 8 reiterates the social niche construction hypothesis and its importance,
and discusses the advantages and limitations of the modelling approach that we28 Chapter 1 Introduction
have used to illustrate it. This chapter also discusses how social niche construc-
tion can be applied in various other contexts apart from those considered in this
dissertation.Chapter 2
The Group Selection Debate and
Social Niche Construction
In this chapter, we discuss the group selection debate that has raged in the social evo-
lution literature since the 1960s, and how the social niche construction framework can
help to resolve some of the tensions that are present.
2.1 Outline of our argument
Group selection has been much debated in the evolutionary biology literature since the
1960s, and remains highly controversial to this day (Wynne-Edwards, 1962; Maynard
Smith, 1964, 1976, 1987; Williams, 1966; Wilson, 1980, 2007; Wilson and Sober, 1994;
Wilson and Wilson, 2007; Sober and Wilson, 1998; Queller, 2004; Foster et al., 2006a;
Okasha, 2006; West et al., 2007a, 2008). On the face of it, the concept of group selection
appears simple: natural selection can logically act between groups to cause the spread
of a group-benecial trait, just like it can act between individuals to cause the spread
of an individually-benecial trait (Sober and Wilson, 1998). All parties agree on this
point: no one has argued that such selection is logically impossible. However, many have
vigorously suggested that such selection is unlikely to be important in nature, for they
argue that there will rarely be sucient variation in the (genetic) composition of groups
for selection amongst them to be eective (Maynard Smith, 1964, 1976; Williams, 1966).
In particular, group selection is often considered to be a highly dubious explanation for
the evolution of cooperation, since it is suggested that individual selection will sweep
selsh behaviour to xation within each group, destroying any between-group variance
(Williams, 1966; Maynard Smith, 1976; Dawkins, 1976). This conclusion was supported
by the early models of group selection, in which the groups were demes whose probability
of extinction was inversely proportion to their frequency of cooperative behaviour, and
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which reproduced by producing migrants that colonised vacant patches (Boorman and
Levitt, 1972; Levin and Kilmer, 1974).
David Sloan Wilson, however, has led a challenge to this position, by arguing that the
conception of groups as reproductively isolated demes is unnecessarily narrow (Wilson,
1975a, 1977, 1980; Wilson and Sober, 1994; Sober and Wilson, 1998). Rather, alongside
Elliott Sober, he has advanced the thesis that the pertinent property of a group is that
its members aect each others tness, and that temporary aggregations of organisms
have this property as well as isolated demes (Wilson, 1975a; Wilson and Sober, 1994).
In cases where groups are aggregations of organisms that periodically mix, it has been
shown that cooperation can indeed be promoted, despite the fact that selsh behaviour
is advantageous within each group. That is, individual selection within groups favours
selshness, but this can be overcome by between-group selection favouring groups whose
members are more cooperative, in the sense that those groups will contribute more
individuals into the global population (Wilson, 1975a, 1987; Wilson and Colwell, 1981).
One example of this is the \Haystack" aggregation and dispersal structure depicted in
Figure 1.1. Indeed, Sober and Wilson argue that group selection, by this understanding,
is both highly eective and pervasive in nature. This is because surely most organisms
live in some kind of group in which tness-aecting interactions take place (Krause and
Ruxton, 2002), be that a family unit, or a habitat shared by unrelated conspecics.
Sober and Wilson therefore argue that group structure drives social evolution.
The response to this argument from many has been to agree that group structure aects
social evolution, but not for the reasons that Sober and Wilson think. Rather, it is
argued that such models are examples of individual selection in a group-structured
population (Grafen, 1984; Nunney, 1985; Harvey et al., 1985; West et al., 2007a). That
is, it pays individuals to be cooperative with other group members in certain situations.
For example, if individuals with the same social behaviour tend to nd themselves in
the same groups, then it will pay for you to be a cooperator if that means you are on
the receiving end of more cooperative behaviour from others (Sterelny, 1996; Maynard
Smith, 1998). Since cooperation is individually advantageous in such scenarios, they
see no role for group selection. Indeed, Wilson's models can be redescribed in terms
of inclusive tness and kin selection, frameworks that were originally intended to avoid
invoking group selection (Hamilton, 1963). On the other hand, Wilson and others stress
that inclusive tness and kin selection are instances of group selection, for they can
only operate in group-structured populations, sensu Sober and Wilson (Hamilton, 1975;
Wilson, 1975a; Wade, 1980; Michod, 1982).
How can this tension be resolved? Some authors have stressed that there are two dierent
concepts of group selection at work in the literature (Damuth and Heisler, 1988; Mayo
and Gilinsky, 1987; Arnold and Fristrup, 1982; Maynard Smith, 1987; Okasha, 2001).
Type 1 group selection is invoked to explain the evolution of an individual-level trait,
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how selection pressure at the group level causes an individual-level trait to increase
in frequency in the population of individuals. By contrast, type 2 group selection is
invoked to explain how a group-level trait increases in frequency in the metapopulation
of groups, due to groups with the trait founding more ospring groups than those lacking
it. Although the dierence may at rst seem subtle, it is a fundamental distinction
(Okasha, 2001, 2006). In particular, only under group selection of type 2 do groups
play a role in evolution strictly analogous to that of individuals (Arnold and Fristrup,
1982; Damuth and Heisler, 1988), and it has been argued that only in such cases can
adaptations evolve that are genuinely \for the good of the group", in the sense that
they evolved to increase fecundity and/or survival of the group per se (Maynard Smith,
1987). Everyone would agree that group selection of type 2 is genuine group selection,
for it is natural selection at the individual-level frame shifted one level up the biological
hierarchy, and surely very few would defend the position that natural selection can in
principle only operate at the individual level (Lewontin, 1970). Moreover, a redescription
of such a process in terms of individual selection will not be causally appropriate, since
group tness cannot be equated directly with individual tness (Okasha, 2006). By
contrast, in group selection of the type 1 variety, group tness just is the tness of the
group members: this has to be the case, for type 1 selection explains why group-level
selection pressures make one individual trait tter than another, e.g., why cooperative
rather than selsh behaviour evolves. Consequently, a redescription of any such models
in terms of individual tness must necessarily be available, for an individual trait can
only be selectively advantageous if individuals with that trait are, on average, tter than
those without it (Wilson, 1975a; Dugatkin and Reeve, 1994; Sterelny, 1996; Sober and
Wilson, 1998; Okasha, 2006). Despite Sober and Wilson's (1998) assertion that breaking
down the selective forces on individuals into within- and between- group components
provides the only correct causal account of evolution in such scenarios, few have been
convinced of this (Nunney, 1985, 1998; Maynard Smith, 1987, 1998; Kitcher et al., 1990;
Sterelny, 1996; Barrett and Godfrey-Smith, 2002; Kerr and Godfrey-Smith, 2002).
One might argue, then, that if everyone agreed to think only of type 2 group selection
as \real" group selection then the problem would be solved. Yet, models of type 2 group
selection are very rare in the literature, and we argue that this is because they presuppose
that groups are evolutionary individuals in their own right. This then begs the question
of how the groups came to be cohesive enough for this to be the case. On the other
hand, type 1 group selection seems to be explained away by individual selection, for the
groups can be treated as just a part of the selective environment. We will argue that
social niche construction can bridge this impasse. In particular, if the groups in a type
1 scenario are being created by the evolving individuals themselves, then they cannot
be treated as a static part of the environmental context. Type 1 group selection cannot,
therefore, be seen as individuals merely adapting to their social environment, in the
same way that they adapt to their abiotic environment in classical models of individual
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increase over evolutionary time, as a result of individual adaptation. By strengthening
the eect of group selection in this way, individuals create more cohesive groups, and
hence start to move towards type 2 selection. Thus, we argue that treating groups in
the same way as any other environmental property is unsatisfactory, given that group
structure can itself change in an adaptive manner.
In the remainder of this chapter we elaborate on this argument, as follows. We rst
discuss group selection in its historical context, and how it was dismissed as an expla-
nation for the evolution of cooperation in the 1960s and early 1970s. We then discuss
the individualist response to how cooperation evolves through kin selection and increase
of inclusive tness (Hamilton, 1963, 1964a,b), before considering how they can be re-
cast in terms of type 1 group selection, and the controversy that this has caused in the
literature. We then turn to the distinction between type 1 and type 2 group selection,
and how while it alone has failed to ease the tension between group- and individual-
selectionists, the social niche construction framework can, alongside this, help to.
2.2 Early models of group selection and their failure
The idea that natural selection could potentially operate at a level higher than the
individual was rst postulated by Darwin (1871), in order to explain the evolution of
human cooperative characters that beneted the whole tribe. The problem as Darwin
saw it was that such characters might well confer no relative tness advantage on their
bearers compared to others in the same tribe, and so could not evolve by individual
(within-tribe) selection. However, tribes with more cooperative individuals would surely
outcompete (in terms of tribal warfare) those with less, and so cooperative traits could
spread by between-tribe selection.
This school of thought continued through to the 1960s, whereby it was dicult to see
how cooperative behaviours that benet others, at an apparent cost to self, could evolve
by individual selection, but easy to see how they might be favoured by group selection.
Groups were seen as playing a role in evolution strictly analogous to that of individuals,
with groups founding ospring groups and sometimes going extinct. A cooperative trait
that beneted the group could then evolve because groups that had that trait would
outcompete, in terms of founding more new groups and/or going extinct less frequently,
groups that did not. Cooperation amongst individuals was therefore seen not as an
adaptation of individuals, but of groups.
Attempts at explicitly modelling the spread of a cooperative trait by this mechanism were
rst made by Haldane (1932) and Wright (1945). However, neither were able to present
a plausible model of the process. In particular, Wright envisaged a population composed
of a number of reproductively isolated groups that occupied discrete geographical sites,
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then supposed that a cooperative trait, which increased group productivity (in terms
of number of migrants sent out) and longevity but which decreased the tness of the
bearer relative to others within the group, could reach xation in a small number of
groups by genetic drift. If such xation of cooperation within one group occurred,
then the possibility was laid open for cooperative behaviour to spread globally due to
the increased productivity and longevity of that group. However, this process seemed
inherently weak, since the rate of ow of migrants must be small enough so as not to
disrupt the within-group process of genetic drift that might favour cooperation, but large
enough so as to allow cooperative groups to export their progeny across the population
(Wright 1945, rearticulated and placed into historical context in Wilson 1983b and Sober
and Wilson 1998). Signicantly, however, Wright only sketched out the above model; a
quantitative or analytical analysis was not carried out.
Despite the lack of a believable model of group selection, and the exposition of the
founders of neo-Darwinism that standard individual-level selection could not be assumed
to lead to traits that increased group productivity (Fisher, 1930; Haldane, 1932), many
ecologists and evolutionists employed the notion of group-level adaptations during the
1950s and 60s without thinking about a mechanistic process that could lead to them
(Wilson 1983b and Okasha 2006 provide summaries of such thinking). Adaptations were
postulated at the level of the group (Allee et al., 1949), population (Wynne-Edwards,
1962), species (Lorenz, 1963), or even the whole ecosystem (Dunbar, 1960), without
considering how higher-level selection might be undermined by individual selection. This
limitation of such thinking was exposed in the 1960s, however, when Williams (1966)
launched an attack on group selection in general, and the thesis of Wynne-Edwards
(1962) in particular.
Wynne-Edwards had proposed that populations evolved adaptations to avoid over ex-
ploiting their resources, for example, by reproductive restraint to control population
density. Moreover, he proposed that since populations which over-exploited their re-
sources would tend to go extinct, they would surely be replaced by other populations
that had adaptations to prevent over exploitation. In this way, such population-benecial
adaptations could potentially spread by a process of selection between populations, just
as individually-benecial adaptations such as camouage colouring spread by selection
between individuals. Williams (1966) gave a highly inuential argument, however, that
such population-level selection was likely to be highly ineective, since selection pressure
at the population level for reproductive restraint would be opposed by selection pressure
at the individual level for unabated reproduction. This follows from the fact that an
unrestrained reproducer (arising by mutation or migration, for example) in a popula-
tion of restrainers would leave more ospring. Therefore, assuming that unrestrained
reproduction was a heritable trait, the frequency of unrestrained individuals would in-
crease within the population with every generation; this is the problem of selsh cheating
and \subversion from within" (Dawkins, 1976) that undermines group cooperation, and34 Chapter 2 The Group Selection Debate and Social Niche Construction
which was not considered by Wynne-Edwards. Furthermore, since the generation time of
individuals is much shorter than that of populations, Williams claimed that competition
between populations would hardly ever be able to counter this trend, since unrestrained
mutants would be spreading quicker than populations were dying out, hence evolution
would be faster at the individual than at the population level. More formally, natural
selection at any level of the biological hierarchy requires a variance in tness at that
level. For example, under the popular Price Equation framework for studying group se-
lection (Price, 1972; Hamilton, 1975), group selection trumps individual selection when
the covariance between group character and group tness is greater than the mean of the
covariances between individual character and individual tness within groups1 (Okasha,
2005). In the kind of groups envisaged by Wynne-Edwards, i.e., whole populations, it
is dicult to see how this condition can be met.
Arguments against the ecacy of higher-level selection became orthodox in evolution-
ary biology, and were supported by the rst simulation models of demic group selection
in the early 1970s2 (e.g., Boorman and Levitt 1972; Levin and Kilmer 1974; see also
Wade 1978 for a review). In these models, the groups were demes occupying resource
patches. The productivity and/or survival rate of a deme was then proportional to the
frequency of cooperative individuals that it contained. In this way, groups with fewer
cooperators would more often be subject to extinction, and they would be replaced by
migrants from groups with more cooperators. This was the kind of process that had
been verbally described by Wynne-Edwards. The models, however, suggested that vari-
ance in tness at the group level would only be sucient to allow a cooperative trait
(such as reproductive restraint) to evolve if the groups were very small. This is because
it was assumed that cooperation would be driven extinct within all polymorphic groups,
due to individual selection favouring selshness (Maynard Smith, 1964, 1976), and the
fact that the generation time of groups was much longer than that of individuals, giving
individual selection much more time to act. If the groups were very small, however,
then cooperation may be able to x within some groups by genetic drift, as envisaged
by Wright (1945). Cooperation could then potentially spread to other groups by mi-
gration. However, the intergroup migration rate typically had to be very low (on the
order of two groups exchanging one migrant per generation (Maynard Smith, 1976)) in
order to stop selsh cheats from \infecting" other groups too rapidly, which would fur-
ther reduce between-group variance. The fact that the models only worked under such
narrow conditions seemed to preclude group selection as a mechanism for the evolution
of cooperative behaviour, except in extremely limited special cases.
1Where group character is dened as the mean character of the group members. So when considering
cooperation, for example, individual character would be whether an individual is a cooperator or not,
while the group character would be the proportion of cooperators. As it turns out, this relationship
between group and individual character is fundamental when considering how to dene group selection,
as will be discussed later in this chapter.
2The dynamics of selection in a metapopulation where groups existed for multiple generations, ex-
changed migrants, and went extinct had resisted analytical treatment, so the availability of computer
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2.3 Kin selection and inclusive tness as a mechanism for
the evolution of cooperation
Despite the failure of group selection as a plausible evolutionary mechanism, it was still
nevertheless the case that cooperative behaviour was to be found in nature and did
appear adaptive, so the evolution of such traits did need to somehow be explained in
terms of selective advantage. This was achieved in the 1960s by taking a gene's eye view
of evolution, in which the fate of a gene, rather than the individuals that carry it, is
followed (Hamilton, 1963, 1964a,b; Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976). A cooperative act
that disadvantages the bearer, but that benets others, will evolve if the net result of
the action is to increase the frequency of genes coding for the cooperative act in the
gene pool (Hamilton, 1963)3. This can occur if the benets of cooperation fall upon
other individuals that also carry the cooperative allele, for this can more than oset
the tness loss to then actor. This process is known as kin selection, a phrase coined
by Maynard Smith (1964), for if social interactions take place between kin, then the
interacting individuals will tend to share the same gene for cooperative behaviour, due
to inheriting it from a common ancestor (Hamilton, 1963, 1964a; Maynard Smith, 1964).
The argument is made formal in Hamilton's (1964a) rule. This states that a social trait
will evolve when rb > c, where b is the benet of the cooperative act bestowed upon
recipients, c is the tness loss to the actor, and r is the genetic relatedness between
actor and recipient (Hamilton, 1964a). Genetic relatedness was originally dened as the
proportion of genes that actor and recipient of social behaviour share due to common
ancestry, i.e., genealogical relatedness, but this concept has since been generalised, as
discussed below. Hamilton's rule simply states that for a cooperative trait to spread, its
eect on the recipient, discounted by relatedness, must be greater than the cost to the
actor. Incorporating the eects on recipients, weighted by relatedness, in this manner
yields the concept of inclusive tness (Hamilton, 1964a,b), whereby both direct (the cost
to the actor) and indirect (the benets given to others) eects are used to calculate the
tness of an individual. Natural selection can then be viewed as acting to maximise
individuals' inclusive tness (e.g., Grafen 2006). Because inclusive tness is a version
of classical individual tness that accounts for social interactions, kin selection is often
seen as being fully compatible with individual selection (Maynard Smith, 1976). Alter-
natively, an equivalent direct tness approach is available, where the benets received
from others are accounted for, rather than those given to others (Taylor and Frank,
1996; Frank, 1998); it is important not to double count and incorporate both, one must
either account for the benets given to others, discounted by relatedness, or the bene-
ts received from others, where the relatedness gives the probability that they will be
received (Grafen, 1984).
3We assume, for ease of exposition, that the trait is genetic. However, all that matters is that the
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Under what kind of population structures is Hamilton's rule satised (and hence, in
what kinds of population can cooperation evolve)? One immediately obvious candidate
is family structured populations, where social interactions take place in kin groups,
such as a bird's nest. Essentially, the ospring of an individual carrying a cooperative
allele will also tend to carry that same allele, hence the relatedness between interacting
individuals in a family group will be high. In particular, in diploid sexually reproducing
organisms obeying Mendelian segregation, the relatedness between parent and ospring,
or between siblings, is 0.5. This then gives the well-known result that an altruistic trait
directed towards siblings or ospring can spread if the benet is more than twice the
cost, hence Haldane's quip that he would lay down his life to save two brothers (e.g.,
as cited by Sober and Wilson 1998). It was these kinds of population structure that
Hamilton rst envisaged, and which led Maynard Smith to relabel inclusive tness as kin
selection. Indeed, the relatedness term in Hamilton's rule was initially only interpreted
in terms of genealogical ancestry, as dened above. Kin selection seemed much more
plausible than traditional group selection as a mechanistic explanation for the evolution
of cooperation, since many social interactions surely take place between relatives, thereby
securing the necessary positive relatedness. By contrast, few populations seemed to
exhibit the conditions for eective group selection as understood at the time kin selection
theory was being developed, i.e., deme sizes of around 10 individuals and low migration
rates (Maynard Smith, 1964, 1976; Levin and Kilmer, 1974). Kin selection therefore
seemed pervasive in nature, while group selection appeared to be extremely unlikely to
be eective in natural populations and hence to be of only limited interest as something
that was theoretically possible (Wilson, 1983b; Sober and Wilson, 1998).
Moreover, later theoretical developments have shown that gene's eye thinking and inclu-
sive tness explanations for cooperation spread beyond kin selection, in the strict sense
used above. In particular, what matters is not that the interacting individuals are kin,
but that they are statistically likely to share the allele for cooperation (Hamilton, 1975;
Grafen, 1985), i.e., that there is a positive regression on the frequency of the cooperative
allele in actors and recipients (Queller, 1985; Frank, 1998). Consequently, relatedness
need only be dened at the locus (or loci if cooperation is coded for by a suite of alleles)
where the cooperative allele resides, rather than on a genome wide basis. In this way,
inclusive tness explanations for social behaviour are not limited to interactions with
genealogical relatives.
What mechanisms, besides common ancestry, might produce the necessary positive re-
gression between actor and recipient of cooperation required for an inclusive tness
explanation? Essentially, any mechanism that produces assortativity on behaviour will
provide a positive regression. For example, individuals may be able to gauge the coop-
erative tendencies of others and use this information to choose with whom they interact.
This may be achieved directly through cognition (Wilson and Dugatkin, 1997), or indi-
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detected by other cooperators. In eect, such a signal would be the \green beard" gene
of Hamilton (1964b) and Dawkins (1976), in which a cooperative allele has a pleiotropic
eect that causes its bearers to emit a signal, and to only cooperate with other indi-
viduals also emitting that signal. Assortativity of behaviour without common ancestry
could also arise if individuals with the cooperative allele somehow ended up living in the
same habitats (Hamilton, 1975; Pepper, 2007). However, although all of these mecha-
nisms can work in theory, kinship does seem theoretically to be the most robust way
of securing positive relatedness (West et al., 2007a). This follows from the fact that if
the interacting individuals are kin, then they share equal relatedness at all loci; thus, a
cooperative allele that helps a genealogical relative benets all other alleles on the same
genome equally (Okasha, 2002; Leigh Jr., 2009). On the other hand, if the interacting
individuals are not kin then alleles at loci unlinked to cooperation will not benet, hence
there could be selection pressure at all of these other loci for suppressing cooperation
(Grafen, 1984; Okasha, 2002; Leigh Jr., 2009), in the same way that meiotic drive alleles
can be suppressed by other alleles at unlinked loci (Alexander and Borgia, 1978; Leigh
Jr., 2009).
2.4 The group selectionist response: new group selection
models and kin selection as an instance of group selec-
tion
While the models of traditional demic group selection developed in the 1970s seemed
very pessimistic for its role in social evolution, work was being undertaken at the same
time by a number of theorists aimed at broadening our conception of group selection. In
particular, D.S. Wilson (1975a; 1980) developed the notion of a trait-group { a subset
of the population that have tness aecting interactions with each other with respect
to some trait, but not with organisms outside of that subset (with respect to the trait
in question). Wilson, and others (Matessi and Jayakar, 1976; Uyenoyama and Feldman,
1980), have argued that such trait groups do not even have to be reproductively isolated,
but instead can be just eeting aggregations of organisms that interact during some part
of their life-cycle, such as birds that breed communally (Brown, 1978), or bark beetles
that aggregate to attack a tree (Avil es et al., 2002). On the other hand, trait-groups can
also last for many generations, for example, they could consist of organisms that share a
common resource patch and reproduce on that patch for a number of generations, until
the resource becomes depleted (Wilson and Colwell, 1981; Wilson, 1987). Thus, trait-
groups are intended by Sober & Wilson as a generalisation of the evolutionary concept
of group from the demes considered in early group selection models, for they see the
relation between individuals of \interacts with" as the pertinent one for dening groups
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How can the presence of trait-group structure in a population aect the evolution of
social traits? If organisms disperse from their trait-group at some stage and mix freely
back into the global population then cooperative behaviours can be selected for. This
is because trait-groups with a greater proportion of a cooperative allele will contribute
more individuals into the population than those with a greater proportion of selsh
individuals. Crucially, this can occur even if cooperation is selected against within each
trait-group, since the dierence in the number of individuals produced by groups at
the dispersal stage can more than oset the decline in cooperation within each group.
By this mechanism, cooperation can decline in frequency within each and every trait-
group but still increase in frequency in the global population, a result that is an instance
of the statistical phenomenon known as Simpson's Paradox (Simpson, 1951; Sober and
Wilson, 1998). An example of this process was provided in Figure 1.1, in which organisms
reproduced on isolated patches for a number of generations, before a global mixing stage
formed the next generation of groups.
Wilson (1975a, 1980), Sober (1984, 1987), and others maintain that this process clearly
demonstrates group selection. That is, they argue that two selective processes act in
trait-group structured populations. They claim that individual selection favours selsh-
ness; this is the reason that the selsh type increases in frequency within each trait-group.
That is, they equate individual selection with within-group selection. Following on from
this, they claim that it is group selection that allows cooperation to evolve in such pop-
ulations, since cooperation only evolves because trait-groups with a greater proportion
of cooperators contribute more individuals into the global population. Thus, just as
individual selection is the dierential productivity of individuals, so group selection is
the dierential productivity of trait-groups, they argue (Wilson and Sober, 1989, 1994).
Moreover, they argue that natural selection at any level requires variation between the
entities at that level (Wilson, 1997), and that this is clearly the case with trait-group
selection. In particular, it has been proved that the greater the variance in initial trait-
group composition, the more eective trait-group selection is at promoting cooperation
(Price, 1972; Wilson, 1975a; Hamilton, 1975). In the limit, if all trait-groups have the
same frequency of a cooperative allele, then cooperation cannot evolve, for there would
not be any dierence in group productivity at the dispersal stage, and hence no compo-
nent of selection between trait-groups (Wilson, 1990, 2004).
More formally, Wilson (1975a, 1977, 1979, 1980) has shown that if trait-groups stay
together for a single organismic generation before dispersal, then random variation be-
tween trait-groups is sucient to allow a class of cooperative behaviours known as \weak
altruism" (Wilson, 1979, 1980) to evolve. These are behaviours that increase the number
of ospring of the actor, but increase the number of ospring of other group members
by even more. Examples of these traits can include both the public goods production
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number of ospring of the actor, Wilson (1979, 1990) stresses that they nevertheless re-
quire group selection to evolve, for they put the actor at a local disadvantage compared
to other group members, and this local disadvantage can only be compensated for by dif-
ferential group productivity4. In particular, these traits cannot evolve if between-group
variance is less than binomial (Wilson, 1990, 2004). If between-group variance is greater
than random, then so-called \strong altruism" can evolve; these are traits that decrease
the number of ospring of the actor, while increasing those of other group members.
These are of the kinds of altruistic traits considered by Hamilton (1964a,b), and include
such extreme forms of cooperation as the suicidal bee sting, or worker sterility in ant
colonies. Wilson (1977, 1980) suggests that random variation in group composition is
likely to be a lower threshold in most natural populations. Mechanisms such as assorta-
tive interactions between individuals of the same type (Wilson and Dugatkin, 1997) can
produce above random between-group variance. Likewise, special mechanisms would
be required to produce below random between-group variance, for this would require
a mechanism of disassortativity (Wilson, 1977). However, in cases where the groups
stay together for multiple organismic generations before dispersal, then the initial vari-
ance when the groups are formed can be either magnied or reduced by the action of
individual reproduction and selection within the groups (Wilson and Colwell, 1981; Wil-
son, 1987; Fletcher and Zwick, 2004, 2007). Consequently, random variance in initial
group composition is no longer the threshold on what type of cooperation can evolve in
multi-generational groups (Fletcher and Zwick, 2004), and the hard distinction between
weak and strong altruism is no longer relevant (Fletcher and Doebeli, 2006; Fletcher and
Zwick, 2007).
The dispersal stage in trait-group models is crucial to maintaining the initial between-
group variance, for selection within each group will decrease the frequency of the coop-
erative trait towards extinction. The groups must therefore mix and be reformed before
cooperation has declined in frequency by too much within each group, so that dieren-
tial group productivity at the mixing stage can more than oset this decline. It is this
regular group reformation that prevents selsh types from xing in groups, and hence
the problem of cooperation being \subverted from within" described by Williams (1966)
and Dawkins (1976), and which hampered the evolution of cooperation in the traditional
demic models (e.g., Maynard Smith 1964; Levin and Kilmer 1974). For example, in his
original \Haystack" model (analogous to that shown in Figure 1.1), Maynard Smith
(1964) assumed that cooperation must be driven extinct in any group that contained
the selsh allele. Wilson (1987) argued that dispersal can take place before this occurs,
for surely it will take many generations for a cooperative allele to be driven extinct.
Wilson showed that when dispersal occurs more frequently, then group selection is a
much more eective force. More generally, group selection is eective when the \gen-
eration time" of groups is relatively short, for then between-group selection will take
4This argument of weak altruism requiring group selection to evolve has been contested in the liter-
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place more frequently. The generation time of the populations of red grouse described
by Wynne-Edwards (1962) would presumably be very long compared to that of the in-
dividuals within a population, hence group selection would be very weak compared to
individual selection in that case (Maynard Smith, 1964; Williams, 1966); this was shown
more formally by the traditional demic models of group selection (Boorman and Levitt,
1972; Levin and Kilmer, 1974). Wilson and Sober's point, however, is that such groups
are extremes, and that group selection is much more likely in other kinds of group.
Strikingly, Wilson (1977) and others (Wade, 1980; Michod, 1982; Breden, 1990) assert
that one such eective trait-group structure is the sibling groups of classic kin selection
models. That is, they see kin selection and inclusive tness explanations for the evolution
of cooperation as instances of group selection. How is this so? The argument turns on the
fact that an inclusive tness or kin selection explanation for the evolution of cooperation
itself requires localised interactions, for genetic relatedness is the dierence between the
frequency of a trait experienced within interaction groups, compared to the frequency
in the global population (Grafen, 1985). Indeed, relatedness is formally equivalent to
the proportion of the total genetic variance in a trait that is between groups, i.e., it
is the between-group variance (Queller, 1992b). Moreover, the net result of selection
in this interaction-group structure can naturally be broken down into two components
by the Price equation (Price, 1972; Hamilton, 1975; Breden, 1990). Specically, in kin
selection models a within kin-group component favours selshness, for selsh individuals
receive the same benets as other members of their kin group without paying the cost;
that the group members are kin does not change this basic fact that follows from the
denitions of cooperative and selsh behaviour. Thus, kinship alone does not remove
the problem of selsh cheating, and so the dierential productivity of individuals within
a kin group selects for selsh behaviour (Wade, 1980; Michod, 1982). Conversely, a
between kin-group component favours cooperation through the dierential productivity
of kin groups: kin groups with a greater proportion of cooperators contribute more
individuals into the population, in exactly the same way as other trait-group models.
Thus, kin selection is itself an instance of Simpson's Paradox, for cooperation declines
in frequency locally but can nevertheless spread globally, exactly as in any other trait-
group selection model. In general kin selection is, by this argument, highly eective
at promoting cooperation because a kin-group structure automatically provides a high
between-group variance (Wilson, 1977, 1980). In particular, a single kin group will tend
towards genetic homogeneity due to common ancestry, thereby reducing within-group
variance and increasing between-group variance (Wilson, 1975a, 1977). Just like any
other form of group selection, the ecacy of kin selection is increased by factors that
reduce the within kin-group variance and hence increase the between kin-group variance;
such factors include inbreeding (Wade and Breden, 1981; Breden and Wade, 1981), and
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Not only can kin selection be understood in terms of group selection, but this under-
standing has itself furthered kin selection theory (Queller, 1992a, 2004). In particular,
it was originally thought that a viscous population, where siblings remain in their place
of birth throughout their lives, would be particularly conducive to kin selection, by en-
suring a high relatedness between interacting individuals (Hamilton, 1964b; West et al.,
2002). However, it has since been proved that unless cooperative interactions take place
on a smaller scale than those for resource competition, cooperation cannot evolve despite
high relatedness (see Taylor 1992 for the analytical proof based on Hamilton's rule, and
Pollock 1983, Goodnight 1992, Wilson et al. 1992 and Mitteldorf and Wilson 2000 for
simulation models; see also di Paolo 2000). This is because if the interacting individu-
als also permanently compete for the same resource, then this competition can remove
selection pressure for helping those individuals, even if relatedness is very high (Pollock,
1983; Taylor, 1992; West et al., 2002). That is, within-group selection favours selsh-
ness locally (Pollock, 1983; Goodnight, 1992; Wilson et al., 1992), and within-group
selection here manifests itself through local resource competition. Cooperation can con-
sequently only spread by dierential group productivity, which cannot be realised in a
purely viscous population, because viscosity imposes local population density regulation
that prevents more cooperative groups from growing to a larger size than more selsh
groups 5 (Wilson et al., 1992). This is exactly the same as the argument given above for
why groups must be periodically reformed in order for group selection to be eective: if
more cooperative groups cannot realise their increased productivity through some form
of dispersal, then cooperation will continue to decline in frequency within each group
and, consequently, decline globally (Wilson et al., 1992).
2.5 Individualist attacks on the new group selection mod-
els
2.5.1 Group selection as individual selection in a group context
When trait-group selection theory was rst developed, its compatibility with individual
selection and neo-Darwinism was stressed (Wilson, 1975a, 1980). This follows from the
fact that the ttest groups contribute the most individuals into the population, hence
group tness is the mean (or sum of the) tness of the individual group members (Mayo
and Gilinsky, 1987; Damuth and Heisler, 1988; Okasha, 2001). Because of this, when
cooperation evolves it does so because cooperative individuals are tter than selsh in-
dividuals when averaged across all groups, i.e., averaged across the whole population
(Wilson and Sober, 1994; Sober and Wilson, 1998). Sober and Wilson (1998) argue,
however, that this in no way undermines the role of group selection, for if cooperation
5Think, for example, of a computer simulation on a lattice, where all of the sites on the lattice become
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is to evolve then it of course must increase in frequency in the global population of
individuals. They contend that to average individual tness over all groups, and then
to say that cooperation is on average tter, is fallacious, for it ignores the fact that
cooperation is locally disadvantageous and spreads through dierential group produc-
tivity. In particular, it does not matter if cooperation is tter at some point in time
when averaged over all groups unless there is some form of dispersal, for otherwise this
tness advantage of cooperation will only be transitory (Sober and Wilson, 1998), as
was discussed above in the case of a viscous population.
Others, however, have argued that an individual selection description of evolution in
group-structured populations is just as valid, and is not fallacious (Maynard Smith, 1987,
1998; Kitcher et al., 1990; Sterelny, 1996; Barrett and Godfrey-Smith, 2002; Kerr and
Godfrey-Smith, 2002; Gildenhuys, 2003; Foster et al., 2006a; West et al., 2008). In partic-
ular, it is argued that such \group selection" models can be viewed as a case of ordinary
frequency-dependent individual selection, since being a cooperator is individually advan-
tageous when the population structure provides a sucient assortment of behaviours,
i.e., when there is a sucient clustering of cooperators into groups (Sterelny, 1996; May-
nard Smith, 1998; Skyrms, 2002). The groups can then be viewed as merely providing
the context in which this frequency-dependent selection takes place, rather than as units
of selection in their own right (Dugatkin and Reeve, 1994; Sterelny, 1996; Kerr and
Godfrey-Smith, 2002). In contrast to the (trait) group selection approach, which sees
both within- and between-group processes as drivers of gene frequency change, this argu-
ment sees only the global dynamic of frequency-dependent selection as important. Local
dynamics within groups are not explicitly accounted for, for example, inclusive tness
equations do not contain an explicit notion of group tness. Such arguments nd favour
with proponents of a reductionist philosophy of science (Okasha, 2005, 2006), including
Dawkins (1976) and Maynard Smith (1998), for they raise the question as to why any
group-level explanations of social evolution are needed.
One particular instance of the \individual selection doing away with group selection"
argument concerns the evolution of weak altruism (Wilson, 1979, 1990) in randomly
formed groups that stay together for only a single generation before dispersal. Recall
that weakly altruistic traits increase the number of ospring of the actor, but increase
those of other individuals in the same group by even more. Because they increase the
ospring count of others by even more, Wilson (1979, 1980, 1990) argues that they
cannot evolve by individual selection, and so must evolve by group selection. That is,
they evolve because of their benecial eect on other group members. Nunney (1985),
however, argues that this is not the case, for if groups are reformed randomly every
generation, then the eect of a trait on other group members cannot matter. This is
because each behavioural type will experience each possible group composition with the
same frequency, i.e., when averaged over all groups, each type will experience the same
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in new random group contexts every generation, and so the context cannot inuence
selection, Nunney argues. As a result, the direct eect of the trait on self is left as the
only pertinent evolutionary force, and so in single-generational trait-groups any trait
that increases the number of ospring of the bearer is selected for, regardless of its eect
on others (Nunney, 1985; Wilson, 2004). Thus Nunney, alongside others (Foster et al.,
2006a; West et al., 2007a), asserts that weak altruism evolves by individual selection.
Signicantly, however, this argument does not hold when randomly formed groups stay
together for more than a single generation, because then each type will not, on average,
experience the same behavioural frequencies as in the global population (Fletcher and
Zwick, 2004). Rather, although the group context is initially random, after the rst
generation (descendants of) the individuals carry on interacting in the same context,
and so this context does matter.
2.5.2 The gene as the fundamental unit of selection
There is a tendency in some circles to dismiss group selection by claiming that the gene is
the fundamental unit of selection (Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976). The argument goes
that only genes copy themselves with sucient delity to cause sustained evolutionary
change in a population, for entities further up the biological hierarchy, such as sexually
reproducing organisms, do not pass copies of themselves intact into the next genera-
tion (Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976). If entities are not passed on intact through the
generations, then sustained selection cannot, over more than one generation, favour one
entity over another, for the targets of selection will be changing with every generation
(Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976). Thus, only units with high copying delity, such as
genes, can be the true targets of selection, it is argued (Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976).
Consequently, all selection must ultimately be \for the good of" genes, and not entities
further up the biological hierarchy such as individual organisms or groups (Williams,
1966; Dawkins, 1976).
Linked with this is the idea that all entities further up the biological hierarchy are
made of genes, so any adaptation that increases the frequency of entities at level x must
necessarily increase the frequency of the genes that created those entities. Essentially,
this is a restatement of the standard denition of evolution as change in gene frequency
(Fisher 1930, see Sober 1984 and Okasha 2006 for discussions of this point). However,
this fact cannot be used as an argument against the existence of group selection without
also arguing against selection at any other level of the biological hierarchy, including the
individual level (Sober and Wilson, 1998). That is, both individual and group selection
will cause some genes to increase in frequency at the expense of others. Moreover, genes
are not directly subject to natural selection, but are only indirectly selected through
the success of the phenotypes that they create (Mayr, 1984; Sober and Lewontin, 1982;
Sober, 1984). These phenotypes can be manifested in individuals or groups (Sober44 Chapter 2 The Group Selection Debate and Social Niche Construction
and Wilson, 1998). Thus, there is a fundamental distinction between the replicators
that copy themselves with high delity and so pass on their structure intact through the
generations (genes), and the vehicles whose phenotypes are directly exposed to selection6
(individuals, groups, or any other level of the biological hierarchy) (Dawkins, 1976, 1984;
Hull, 1984). Consequently, arguing that only genes are replicators does not in any way
undermine the role of either individuals or groups as vehicles of selection, and so \Selsh
Gene Theory" (Dawkins, 1976) cannot be used to rule out group selection a priori, as
is sometimes thought (Sober and Wilson, 1998). On the other hand the gene's eye view
to evolution, whereby the fate of single alleles in the population is tracked, can provide
another perspective in which to view group selection, for group selection will itself result
in a change in gene frequencies7 (a change in gene frequencies due to dierential group
productivity and/or extinction is how Wade 1978, and others, dene group selection).
Thus, the results of group selection can themselves be measured in the currency of
gene frequencies, exactly as the results of individual selection can be. Indeed, we do so
throughout this dissertation.
The notion that the gene is the fundamental unit of selection, then, is not an empirical
thesis, but rather one about how we should best represent the selective process (Sober,
1990). This should be contrasted with another meaning of genic selection that is present
in the literature. This is the idea that genes within individuals can compete with each
other, just like individuals can compete with each other within groups (Wilson and Sober,
1989; Wilson, 1997). Thus, selection on genes need not necessarily be in alignment with
selection on individuals, just like selection on individuals need not necessarily be in
alignment with selection on groups. Genic selection not being aligned with individual
selection is demonstrated by the existence of meiotic drive genes, that increase their
representation in the gamete pool at the cost of a reduction in tness of their individual
carrier (Alexander and Borgia, 1978; Leigh Jr., 2009). Thus, meiotic drive genes increase
their own genic tness, but lower the individual tness of their carrier. The strength of
such genic selection is then an empirical matter that must be determined on a case-by-
case basis, and this is the way that gene-level selection is understood in the multi-level
selection literature (Wilson, 1997; Sober and Wilson, 1998; Okasha, 2006). That is, genes
are one level of the biological hierarchy at which selection can act, alongside individuals
and groups (Wilson, 1997). This is in contrast to the representational thesis of genic
selection, which simply states that where genes are the particles of heredity, selection
at any level can be described in terms of gene frequency change (Sterelny and Kitcher,
1988).
The Selsh Gene Theory of Dawkins is the representational thesis of genic selection
(Sober, 1990). Within this framework, both groups and individuals play the role of
6Dawkins uses the terms replicator and vehicle, Hull uses interactor in place of vehicle.
7We assume that the replicators are genetic throughout this section for ease of exposition. However,
there are other kinds of replicators, for example, cultural memes (Dawkins, 1976; Richerson and Boyd,
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vehicles of selection. There is, however, a caveat. Dawkins (1982, 1994), has resisted
the argument that many kinds of groups are vehicles, stating that groups typically lack
the necessary cohesion, i.e., they do not present themselves as a single unit to selection
in the way that individuals do. Wilson and Sober (1989, 1994) argue that such cohesion
must itself be an evolved property, and that more cohesive groups must be the product
of a process of group selection, for more cohesive groups presumably outcompete less
cohesive ones.
Sterelny (1996) has argued that the most convincing examples of groups as vehicles are
those where group tness is not just the simple sum of individual tnesses. He argues
that in such cases, it is possible to distinguish between adaptations that evolved for the
good for the group and those that evolved for the good of the individual. To support
this, he gives an example of a sister-killing gene that has evolved in some eusocial insect
species, which induces a queen to kill any other queens that are born in the same colony.
Sterelny proposes two possible hypotheses for how this gene could have evolved. The
rst is that it evolved because it reduced genetic variation within the colony. This would
reduce within-colony conict as the colony developed, since all colony members would
be descendants of the single queen, thereby reducing the potential for within-colony
selection. Such reduced within-colony selection would help that colony in competition
with others, by favouring more cooperative interactions between the colony members.
The second hypothesis is that once the sister-killing gene arose by mutation, it would
rapidly be selected for by individual selection. This is because any queen that did not
kill others would loose out and fail to pass its genes on, i.e., sister-killing could be seen as
defect in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. In this case, the gene would spread by individual
selection, even though it might be detrimental to colony output. Both of these theses
describe alternative mechanisms by which a gene for sister-killing could increase its
representation in the gene pool. Sterelny argues that the rst hypothesis would result in
a group-level adaptation, the second in an individual-level adaptation. Moreover these
two hypotheses, and hence who the adaptation benets, could be discriminated between
empirically. Sterelny concludes that if sister-killing did indeed evolve because it reduced
within-colony variance, then it is much more convincing to view the colony as a vehicle
of selection in its own right.
By Sterelny's argument, then, trait-groups would not count as vehicles of selection be-
cause trait-group tness just is the tness of the group members. Individuals therefore
seem to be the vehicles, not the trait-groups. This links with the argument about
\groups as the context for individual selection" discussed in Section 2.5.1, for if individ-
uals rather than groups are the vehicles in a group-structured population, then surely
an individual selection story is sucient, and group tness does not need to be invoked
(Sterelny, 1996). This argument applies to the construal of kin selection as an instance
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of selection, then why do we need to see selection as acting on the kin group as a whole?
For example, Maynard Smith (1987, pp.123-124) wrote:
When Wilson (1975) introduced his trait-group model, I was for a long
time bewildered by his wish to treat it as a case of group selection, and
doubly so by the fact that his original model...had interesting results only
when the members of groups were genetically related, a process I had been
calling kin selection for ten years.
In other words, Maynard Smith thought that trait-group selection was just a case of
individual selection (see also Maynard Smith 1998), and was very dierent from the
original formulation discussed by Wynne-Edwards (1962), which had sparked the group
selection controversy. Sober & Wilson, on the other hand, see selection on trait-groups
and selection on the breeding populations of red grouse described by Wynne-Edwards
as part of a continuum, and they argue that both types can be vehicles of selection
and can evolve adaptations \for their own good" (Wilson and Sober, 1994; Sober and
Wilson, 1998). By contrast, Maynard Smith (1987) argued that trait-groups cannot
evolve adaptations, because they lack heredity and so are not \units of evolution", that
is, units that have the properties of multiplication, variation, and heredity, and are hence
subject to natural selection (Maynard Smith, 1987). In a similar vein, authors such as
West et al. (2007a, 2008) see a clear distinction between the early demic models of group
selection that were ineective, and the newer trait-group models. They argue that only
the former represent real group selection, and that consequently, real group selection is
just as unlikely to occur as was originally thought when rst discussing Wynne-Edwards'
hypothesis. They then view trait-group selection as an instance of kin selection, rather
than the other way around. In the next section, we discuss suggestions for how this
tension can be resolved that have been put forward in the literature, and why in general
they have not succeeded. We then turn to how social niche construction can build a
bridge between individual- and group- selectionists.
2.6 Resolving the tension between individual and group
selectionists
Let us rst consider again the relationship between kin and group selection. In Sec-
tion 2.4, we detailed an argument that kin selection is actually a particular instance
of group selection, i.e., that kin selection is really selection at the level of kin groups
(Wilson, 1975a, 1977; Wade, 1980; Michod, 1982). However, as discussed above, some
authors prefer to see this the other way around, with kin selection being the fundamental
process of which trait-group selection is an instance (Foster et al., 2006a,b; West et al.,
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the dierential productivity of kin groups, which requires between-group variance and
so is clearly a group selection process. On the other hand, an individual selectionist
would say that kin selection works on inclusive individual tness, and that cooperation
only evolves in group selection models when there is a positive coecient of relatedness
between the group members (Maynard Smith, 1987). We now turn to how this debate
might be resolved.
2.6.1 Pluralism between group and kin selection
A consensus has emerged amongst some authors that there is no one approach that is
fundamentally correct, for both have heuristic value, they argue (Dugatkin and Reeve,
1994; Kerr and Godfrey-Smith, 2002). The argument is that both kin and group se-
lection are equally valid descriptions of how cooperation evolves, and each can provide
dierent insights (Kerr and Godfrey-Smith, 2002). For example, kin selection models
have proved particularly useful for studying conicts in the social insects (Queller, 2004;
Boomsma and Franks, 2006), and the concept of genetic relatedness can be more intu-
itive than between-group variance to many eld ecologists (Grafen, 1984), and is easier
to measure in the lab thanks to modern genetic marker techniques (Queller and Good-
night, 1989) (West et al. 2007a discusses these and further heuristic advantages of a kin
selection approach). On the other hand, group selection thinking has highlighted the
local disadvantage of altruism even amongst immediate genealogical relatives, which is
why purely viscous populations are not conducive to the evolution of cooperation (Wil-
son et al., 1992; Queller, 2004). It has also stimulated the creation of models where
genealogical relatedness is not the driver of strong altruism (e.g., Peck 2004; Santos and
Szathm ary 2008).
This pluralistic position may seem attractive, but it has not settled the group selection
debate, for three reasons. The rst reason is that authors on both sides still advocate
that their way of looking at social evolution is the correct one (Sober and Wilson, 1998;
West et al., 2007a, 2008; Wilson, 2007). That is, they are able to acknowledge the other
position without giving it parity. The number of real pluralists in the social evolution
eld is thus very small. The second reason is that the formal theory of individualists rests
on the calculation of inclusive tness in order to determine the direction of selection on a
social trait. This theory, however, is based on pairwise interactions between individuals
(van Veelen, 2009). van Veelen (2009) has shown that if interactions instead involve more
individuals then inclusive tness does not correctly predict the direction of selection,
unless the interaction takes the form of a linear public goods game8 . Such linearity
8The crucial point is that more than two individuals interact simultaneously. In many models,
although the trait-group size is larger than 2, the interactions are still assumed to be pairwise. For
example, in the models presented in this dissertation, 2 player games are generalised to trait-groups of
size n, by multiplying the 2x2 payo-matrix by the proportion of cooperative and selsh individuals
in the group, respectively. The interpretation of this is that pairs of individuals in the group interact
randomly. Alternatively, an n-player game could be formulated as an nxn payo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in the costs and benets of cooperating is a special case, and only applies when the
benet of cooperating does not change with the frequency of cooperators in the group.
van Veelen provides many examples of models in the literature with non-linear costs
and benets, and argues that such non-linearity is likely to be relevant during many
of the major transitions to new levels of biological organisation. This suggests that
inclusive tness may be the wrong methodology for modelling the major transitions,
and that multi-level selection methods may instead be necessary to correctly analyse
models, since they do not suer from problems with non-linearity when the trait-group
size is larger than 2.
The third problem with a pluralistic approach is that it does not touch on the question
of whether trait- and kin- group selection are real group selection or not. That is,
are these selective processes the same kind that Wynne-Edwards envisaged, and which
the demic group selection models attempted to capture? This question is important,
because there is a strong tendency in the literature to distinguish between \old" and
\new" group selection. \New group selection" is considered to be the trait-group style
models, whereas \old group selection" is that envisaged by Wynne-Edwards, according
to some authors (Grafen, 1984; Reeve and Keller, 1999; West et al., 2007a, 2008). Old
group selection is thought by these authors to be fundamentally dierent to individual
selection, and is thought to have been ruled out as a plausible evolutionary mechanism
because, as shown by the demic models of the 1970s (Boorman and Levitt, 1972; Levin
and Kilmer, 1974), it was ineective under plausible conditions. These authors then
redescribe trait-group selection in individualist terms, and hence see no real role for
group selection of any kind (West et al., 2007a, 2008).
2.6.2 Old versus new, and type 1 versus type 2, group selection
It is important to carefully evaluate the claim that old and new group selection are fun-
damentally dierent selective processes, for much of the modern group selection debate
turns on this issue. In the philosophical literature, a distinction is made between type 1
and type 2 group selection models (Damuth and Heisler, 1988). Type 1 group selection
models aim to explain the evolution of individual traits in a group-structured popula-
tion (Damuth and Heisler, 1988; Okasha, 2001, 2006). Groups are assigned tnesses in
such explanations, but tness is measured in terms of the number of individuals that
the group contributes into the global population (Damuth and Heisler, 1988; Mayo and
Gilinsky, 1987; Okasha, 2006). This has to be the case, given that such models aim to
explain how an individual trait, such as cooperation, increases in frequency in the popu-
lation of individuals (Okasha, 2001, 2006). So individuals, and not groups per se, are the
individuals in the group participating in one simultaneous interaction. It is in these cases that inclusive
tness does not give the right answer if the group size is greater than 2, and the interaction is not a
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focal units in such models (Damuth and Heisler, 1988), and this is why a redescription
of such models in terms of individual tness and selection is always available.
By contrast, type 2 group selection models explain the evolution of group-level traits
(Damuth and Heisler, 1988; Okasha, 2006). Consequently, group tness has to be mea-
sured in terms of the number of ospring groups founded by a parent group (Damuth
and Heisler, 1988; Mayo and Gilinsky, 1987; Okasha, 2006), for we wish to explain how a
group-level trait increases in frequency in the metapopulation of groups. In such models
we therefore need to track the frequency of groups as well as individuals, so the groups
are focal units in this variety of group selection. It is important to stress that it is not
a matter of perspective as to whether we count groups or individuals or both (Okasha,
2006): if we are interested in the evolution of an individual-level trait, then we need only
count individuals, but if we are interested in the spread of a group-level trait, then we
need to track the frequency of groups with that trait. In type 2 group selection we will
often need to track the frequency of individuals as well, because selection on individuals
within a group may be in opposition to selection between groups that promotes the
group-level trait. This does not, however, undermine the need to track groups also.
An example of this is provided in the Stochastic Corrector model of Szathm ary and
Demeter (1987). In this model, dierent types of replicator are encapsulated inside
protocells. Within a protocell, the replicators contribute to a common metabolism, but
use that metabolism at dierent rates. Thus, selection on replicators within protocells
will favour the type that uses the shared metabolism at the fastest rate, ultimately
tending to competitive exclusion of all other replicator types within the protocell (and
in fact, the death of the protocell, as protocell functionality is assumed to require the
presence of all replicator types (Grey et al., 1995); this is thus a perfect instance of the
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968)). But, there is an optimum combination of
dierent replicator types, which causes protocells close to that combination to divide
more rapidly, and hence to become the more common protocell type9. The model
thus explains how the protocell-level trait of having a certain combination of replicators
increases in frequency in the population of protocells. In order to do so, the model needs
to track both the frequencies of dierent types of replicator within protocells, and the
frequencies of protocells that have dierent combinations of replicators. The model is
therefore of the type 2 group selection variety.
It seems clear that all authors in the literature would agree that type 2 selection is \real"
group selection, for it is an exact analogue of individual selection shifted one level up
9The model is called the \Stochastic Corrector" because there are two forms of stochasticity that
generate the necessary between-protocell variance in replicator composition, for group selection to act
on. These are the random assortment of replicators into ospring protocells when the parent divides,
and a stochastic component of reproduction within protocells owing to the small number of replicators
present (Szathm ary and Demeter, 1987; Szathm ary, 1999). The between-group variance generated by
this stochasticity allows group selection to \correct" for the tendency of within-group selection to lead
to competitive exclusion, and hence the loss of replicator types required for protocell functionality
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the biological hierarchy. Moreover, this is the kind that authors such as Grafen (1984)
and West et al. (2007a, 2008) equate with \old" Wynne-Edwards style group selection.
However, was type 2 group selection really what Wynne-Edwards was postulating? Sev-
eral authors attempted to model the Wynne-Edwards process (Maynard Smith, 1964;
Boorman and Levitt, 1972; Levin and Kilmer, 1974), by considering that demes with a
greater proportion of altruists would be less likely to go extinct and/or would send out
more individuals to colonise vacant resource patches. On close inspection, these models
are actually of type 1 (Okasha, 2001, 2006). In retrospect, this had to be the case,
for they modelled how the individual-level trait of altruism could spread as a result of
dierential group productivity and/or extinction (Okasha, 2001). That is, they showed
conditions under which an altruistic allele could increase in frequency in the population
of individuals, due to dierential group productivity and/or extinction (Maynard Smith,
1964; Boorman and Levitt, 1972; Levin and Kilmer, 1974). None of these models tracked
the frequency of particular kinds of group (i.e., the frequency of groups with x% of al-
truists in the metapopulation of groups). Their results were framed entirely in terms of
the frequency of alleles carried by individual organisms, for this is all that is needed to
explain the evolution of an individual phenotype like altruistic behaviour. This should
be contrasted with the Stochastic Corrector model, which explains the evolution of a
group phenotype10, namely, the combination of replicator types inside the protocell.
Okasha (2001) points out that the demic group selection models, which aimed to model
the Wynne-Edwards process, could instead have modelled the evolution of a group-
level phenotype \group has x% altruists", rather than the individual-level phenotype
\individual is an altruist". They did not do so, however, for their focus was on how
individual altruists could increase in frequency in the population. In general, a group-
level trait must depend on individual-level traits, which in turn must depend on the
genes that code for them. But, this does not mean that we do not need to explain
the evolution of a trait at a higher level. For example, the Stochastic Corrector model
was designed to explain how protcells with the optimum (from the point-of-view of the
protocell) combination of replicator types came to increase in frequency in the population
of protocells. Although this trait depends on the replicator-level trait \is a replicator of
type x", the aim of the model was not to explain why a certain proportion of replicators,
in the global population of replicators, evolved to be of type x. The fact that changes
in protocell frequency result in global changes in replicator frequency does not preclude
them from being dierent questions. On the other hand, the demic group selection
models cited above did just seek to explain the evolution of an individual-trait, and the
10The use of group- and individual- phenotype, rather than trait, emphasises the fact that in either
case, it is the product of genetic interactions with the biotic and abiotic environment. Thus, group
phenotypes have a genetic basis, just like individual phenotypes. The fact that groups are made of
individuals does not prevent groups from having their own phenotypes, in the same way that the fact
that individuals are made of cells does not prevent individuals from having their own phenotypes. This
follows on from the separation between replicators and vehicles made by Dawkins (1984) and Hull (1984),
for they argued that the fact that entities at level x of the biological hierarchy are made of genes does
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fact that this resulted in the composition of groups changing was a by-product. This
is why \an individual selection in the context of groups" account of such evolution is
available.
So, the early group selection models were indeed of type 1 (Okasha, 2001, 2006). That
is, they are of the same type as trait-group models and kin selection models. They can
therefore be viewed as \individual selection in a group context" in the same way that
trait-group models can be, contrary to what Grafen (1984) and West et al. (2007a, 2008)
suggest. These demic models were ineective not because they were \old" group selec-
tion, but because they lacked eective mechanisms to generate between-group variance
(such as kinship), and preserve it (such as global dispersal stage). On the other hand,
the\old" style group selection Stochastic Corrector model is eective because the fact
that protocells regularly split allows between-group variance to be regenerated (Sza-
thm ary, 1999). The connection between the early group selection models and those of
the trait-group variety is particularly vivid when one considers multi-generational trait
group models, such as those in Wilson (1987) and Fletcher and Zwick (2004). Argu-
ments that trait-group models are not \real" group selection, but merely instances of
individual selection, thus apply to any of these models, and indeed must do so since all
of them consider the evolution of individual traits.
What, then, of type 2 models? Even individualists such as Grafen & West would pre-
sumably agree that an individual-level selection explanation is much less appropriate in
such cases. Yet, such processes have very rarely been modelled, as Okasha (2001, 2006)
notes. Why is this so? We argue that just asserting group-level reproduction and the
existence of group-level traits begs the question of how those properties arose. That is,
how did the groups become cohesive enough for type 2 group selection to be operative?
In some sense, in order for type 2 selection to occur the groups must posses a degree
of individuality. We can see this by the fact that type 2 group selection is individual
selection shifted one level up the biological hierarchy, so the groups are treated just like
individuals. In general, for a type 2 model to be satisfying from an explanatory point of
view, we need to be able to explain why we are interested in tracking the frequency of
particular kinds of groups and not just individuals. That is, why are the groups cohesive
enough to warrant this? This problem does not arise in type 1 models because there we
are only interested in the frequency of individuals, and by denition what we call an in-
dividual is a cohesive unit, or a unit of evolution as Maynard Smith (1987) would call it.
Interestingly, articial group selection experiments (e.g., Wade 1976, 1977; Craig 1982;
Muir 1996) are of the type 2 variety, but the problem of explaining cohesiveness does not
arise there because the experimenter imposes individuality on the groups. That is, both
group-level reproduction, and group tness meaning number of descendant groups, are
imposed as part of the experiment. These models show us that when these properties
are imposed, there can be a response to selection on group-level traits. In the case of
natural selection, however, we cannot rely on these properties being imposed. As we52 Chapter 2 The Group Selection Debate and Social Niche Construction
discuss in the next section, however, social niche construction can explain how these
properties arise through the evolution of individual traits, and can thus bridge the gap
between type 1 \individual selection in the context of groups", and type 2 \real group
selection".
2.6.3 Social niche construction bridges the gap between individual-
and group- selectionists
Proponents of an individual-level view to all social evolution, such as Grafen (1984),
Dawkins (1994) and West et al. (2007a, 2008), see no need to invoke group selection in
type 1 cases. This is because for them, it is just frequency-dependent individual selection
in a structured population (Maynard Smith, 1998; Sterelny, 1996). On the other hand,
although these authors would agree that type 2 models involve group selection, such
models might seem unsatisfactory unless we can explain how the groups came to be
cohesive targets of selection in their own right. As Dawkins would put it, why should
we treat the groups, and not just the individuals, as vehicles?
Social niche construction, however, suggests that if the group structure is itself evolving
in type 1 models, then it should not be regarded as merely a part of the environmental
context of individual selection, in the way that abiotic environmental factors are. This
is because individual adaptation can actually strengthen type 1 group selection, as we
illustrate in this dissertation. Moreover, models that treat groups as merely a part
of the selective environment cannot explain how those groups are themselves created.
That is, type 1 group selection itself needs an evolutionary explanation, in the way that
other static environmental contexts, such as aspects of the physical environment, do not.
How does this connect with type 2 group selection? Social niche construction explains
how individual adaptation reinforces group selection, by creating more cohesive groups.
Such greater group cohesion could lead to type 2 group selection becoming operative
on the groups. This suggests that the apparent impasse between type 1 and type 2
group selection can be bridged (see also Okasha 2006 and Michod 2005). Thus, social
niche construction suggests that merely viewing the groups as part of the environmental
context in type 1 scenarios is unsatisfactory, for doing so cannot explain how the groups
were created and hence how group-level selection pressures on social behaviour came to
be exerted. In addition, the evolution of type 1 group structure can potentially lead
to \real" (sensu West et al. 2007a, 2008) type 2 group selection becoming operative,
bridging the gap between these types of group selection.Chapter 3
A Minimal Model of Social Niche
Construction
In this chapter, we present a rst investigation into how individuals can create selective
environments favouring more or less cooperative behaviour, by modifying their popula-
tion structure. Specically, we consider how individuals can evolve a preference for the
number of other individuals with which they found a group, for example, when colonis-
ing a resource patch. Such a preference directly aects the selection pressures on social
behaviour, since groups founded by fewer individuals will tend to be less representative
of the global population and more homogeneous. More formally, the groups' genotypic
composition is a statistical sample of that of the global population, and taking a smaller
sample size increases the between-sample variance and reduces within-sample variance.
A smaller initial group size therefore tends to cluster individuals with the same social
behaviour into groups together, providing a greater selection pressure for cooperation.
3.1 Introducing the aggregation and dispersal population
structure
We consider a population structure based on the \Haystack model"1 as conceived by
Maynard Smith (1964), and later extended by Wilson (Wilson and Colwell, 1981; Wilson,
1987; Sober and Wilson, 1998). In this structure, groups of initial size n colonise a
resource patch, and reproduce on that patch for a number of generations. After a xed
number of generations, the members of all groups disperse and freely-mix in a migrant
pool, before new patches are again colonised by n individuals and the process repeats.
Such a population structure can potentially allow cooperative behaviours to evolve, since
groups founded by a greater proportion of cooperators will grow to a larger size, and
1The model is known as the Haystack model because Maynard Smith (1964) originally presented it
as a model of an imaginary species of mouse that formed groups in discrete haystacks.
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will hence contribute more individuals into the migrant pool at the dispersal stage.
This is between-group selection of type 1. However, within-group selection also operates
since cooperators decline in frequency within each group as reproduction and selection
occurs. Whether or not cooperation increases in frequency globally then depends upon
the balance of these two selective forces: the extra contribution of groups with more
cooperators to the migrant pool must outweigh their decline within each group. An
illustration of this population structure is shown in Figure 1.1.
Although somewhat idealised, this kind of population structure ts some organisms
particularly well. In particular, organisms that live on an ephemeral resource patch
where resource depletion triggers the dispersal stage. Examples include small arthropods
(Wilson and Colwell, 1981), parasites (where the host is the ephemeral resource) (Wilson
and Colwell, 1981; Bull et al., 1991; Williams and Nesse, 1991), and micro-colonies in
bacterial biolms (Ghannoum and O'Toole, 2004), or more generally any species that
undergoes very large uctuations in density due to population explosions and subsequent
crashes (Bulmer and Taylor, 1980; Wilson and Colwell, 1981). However, our use of the
model is motivated by the fact that it has few parameters and has been well studied
in the social evolution literature (Bulmer and Taylor, 1980; Wilson and Colwell, 1981;
Wilson, 1987; Bergstrom, 2002; Fletcher and Zwick, 2004). This means that it provides a
simple and well understood population structure that we can extend by allowing, unlike
in previous work, the structure to itself evolve. In the remainder of this dissertation we
use the term \aggregation and dispersal", rather than \Haystack", model as this is a
more descriptive term for the population structure. Specically, \aggregation" refers to
the individuals coming into groups, while \dispersal" refers to the individuals leaving
those groups after a number of generations.
The parameters in the classical, xed structure, aggregation and dispersal model that
aect the evolution of cooperation are:
 the ratio of the group tness benet to the individual cost;
 the number of generations, t, spent reproducing within groups prior to the dispersal
stage;
 the variance in initial group composition.
The greater the benet-to-cost ratio of a cooperative act, the less stringent are the
conditions for its evolution. Conversely, the greater the variance in the frequency of a
cooperative allele between groups, the greater the range of cooperative behaviours that
can evolve. In the limit, if there is no variance in cooperative behaviour between groups
then the behaviour cannot evolve regardless of its benet to others, since within-group
selection favouring avoiding paying the immediate cost of cooperating will be the only
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occurring) then any cooperative behaviour can be selected for that has a benet-to-cost
ratio greater than 1, for in that case between-group selection will be the only selective
force. This between-group variance will depend upon the initial variance in genotypic
composition of the groups, which in turn depends on how groups are formed. As dis-
cussed above, if groups are formed randomly then a smaller initial group size will increase
the between-group variance in the frequency of a cooperative allele, thus favouring the
evolution of cooperation. Random group formation, however, represents something of
a worst-case assumption (Wilson, 1977; Wilson and Dugatkin, 1997). Group forma-
tion could instead be assortative, such that individuals with the same social behaviour
tend to join the same groups (Wilson and Dugatkin, 1997). This would again increase
between-group variance and favour cooperation. Any such mechanism that increases
between-group variance also conversely decreases within-group variance, and so reduces
the scope for within-group selection favouring selshness.
The number of generations spent within groups prior to dispersal can have two eects
(Wilson, 1987). At the extreme, if the number of generations is large enough that the
equilibrium allele frequencies are reached within each group, then the cooperative allele
will be driven extinct in all groups that initially had at least one selsh allele present.
This is because within-group selection is generally assumed to monotonically favour
selshness (an assumption that we show the implications of in the next chapters), and so
causes the cooperative allele to decline in frequency within each mixed group with every
generation. The assumption that each group must reach equilibrium allele frequencies
before dispersal was made by Maynard Smith (1964) in his original presentation of
the model (highlighted by Wilson 1987), where it was concluded that the likelihood of
cooperation evolving in such a scenario was very bleak. However, the dispersal stage
could happen before equilibrium allele frequencies are reached 2. This could easily
happen, for example, if each group lives on an ephemeral resource patch that becomes
depleted after a few generations. Studies such as Wilson and Colwell (1981); Wilson
(1987) have investigated the eects of this, and found that cooperation evolves far more
readily if dispersal occurs before equilibrium. In some cases, an intermediate number
of generations before dispersal can most favour the evolution of cooperation, since the
initial between-group variance can become magnied over the rst few generations of
reproduction (Wilson, 1987; Fletcher and Zwick, 2004). On the other hand, in some
cases only a single generation within groups can better favour cooperation, since this
gives within-group selection fewer generations to act. This partly explains why the
classic example of kin selection in sibling groups so eectively promotes cooperation
(e.g., Williams and Williams 1957), since the siblings disperse immediately after the
cooperative act towards each other has been expressed, reducing the eectiveness of
opposing selection within the sibling group. Whether one or more generations within
groups most favours cooperation depends upon the dynamics of within-group selection,
2In type 2 group selection, the analogue of dispersal is the formation and emigration of ospring
propagules, that is, a subset of the group that breaks away after growth to occupy a new site.56 Chapter 3 A Minimal Model of Social Niche Construction
which in turn depends on the type of the cooperative act, for example, whether it is
weakly or strongly altruistic.
Although we have explained the above factors of population structure in terms of type
1 group selection theory, they can also easily be framed in terms of kin selection (for
example, a version of the classical Haystack model where groups are founded by a single
mated female and her clutch of ospring has been analysed in a kin selection framework
by Taylor and Wilson 1988). To do so, we use the expanded version of Hamilton's rule
introduced by Queller (1994) and advocated by West et al. (2002), which is able to deal
with the eects of local competition between the beneciaries of cooperation and hence
with multiple generations of reproduction within groups before dispersal.
rxyb   c   rxed > 0 (3.1)
This version of Hamilton's rule is shown in equation 3.1 (West et al., 2002), where rxy is
the relatedness of the actor to the recipients of cooperation (the classical r term in the
original version of Hamilton's rule), b is the benet to the recipient, and c the cost to
the actor. The extra term rxed accounts for local competition. Specically, d measures
the extra competition due to increased crowding that is caused by cooperation raising
the tness of recipients and hence causing them to have more ospring. It is thus a
measure of the negative density-dependent eects of extra growth. rxe then measures
the relatedness between actors and the individuals that suer this increased crowding
due to the cooperative act, and a reduction in this favours the evolution of cooperation.
Equation 3.1 therefore highlights the need for two scales of interaction for cooperation to
evolve: recipients of cooperation should disperse away from the actor to avoid ultimately
competing with her for limited resources. This is therefore an explanation for why
reproduction must not occur for too many generations before dispersal if cooperation is
to evolve, and is equivalent to the notion of within-group selection opposing cooperation
in the group selection framework. Similarly, the variance in initial group composition in
the group selection framework is equivalent to rxy at the time the groups are founded,
once relatedness is measured as a statistical correlation between the allelic composition of
group members relative to the mean allele frequencies in the global population (Grafen,
1984, 1985; Queller, 1994).
3.2 The evolution of the aggregation and dispersal struc-
ture
The basic aggregation and dispersal model, like nearly all models of social evolution,
assumes that the parameters of the population structure remain xed over evolutionary
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aected by individual traits and hence evolve in an adaptive manner. In particular, if
the parameters can evolve, will they evolve towards conditions that favour cooperative
or selsh behaviour? Here, we allow individual adaptation to determine whether the
conditions for cooperation or selshness are created.
To do so, we consider two competing initial group sizes, by giving individuals a genetic
preference for living in groups founded by either many or few individuals. An individual's
genotype thus contains two alleles. The rst of these species the size of group that
an individual will join from the migrant pool, the second the social behaviour of that
individual. Selection for a small initial group size preference should favour cooperation,
by in creasing between-group variance and the relatedness of the group members. On
the other hand, selection for a large size preference should favour selsh behaviour, by
reducing between-group variance and within-group relatedness.
We frame social behaviour in terms of resource utilisation strategy. Specically, each
group has a resource pool that is shared by all members. We assume that there is
a trade-o between growth rate and yield, where the yield is the amount of biomass
produced per unit of resource consumed. The cooperative strategy is then to reduce
growth rate and increase yield, while the selsh strategy is to grow faster and hence
reduce yield. If all individuals adopted the cooperative strategy, then the group would
reach a larger total biomass. However, the selsh strategy will increase in frequency
within each mixed group, since it has the higher growth rate, even though it will reduce
the total biomass available from the resource. This therefore creates a \Tragedy of
the Commons" scenario (Hardin, 1968), as discussed in Chapter 1, and the question is
whether population structuring can avert this tragedy and allow a higher yield to evolve
even when it is costly in terms of a reduced growth rate. This exact kind of trade-o
between growth rate and yield has been demonstrated to occur in micro-organisms, for
example, in ATP production as a result of metabolic trade-os (Pfeier et al., 2001;
MacLean, 2008).
3.3 A rst model of the concurrent evolution of initial
group size and social behaviour
The genotype of each individual in our model is haploid and species two binary traits:
1. Cooperative or selsh resource usage (specied as a growth rate, Gi, and a resource
consumption rate Ci);
2. specication of the initial size of the group that that the individual will join (small
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We therefore consider 4 possible genotypes: cooperative + small, cooperative + large,
selsh + small and selsh + large.
3.3.1 Reproduction within groups
Asexual reproduction occurs entirely within groups, as follows. Let ni represent the
(continuous) density of genotype i in a single group. In order to reproduce, these geno-
types require a share of the group's resource inux, R. The size of this share that each
genotype receives depends upon its growth and consumption rates relative to those of
the other genotype(s), where the consumption rate should be understood as the amount
of resource required for a genotype to make one copy of itself. The magnitude of the
share of the total group resource that the genotype receives, ri, is then as dened in
Equation 3.2.
ri =
niGiCi P
j
(njGjCj)
R (3.2)
Therefore, the genotype with the highest growth and consumption rates will receive the
largest per capita share of the total resource. This means that the selsh genotype always
receives more per capita resource than the cooperative type, and so will ultimately drive
a cooperative genotype in the same group extinct at equilibrium.
In one version of the model, the amount of resource that a group receives at each time-
step depends upon its size, with a larger per capita amount of resource allocated to
larger groups. Specically, groups of a large initial size receive 1.25 times more resource
per capita than small groups. This implements a (weak) Allee eect (Allee, 1938; Odum
and Allee, 1954; Avil es, 1999) whereby larger groups have an intrinsic advantage, for
example, due to access to resources that a smaller group cannot obtain. Signicantly,
this provides an upwards pressure on initial group size away from that which would
maximise cooperation and long term group productivity. We thus give in this version of
the model the conditions that favour selsh behaviour an intrinsic advantage.
Given the resource share received by a genotype as described above, the density of
the genotype in that group then changes according to Equation 3.3. The form of this
equation is motivated as a simplication of existing models of bacterial colony growth
(Pfeier et al., 2001; Pfeier and Bonhoeer, 2003; Kreft, 2004). We allow the densities
to be continuous numbers within groups.
ni(t + 1) = ni(t) +
ri
Ci
  Dni(t) (3.3)Chapter 3 A Minimal Model of Social Niche Construction 59
As the dierence equation (3.3) shows, the density of a genotype produced during re-
production depends on both growth (favouring the selsh type in the short-term) and
consumption rates (favouring the cooperative type in the long-term under limited re-
source). The nal term in (3.3) represents mortality, where D is a death rate that is
constant to all genotypes.
3.3.2 The aggregation and dispersal process
The overall operation of our model is as stated in Algorithm 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1 Aggregation and dispersal model with two competing initial group sizes.
1. Initialisation: Initialise the migrant pool with a total density of N individuals,
consisting of each of the 4 possible genotypes at equal frequency.
2. Group formation (aggregation): Assign individuals in the migrant pool to
groups, as described in the main text below.
3. Reproduction: Perform reproduction within groups for t generations, by per-
forming t iterations of Equation 3.3 within each group.
4. Migrant pool formation (dispersal): Return the progeny of each group to the
migrant pool.
5. Maintaining the global carrying capacity: Rescale the migrant pool back to
size N, retaining the proportion of individuals with each genotype, and rounding
the density of each type to the nearest integer. This implements a global carrying
capacity.
6. Iteration: Repeat from step 2 onwards for a number of cycles, T.
Assignment of genotype densities to groups occurs by the following process. Groups
of the \small" initial size are created by choosing (without replacement) individuals at
random who carry the small size allele on their genotype. Likewise, groups of the \large"
initial size are created from randomly drawn individuals carrying the large allele. There-
fore, although all individuals in a group will specify the same size trait, the composition
of the group will be random with respect to the cooperative / selsh resource usage
trait. This group formation process can be modelled by two hypergeometric distribu-
tions, one for individuals with the small size allele, and the other for individuals with
the large allele. The parameters of these hypergeometric distributions are: Nh is the
density of individuals with the size allele, nh is the initial group size as specied by the
size allele, and mh is the frequency of the cooperative allele in the pool of individuals
with that size allele (the subscript h denotes classical parameters of the hypergeometric
distribution). Finally, if there are an insucient number of individuals remaining in the
migrant pool to form the appropriate group size, then those remaining unassigned to
groups are discarded. Given a large population size, the eect of this is negligible.60 Chapter 3 A Minimal Model of Social Niche Construction
3.4 Results: the concurrent evolution of initial group size
and social behaviour
In this section, we rst investigate the results of pairwise competition between genotypes,
before proceeding to investigate the dynamics that occur when all 4 possible genotypes
are present. Throughout this section, the parameter settings stated in Table 3.1 are used.
We explore the eect of dierent initial group sizes and per capita resource allocations
below.
Table 3.1: Parameter settings used throughout Chapter 3.
Parameter Value
Growth rate (cooperative), Gc 0.018
Growth rate (selsh), Gs 0.02
Consumption rate (cooperative), Cc 0.1
Consumption rate (selsh), Cd 0.2
Small initial group size, n0s 4
Large initial group size, n0l 40
Total resource inux for small groups with Allee eect, Rs 4
Total resource inux for large groups with Allee eect, Rl 50
Migrant pool density, N 1000
Number of aggregation and dispersal cycles, T 4000
3.4.1 Preliminary Experimentation / Pairwise Competition
When deciding on values for \small" and \large" initial group sizes, it was essential that
the imposition of the small size upon all members of the population lead to selection
on behaviour favouring the cooperative trait, and the imposition of the large size lead
to selection favouring the selsh trait. This would then give individuals the possibility
of adaptively determining whether the environmental conditions, in the form of initial
group size, lead to cooperation being selected for.
To determine suitable values for large and small initial group sizes, the 2-dimensional
parameter space consisting of initial group size and the number of generations spent
reproducing within groups prior to dispersal was sampled; all other parameters of the
model were held constant. We set the resource inux, R, for each initial group size to
be equal to that size, i.e., if the initial group size was 4, then the resource inux per
generation was also 4. Thus, the initial per capita resource inux across all group sizes
was unity. Figure 3.1 plots the 2-dimensional parameter space with respect to whether
cooperation was selected for. We report cooperation as being selected for only if the
cooperative trait reached xation in the global population at equilibrium, i.e., after 4000
aggregation and dispersal cycles.Chapter 3 A Minimal Model of Social Niche Construction 61
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Figure 3.1: Exploration of the 2-dimensional parameter space over initial group
size and the number of generations within groups before disperal.
As expected from the classical theory discussed at the start of this chapter, this sample
of the space shows that cooperation is favoured by a population structure where groups
are founded by few individuals and where a short number of generations is spent within
those groups prior to dispersal and global mixing. A small initial group size favours
cooperation by increasing the variance in group composition, thereby strengthening se-
lection acting between groups, i.e. selection that is due to the dierence in group sizes
after reproduction Sober and Wilson (1998). Equivalently, they increase the related-
ness between a cooperator and the other group members that benet from her reduced
growth rate. A small number of generations within groups prior to mixing favours co-
operation since the longer the time spent in groups, the greater the decline in frequency
of cooperators within all groups that also contain cheaters (Sober and Wilson, 1998).
From the kin selection perspective, it decreases the relatedness between the actor and
the other individuals who suer the eects of crowding due to the increased fecundity
of the recipient of cooperation, since the groups are reformed more frequently.
Given the results in Figure 3.1, we set the small group size at 4 and the large at 40, with
the number of generations within groups xed at 4. This then creates the situation in
which cooperative + small outcompetes selsh + small, and selsh + large outcompetes
cooperative + large. Therefore, our denition of small initial size favours cooperative
resource usage, while our denition of large favours selsh usage.
3.4.2 Allowing Both Social Behaviour and Population Structure to
Evolve
We initially considered the case where there is no intrinsic advantage to larger groups,
thus groups of the small initial size received 4 units of resource per generation, and groups
of the large initial size 40. We competed cooperative + small against selsh + large62 Chapter 3 A Minimal Model of Social Niche Construction
by starting each genotype in equal frequency in the global population. We found that
cooperative + small always outcompeted selsh + large; the results of an illustrative run
are shown in Figure 3.2 (all runs showed the same qualitative trends, and the standard
error was close to 0. This is due to the fact that everything in the model is a deterministic
process, apart from group formation). Both the cooperative + small and selsh + small
genotypes initially increased in frequency, meaning that the small groups population
strucutre was initially favoured by both types. In particular, selsh individuals did well
in the small groups for a short time, since they were able to exploit the cooperators in
those groups. However, this could not be sustained, because we know from Figure 3.1
that the selsh type is ultimately driven extinct by group selection in such small groups.
In conclusion, even though a population structure favouring selshness was available,
this was never selected for, since both cooperators and selsh individuals (initially) do
better in the smaller groups where there is a greater frequency of cooperation. As this
group size becomes dominant, cooperative behaviour sweeps to xation.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of population structure and social behaviour with no
intrinsic advantage to larger groups.
We can provide a logical argument for why, in the absence of any other selection pressures
on population structure, this must be the case. Cooperation increases in frequency in
groups of a smaller initial size, compared to those of a larger initial size. This follows
immediately from the fact that the between-group variance and relatedness is higher
in the smaller groups, and so cooperators in such groups tend to interact more with
each other and reduce exploitative interactions with selsh individuals (the \small" size
was chosen so that it would provide sucient extra between-group variance to select for
greater cooperation, as shown in Section 3.4.1). Thus, greater cooperation is selected for
in the smaller groups. If the individuals in such groups are those with a genetic preference
for being in them, i.e., they posses the small size allele, then linkage disequilibrium will
be generated between the cooperation and small size alleles. As a result bearers of theChapter 3 A Minimal Model of Social Niche Construction 63
small allele will receive a greater per capita share of the benets of cooperation, and so
will be tter than bearers of the large allele, all other factors being equal. Selection for
cooperative behaviour that occurs in small groups therefore drives selection for those
small groups themselves, initiating a positive feedback process (Breden and Wade, 1991;
Crespi, 2004) that drives the cooperative + small genotype to xation. We can conclude
that any component of selection on population structure that is due to social behaviour
must be in the direction of a structure that supports cooperation. This is because,
with all other factors held constant, selection towards a structure favouring increased
selshness would reduce the tness of individuals in that structure. This follows from the
denition of cooperative and selsh behaviour, and the fact that linkage disequilibrium
is generated between the behavioural and structural alleles by the fact that individuals
with a preference for a certain structure nd themselves living in that structure more
frequently than individuals that do not have the preference (in this model, the match
between preference and the structure inhabited is perfect). Thus, if individuals have an
allele that determines which structure they live in, those choosing the selsh structure
would be less t, and so an allele that creates this structure must decline in frequency.
The question that we turn to next is, what happens if there are other components of
selection on population structure apart from those resulting from social behaviour? In
particular, we consider an Allee eect that provides an intrinsic advantage to groups
founded by more individuals. This thus provides a component of selection on initial
group size that is in the opposite direction to that caused by social behaviour. How
will these components interplay to form the resultant vector of selection on initial group
size? As discussed previously, we incorporate an Allee eect by giving small groups 4
units of resource inux per generation, and large groups 50, i.e, 1.25 times more per
capita.
Because of the Allee eect, preliminary results showed that in pairwise competition,
cooperative + small is outcompeted by cooperative + large. This is due to the greater
per capita resource inux provided to large groups, which allows such groups to grow
to a larger size, assuming all other conditions are the same. Likewise, selsh + large
outcompetes selsh + small. Given that large size preference genotypes outcompete their
small counterparts, and that selsh resource usage is favoured in a population structure
where groups are of a large initial size, it might be expected that the population would
evolve towards a state with the selsh + large genotype at xation. In particular,
selection on the size allele due to the Allee eect is direct, for the benets of a larger
size are immediate. On the other hand, the component of selection on initial size due to
social behaviour is indirect, for it occurs only after cooperation has increased in frequency
within those groups. We might therefore expect the direct component of selection on
population structure to outweigh the indirect, and so the conditions favouring selshness
would be created after all.64 Chapter 3 A Minimal Model of Social Niche Construction
In order to investigate this, we started each of the 4 possible genotypes in equal frequency
in the migrant pool, and recorded the change in genotype frequencies over 4000 aggre-
gation and dispersal cycles, which was a sucient length of time for a global equilibrium
to be reached. We show results from a single run here in order to highlight the transient
dynamics; there was no qualitative variation in these dynamics over 30 runs. This is
because the only source of stochasticity in our model is in the group formation stage,
but over many aggregation and dispersal cycles this does not have a signicant eect,
and can be modelled by the hypergoemetric distribution as described in Section 3.3.2.
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Figure 3.3: A) average population structure and social behaviour through time.
B) change in genotype frequencies over time.Chapter 3 A Minimal Model of Social Niche Construction 65
Figure 3.3A shows how the average population structure, in terms of initial group size,
and the average social behaviour, in terms of resource usage strategy, change over time.
The key point is that at the start neither small groups nor cooperators are favoured;
this is shown by an increase in the frequency of both large groups and selsh cheats.
Therefore, since the initial conditions favour both large groups and selsh individuals, it
might be expected that the equilibrium reached would consist entirely of large groups of
the selsh type. However, this is not what occurs. Instead, after around 20 aggregation
and dispersal cycles, both small groups and cooperators become favoured by selection.
Therefore, the selective pressures change in a way that was not easy to predict from the
pairwise competition of genotypes alone.
Figure 3.3B helps to explain why this occurs, by showing how all possible combinations
of population structure and social behaviour change over time. The gure shows that
initially, the population structure of large groups is favoured; this is due to their per
capita resource advantage. In such large groups, the selsh inecient resource usage
strategy is favoured, as previously discussed.
However, the selsh + large genotype does not reach xation. This is because selsh
cheats benet from consuming resource in mixed groups with cooperators, since they can
consume the left-over resource that follows from the cooperators eciency. As the selsh
+ large type increases in frequency, it reduces the frequency of cooperative + large and
hence the number of cooperators that it can exploit. However, there are still cooperative
+ small individuals present in the population. This then creates a selective advantage
for the cheats that are in small groups rather than large, because the small groups still
contain cooperators that can be exploited. Thus, cheats change their preference to create
small groups rather than large. This explains the increase in frequency of both small
types after around 10 aggregation and dispersal cycles. By changing size preference,
however, the cheats create the very population structure in which cooperation thrives.
Thus, once small becomes the dominant size allele, cooperative social behaviour xes
in the population. In particular, we know that cooperators drive selsh cheats extinct
where the initial group size is 4 and t = 4 (as shown in Figure 3.1), and this is the
resulting state when cheats change their initial size preference from large to small.
3.5 Discussion
We have developed here a minimal model of social niche construction, by considering
competition between two initial group sizes. The \small" initial group size allele creates
a population structure that selects for cooperative behaviour, by increasing the between-
group variance / relatedness of the group members. Conversely, the \large" allele creates
a population structure that selects for selsh behaviour, by increasing within-group
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size allele will therefore evolve to invest in between-group competition, whereas those
with the \large" allele will evolve to invest in individual competition within their group.
On the face of it, it may not seem obvious which of these strategies would be favoured.
Indeed, one may think that individuals would evolve to invest in individual competition
within their group, since the benets of this would be immediate, whereas the benets
of investing in between-group competition would only be realised when the groups mix
and are reformed. Under natural selection, we should expect social niche constructors
to create an environment that favours themselves compared to other individuals, for
this is the only way that the social niche constructing trait could be selected for. If
we equate individual competition with within-group competition, then we would expect
social niche constructors would create an environment that favours themselves in within-
group competition with other individuals.
However, our model has provided an illustration that this is in fact not what happens
when a niche constructing trait aects population structure and hence the evolution of
social behaviour. Consider rst the case where there is no Allee eect, and so the only
pressures on group size come from social behaviour. To understand why small, coopera-
tive groups are favoured, we need to take account of the fact that group size preference
eectively partitions the population into two. Specically, a group size preference allele
must mean that individuals with a certain size preference tend to nd themselves living
in a group of that size more frequently than individuals that do not have that preference.
If this were not the case, then it would not really be an allele that aected the group size
of its bearers. In this model, the match between preference and size of group inhabited is
perfect. This then partitions the population into two: individuals with the small prefer-
ence allele live and interact in small groups, individuals with the large allele live in large
groups. If small groups are more aected by group selection than large, then the mean
tness of individuals in small groups will be greater. This is because (type 1) group
selection by denition favours traits that increase the mean tness of group members,
for this is what we mean by group tness in a type 1 scenario. Thus, over a number of
aggregation and dispersal cycles, cooperative traits that increase the mean tness of all
individuals will be selected for in the \small" subpopulation. Competition between the
two subpopulations occurs when the migrant pool is formed, since individuals from all
groups, regardless of size, compete to form the next generation of groups. In particular,
when the migrant pool is formed, if individuals in small groups are on average tter,
then they will make up a larger frequency of the migrant pool and hence increase in
frequency in the global population. Since individuals from small groups carry the small
preference allele, both the small and cooperative alleles increase in frequency together.
Put another way, linkage disequilibrium evolves between group size and behavioural al-
leles, and the end result shows this in extreme form by the xation of the cooperative
+ small genotype.Chapter 3 A Minimal Model of Social Niche Construction 67
In summary, social niche construction leads to evolution of small initial group size, and
cooperation, in this model because:
1. Small initial group size in isolation selects for cooperation, large initial group size
does not (Figure 3.1).
2. Cooperative behaviour raises the mean tness of group members (by denition).
3. The size allele partitions the population into those living in small or large groups
(denition of size preference + assumption that match between preference and
actual group size is exact).
4. Because of points 1 and 3, linkage disequilibrium evolves between the size pref-
erence and socio-behavioural alleles. In particular, only two genotypes will be
supported: cooperative + small and selsh + large.
5. Because of point 2, individuals with the cooperative + small genotype outcompete
those with the selsh + large in the migrant pool formation stage, and hence
increase in frequency in the global population.
This process relies on a matching between group size preference and the group size
inhabited, and on greater cooperation being selected for in small groups than large.
This second factor turns out to be critical, as we will demonstrate in Chapter 6.
The above argument assumed that the only pressures on initial group size came from
social behaviour, as in the rst version of our model. When there are other factors, such
as an Allee eect favouring larger groups, then matters are more complicated, as the
non-monotonic selective dynamics in Figure 3.3B illustrate. However, we can still see
some of the same principles at work. In particular, the evolution of linkage disequilib-
rium between size and behavioural alleles again takes centre stage in the story. This
time, the intrinsic advantage to initially larger groups, in the form of a greater per capita
resource allocation, means that large groups are initially selectively favoured, despite the
increased cooperation in small groups. However, this advantage is frequency dependent,
and only occurs when the cooperative + large genotype is present in appreciable fre-
quency. Essentially, when both cooperative + large and selsh + large genotypes are
present, the large allele enjoys the benets both of cooperation and of greater resource
access. It is thus tter than the small allele, which only experiences the benet of co-
operation. This advantage is not sustainable, however, because a population structure
of large groups does not support cooperation (see Figure 3.1), and so the cooperative +
large genotype must decrease in frequency, eventually to extinction. We can see from
the grey dotted line in Figure 3.3B that this trend of decreasing frequency of coopera-
tive + large is monotonic from the start. As the cooperative + large genotype reaches
extinction, the large allele no longer enjoys the bene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case with the model parameters examined that cooperation yielded a greater per capita
tness than did the intrinsic benets of large size, and so the cooperative + small geno-
type xed in the population. Indeed, this is the only interesting case, for otherwise
cooperation could never be selectively advantageous. What is then interesting is the
conditions under which the tter state of cooperation can be reached by a population
that modies its own structure, for the fact that one state is tter than another does
not entail that that state will be reached. This model illustrates that when structure is
evolving, the cooperative state can be reached even when cooperation is initially being
selected against. Signicantly, the model illustrates that it is possible for the component
of selection on population structure due to social behaviour to overcome another op-
posing component, even when that opposing component is due to an immediate tness
benet in the form of a greater per capita resource allocation. The model also illustrates
that the interplay between these opposing components of selection on the group size al-
lele can be non-monotonic, and that the transient behaviour in the rst few generations
is not a good predictor of the end state.
We have developed this model as a minimal illustration of social niche construction. To
keep the model minimal, we have only considered competition between two group size
alleles, both of which were present in the initial population. When combined with the
socio-behavioural alleles, this produced 4 possible genotypes whose frequency we tracked.
The presence of one group size that favours cooperation, and another that favours self-
ishness, provides the minimal conditions for the evolution of population structure to be
aected by social behaviour. We were thus able to explore whether individual selection
on group size would create the conditions for cooperation or selshness.
However, the scenario that we would ultimately like to consider is one where a population
starts out living in a population structure where selsh behaviour dominates, and then
evolves by a series of mutations to create the conditions for cooperation. For example,
we would like to start the population out xed for one large group size allele, and
then investigate the dynamics that occur when both slightly smaller and slightly larger
size alleles arise by mutation. For selection to lead to a group structure favouring
cooperation, it must be the case that moving to a slightly smaller group size increases
the degree of cooperation experienced by individuals living in those slightly smaller
groups. If this does not occur, then individuals living in the smaller groups will not be
tter than those in the larger ones, all other factors being equal. As a result, the small
size allele would not be selectively advantageous and so would not be able to invade a
population xed for the large allele. That is, there must be an adaptive gradient on the
size allele such that a small decrease, as would be plausible by mutation, would increase
the tness of its carriers. In the absence of any other ecological advantage to smaller
groups, this tness increase must come from a change in the selection pressures on social
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Yet, Figure 3.1 demonstrates that such a tness increase would not occur over a large
range of initial conditions in this model. In particular, above an initial group size of
6, decreasing initial group size by 1 does not yield any increase in cooperation. Thus,
if the population were xed for a size allele of 7 or greater, a mutant allele of 1 size
smaller could not invade. Thus, over much of the parameter space the conditions for
cooperation could not be created by mutation and selection, unless the mutations were
very large. The problem is that as the initial group size increases, any eect of group
selection on social behaviour rapidly reaches zero, as shown in Figure 3.1. Because of
this, moving to a slightly smaller initial group size does not increase the eect of group
selection, and hence does not increase cooperation and the tness of individuals living
in those groups.
Must it always be the case that any eect at all of group selection on cooperation
rapidly reaches zero as the initial group size increases? In the next two chapters, we
will show that this eect rests on an assumption of competitive exclusion within groups.
In particular the model here, like nearly all other models of group selection, assumes
that within-group selection on social behaviour is directional and always favours the
selsh allele. Thus, in the limit, cooperation would be driven extinct within each group.
However, there are many cases where a stable polymorphism of social types could be
maintained in each group by negative frequency-dependent selection. In Chapter 4,
we examine this dynamic in a two-species group, where one (selsh) species dominates
within the group and lowers the eective carrying capacity, but does not drive the other
more cooperative species extinct, because their niches only partially overlap. In Chap-
ter 5, we examine negative frequency-dependent selection on cooperation in the context
of the Snowdrift game (Sugden, 1986; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). In general, we nd
that where negative frequency-dependent selection operates within groups (of single or
multiple species), then the eect of group selection does not rapidly tail to zero. Rather,
a small decrease in initial group size can increase the eect of group selection, and hence
the frequency of cooperation, over a much greater range of parameters. Thus, an adap-
tive gradient on a population structure-modifying allele is present from a much larger
set of conditions. This means that where selection on social behaviour exhibits nega-
tive frequency-dependence, the adaptive evolution of population structure in support
of greater cooperation can occur from a much larger range of initial conditions, as we
demonstrate in Chapter 6.Chapter 4
Behavioural Polymorphism and
Group Selection
4.1 Introduction
Natural selection at any level of the biological hierarchy requires there to be a variance in
tness at that level (Price, 1972; Sober and Wilson, 1998; Michod, 1999; Okasha, 2006).
In models of group selection, this variance is usually generated through the stochastic
processes of either genetic drift (e.g., Wright 1945; Levin and Kilmer 1974) or group
formation through random sampling from the global population (e.g., Wilson 1975a,
1987; Fletcher and Zwick 2004). In both of these cases, the group size must be small
in order for the stochastic process to reliably create a signicant level of between-group
variance. Consequently, it is commonly held that group selection can only be eective
in groups of an implausibly small size.
Proponents of group selection sometimes point out that signicant levels of between-
group variance can be generated in even large sized groups if group formation is an
assortative, rather than purely random, process. That is, if individuals of the same type
tend to somehow nd themselves in groups with each other then the between-group
variance will be larger. If this is the case then compared to the random group formation
case more of the variance in tness will be at the group, rather than the individual,
level, and so one might expect to see an eect of group selection where there is none
under random group composition. This could then provide a way out of the problem
discussed at the end of the previous chapter, i.e., that the lack of any eect of group
selection over a large range of group sizes entails that there is no selective gradient over
which the niche constructing dynamic can operate. Assortative grouping, then, could
be expected to allow an eect of group selection to be seen over a much larger range of
group sizes, thereby providing a selective gradient towards smaller groups and increased
cooperation to follow.
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However, although such assortative grouping can in principle result from a variety of
mechanisms (e.g., Wilson and Dugatkin 1997), it is commonly believed that kin grouping,
where the group members are related by descent from a common ancestor and are hence
more similar to each other than to members of other groups, is by far the most common
way in which positive assortment is achieved in nature. Consequently, such processes
are commonly said to operate over a large range of parameter settings precisely because
they are kin, rather than group, selection1 (e.g., Maynard Smith 1964, 1976; Grafen
1984). We consider here, however, a dierent reason as to why group selection may
operate over a larger range of group sizes than is commonly believed. Specically, we
consider the within-group selective dynamics of groups of initially random composition,
but investigate the eect of dierent types of within-group selection regimes.
Traditionally, it is assumed that within-group selection will lead to the competitive
exclusion of a cooperative type by its more selsh counterpart, that is, that within-
group selection is purely directional. Is such competitive exclusion always inevitable
within social groups? We would argue that the answer is no. For example, cooperative
and selsh behaviours can be subject to negative frequency-dependent selection, leading
to a stable polymorphism of cooperative and selsh types within groups (as can be
modelled by the Snowdrift or Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith, 1982; Sugden, 1986;
Doebeli and Hauert, 2005), see Chapter 5). Such polymorphisms can occur even in
the absence of group selection, if the benets of cooperation change with the frequency
of cooperators in the group (Dugatkin et al., 2003; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Gore
et al., 2009). Examples of where cooperators and cheats coexist within single trait
groups, due to such negative frequency-dependent selection, include cooperative foraging
in spiders (Pruitt and Riechert, 2009) and extracellular enzyme production in yeast
(Gore et al., 2009) (Chapter 5 provides further examples). Although these are examples
where the groups consist of a single species, a coexistence of dierent species could also
potentially occur within a trait group. For example, bacterial biolms are commonly
composed of multiple coexisting species (Watnick and Kolter, 2000), and cooperative
interactions between these species have been implicated in the high resistance of biolms
to antimicrobial agents (Burmolle et al., 2006).
Results presented in this chapter show that measurable group selection eects are sus-
tained over a much larger range of group sizes, in cases where a within-group stable
coexistence of social types exists. This can potentially overcome the diculty discussed
at the end of Chapter 3, i.e., that no eect of group selection is seen at all over a
wide range of parameter space under competitive exclusion dynamics. Thus, coexis-
tence dynamics might provide an individual adaptive gradient towards smaller groups
that enhance group selection over a much larger range of parameter space, and hence
1Kin selection here is used in the older sense of relatedness due to shared ancestry, rather than in the
modern sense of any positive type correlation, since if the relatedness is not by descent then it seems
hard to argue against describing the model as one of type 1 group selection. It is this older sense of the
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allow social niche construction to occur from a much larger range of initial conditions.
The fact that our model considers groups of initially random composition (rather than
formed assortatively) is very important when considering the plausibility of the pro-
cess, since random group formation represents the most conservative assumption of the
level of variance that may initially exist between groups in natural populations (Wilson,
1980).
The model presented herein uses the aggregation and dispersal process from the previous
chapter, but considers dierent types of within-group selection, as discussed in the next
section.
4.2 Modelling within-group dynamics: competitive exclu-
sion versus coexistence
Classical models of group selection consider a scenario where a selsh type ultimately
drives its cooperative counterpart extinct at within-group equilibrium. In particular,
tness functions of the following form, rst proposed by Wright (1945) but subsequently
used in a plethora of other models (Williams and Williams, 1957; Maynard Smith, 1964;
Charnov and Krebs, 1975; Wilson, 1980, 1987), are typically used to model within-group
selection:
ws = 1 + pb wc = (1 + pb)(1   a) (4.1)
In the above equations, ws and wc denote the per capita tness of selsh and cooperative
individuals within a group, respectively. Cooperators, whose proportion within the
group is denoted by p, confer a tness benet b on every group member. Crucially, both
types receive this benet, while only cooperators pay a cost, represented by the selection
coecient against cooperation, a. It is then clear that if these equations are iterated
until equilibrium is reached then the selsh type will be driven to xation within a
single group (in the absence of any group selection eects). Thus, such equations tacitly
assume competitive exclusion of social behaviours.
Both competitive exclusion and stable coexistence within-group dynamics can instead
be modelled using the standard two-species symmetric Lotka-Volterra competition equa-
tions (e.g. May, 1976), which we use here as a well studied didactic example of coex-
istence and competitive exclusion. For implementation purposes, we use the following
dierence equation as a discrete approximation:
Ni(t+1) = Ni(t) +

MiNi

Ki   iiNi   ijNj
Ki

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In the above equation, Ni(t) is the biomass of species (type) i at time t, and Mi the
intrinsic per capita growth rate. Each species has an intrinsic carrying capacity Ki,
which is then modied through interspecic interactions. Specically, the per capita
eect of species j on species i is given by ij, the coecient of interaction. All such
interactions are competitive in the above equation, as ensured by the negative sign and
the stipulation that all  > 0. Similarly, ii denotes the negative density-dependent
eect of species i on itself that prevents unbounded exponential growth. This coecient
can be seen as representing crowding and can vary for dierent species.
We dene selsh (s) and cooperative (c) strategies in the above equation through settings
of the within- and between-type interaction coecients. Specically, a selsh type is
dened as having a large negative per capita eect on both itself (ss) and the other type
(cs). A cooperative type is then dened as having correspondingly smaller per capita
negative eects (cc and sc). A pure group of cooperators will therefore grow to a larger
size than a pure group of selsh individuals, creating a group productivity dierential on
which selection can potentially act. However, within mixed-groups the selsh type will
reach the larger frequency (provided that ss is not too large), since cs > sc. In other
words, cooperators are favoured by between-group selection, while selsh individuals are
favoured under within-group selection, exactly as in a classic group selection scenario.
It should be noted that our denition of cooperative behaviour corresponds to weak,
rather than strong, altruism (Wilson, 1980). This follows because although cooperation
confers a relative tness disadvantage compared to a selsh individual within the same
group, it nevertheless increases the absolute tness of all group members, including the
cooperator.
It is well known that a stable coexistence of both types occurs in such a model when
competition for resources (space, food, etc.) between individuals of the same type is
stronger than competition between individuals of dierent types. Such a case corre-
sponds at the ecological level to species occupying dierent niches, i.e. only partially
overlapping in their resource requirements (May, 1976). Conversely, if between-type
competition is stronger than within-type competition then competitive exclusion of one
type will occur. Between- and within-type competition are both modelled in the Lotka-
Volterra equations through the settings of the interaction coecients. Throughout this
chapter, we assume the following:
1. cc < ss and sc < cs, i.e. that cooperators have lower negative density-
dependent eects on themselves and others;
2. cssc  1;
3. M and K, the intrinsic per capita growth rates and carrying capacities respectively,
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Given these assumptions, competitive exclusion of the cooperative type occurs when
ss < cs, producing qualitatively similar dynamics to those of the traditional within-
group selection equations described in Section 4.2. However, when ss > cs then the
cooperative type is maintained at within-group equilibrium at an above-zero frequency,
i.e. a stable coexistence of types occurs. When the interaction coecients of the co-
operative strategy are xed, the equilibrium frequency at which it is maintained then
depends upon the settings of ss and cs, i.e. the magnitude of the negative density-
dependent eects of selsh individuals on themselves and cooperators, respectively. In
addition, the within-group equilibrium is reached more quickly the greater the eects of
the selsh type. Although a Lotka-Volterra model such as this is typically interpreted
at the ecological level as representing species interactions, it could also be interpreted
as a model of allelic competition dynamics within a single species group. In particular,
coexistence Lotka-Volterra dynamics are analogous to negative frequency-dependent se-
lection leading to a stable allelic polymorphism within a group. Conversely, competitive
exclusion of one species by another is analogous to directional selection driving one allele
to xation. The motivation for using the language of allelic competition is to facilitate
comparison with classical group selection models, which consider competition between
selsh and cooperative alleles.
Our use of the Lotka-Volterra equations in the model should be contrasted from their
use in community or ecosystem selection models (Wilson, 1992; Penn, 2003, 2006). Such
models do not consider explicit cooperative and selsh types in the fashion of traditional
group selection models. Instead, they examine the complex within-group dynamics that
arise when a larger number of types are present. These complex dynamics can give
rise to multiple within-group attractors, which can then provide a source of variation
in their own right upon which selection can act (Penn, 2003). By contrast, this model
considers simple two-type within-group dynamics, where only a single group attractor
exists (either coexistence or competitive exclusion, as discussed above). As far as we are
aware, our use of the Lotka-Volterra equations to dene explicit selsh and cooperative
strategies is novel.
4.3 Results
The parameter settings used for the Lotka-Volterra equations throughout this chapter
are shown in Table 4.1. Changing between competitive exclusion and coexistence within-
group dynamics is achieved by simply switching over the values of ss and cs, since
that determines whether ss < cs and hence whether competitive exclusion occurs.
The values of the interaction coecients in Table 4.1 produce representative within-
and between-group dynamics; other settings produce the same qualitative trends. In
this section, we rst present results using classical competitive exclusion dynamics, and
then contrast these to results from the coexistence case.76 Chapter 4 Behavioural Polymorphism and Group Selection
Parameter Value (competitive exclusion) Value (coexistance)
ss 1.9 2
cs 2 1.9
cc 1 1
sc 0.5 0.5
K 100 100
M 0.1 0.1
Table 4.1: Parameter settings of the Lotka-Volterra equation. Note that the
only dierence between the competitive exclusion and coexistence settings is a
swapping of the values of ss and cs.
4.3.1 Group Selection Dynamics in the Competitive Exclusion Case
The within-group dynamics for a group initialised with unit biomass of each type are
shown in Figures 4.1A and 4.1B, for the competitive exclusion case. Initially, both types
are in their growth phase; their biomass is below the intrinsic type carrying capacity of
100. However, the selsh type grows at a faster rate, despite the fact that their intrinsic
growth rates, M, are the same. This is because of the greater negative density-dependent
eect of the selsh type on cooperators, i.e. cs > sc. Finally, since cs > ss,
the cooperative type is driven to extinction. Furthermore, as Figure 4.1B shows, the
proportion of selsh individuals increases monotonically. Such behaviour is qualitatively
identical to that of directional within-group selection for a selsh allele in classical group
selection models (e.g. Wright 1945; Wilson 1980).
Now let us consider global dynamics under group selection in this competitive exclusion
case. In order for group selection to operate through an aggregation and dispersal
process, a dierence in group size at the dispersal stage must exist. Figure 4.2 illustrates
how nal group size varies as a function of the time spent in the group prior to dispersal,
for various starting frequencies of cooperators in groups of initial size 10. It can be seen
from this graph that, using the parameters described in Table 4.1, groups with a greater
proportion of cooperators do indeed grow to a larger size. In addition, the results for
the coexistence case, where ss and cs are swapped, are quantitatively similar. These
results therefore conrm that group selection can in principle operate, since there is a
variation in group productivity on which selection can act.
To determine the magnitude of the eect of group selection, the aggregation and dispersal
process was executed for 5000 iterations, which preliminary experimentation had shown
to be a sucient length of time for a global equilibrium to be reached, using the within-
group parameter settings described in Table 4.1. Equation 4.2 was iterated 30 times
in the reproduction stage, while the global population size was maintained at 5000.
Initial group size was then varied from 1 to 100 inclusive, while the migrant pool was
initialised with 50% of each type. The result of this process after 5000 aggregation
and dispersal cycles is shown in Figure 4.3, where `eect of group selection' on theChapter 4 Behavioural Polymorphism and Group Selection 77
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Figure 4.1: Competitive exclusion within-group dynamics. A)Biomass of each
type. B) Proportion of selsh type.
y-axis is dened as the dierence between the frequency of the selsh type at within-
group equilibrium and the global frequency of the selsh type after 5000 aggregation
and dispersal cycles. Since the within-group equilibrium in the competitive exclusion
case is the selsh type at 100%, the y-axis equivilantely shows the global frequency of
cooperators in this case. Furthermore, it should also be stressed that the within-group
equilibrium is the equilibrium that would be reached in an unstructured population
where there were no groups. The y-axis therefore shows the eect that group structure
is having on the outcome of evolution compared to that in an unstructured population.
There are two points to note from Figure 4.3. Firstly, increasing the initial group
size decreases the eect of group selection, and consequently the global proportion of78 Chapter 4 Behavioural Polymorphism and Group Selection
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Figure 4.2: Final group size as a function of time spent reproducing within
groups; initial group size 10 with various % of cooperators (competitive exclusion
case shown; coexistence quantitatively similar). Dotted line shows time at which
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erence in group productivity is greatest.
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Figure 4.3: `Eect of group selection' (see text) as a function of initial group
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cooperators. In particular, for small group sizes, the cooperative type reaches global
xation (and remains there because we do not reintroduce types by mutation). However,
for group sizes above 10, it is driven extinct. This follows from the fact that the between-
group variance necessary for group selection to act is generated by random sampling from
the migrant pool, and therefore rests on the existence of a small initial group size, as
previously discussed.
The second, and a key point for our claim, is that the eect of group selection rapidly
tends to zero as initial group size increases. Specically, above a group size of 10, there is
no measurable eect at all. Such a result may therefore make the idea of group selection
acting on randomly formed groups seem rather implausible as a signicant evolutionary
pathway. However, the above results only consider the competitive exclusion case; in the
coexistence case, the results are somewhat dierent, as shown in the following section.
4.3.2 The Ecacy of Group Selection under Coexistence Dynamics
Let us now consider the coexistence dynamics that arise from redening the selsh
strategy as ss = 2 and cs = 1:9, i.e. by swapping the interaction coecients over from
the competitive exclusion case. Figures 4.4A and 4.4B show how the cooperative type
is no longer driven extinct at the within-group equilibrium. In particular, the change
in the frequency of the selsh type from an initialisation of 50% shows clear negative
frequency-dependent selection resulting in the maintance of cooperation at an above-
zero frequency. In other words, the result is a stable coexistence of cooperative and
selsh types within a group.
Group selection dynamics under the aggregation and dispersal process are now as shown
in the black curve in Figure 4.5. Crucially, in contrast to the competitive exclusion case
(shown again in the dotted line), an eect of group selection can be seen over the
entire range of group sizes examined. For example, in groups of initial size 50, group
selection can be seen to still increase the global frequency of cooperation above the
within-group equilibrium. The signicance of this observation is that since the within-
group equilibrium is the same equilibrium that would be reached in an unstructured
population, these results show that group structure is having an eect on population
dynamics across a wide range of group sizes.
Finally, to verify that this result is not an artefact of the particular values of ss and
cs used, the same curves were plotted for a variety of other parameters. Figure 4.6
provides an example of this, where ss = 1:99 and cs = 2 in the competitive exclusion
case, vice versa for the coexistence case. These parameters were chosen since they
represent stronger within-group selection towards selsh behaviour in the coexistence
case than in the previous example. Specically, the within-group equilibrium frequency
of the selsh type in the coexistence case is 98.04%, compared to 83.3% previously. The80 Chapter 4 Behavioural Polymorphism and Group Selection
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Figure 4.4: Coexistence within-group dynamics. A) Biomass of each type. B)
Proportion of selsh type.
results in Figure 4.6 show that while an eect of group selection is still seen over a
larger range of group sizes in the coexistence case, the magnitude of the eect is reduced
compared to Figure 4.5. The reason for this is that variance in group composition is
proportional to the frequency of cooperators in the migrant pool in this case, and hence
to the corresponding within-group equilibrium frequency, as discussed in detail in the
following section.Chapter 4 Behavioural Polymorphism and Group Selection 81
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Figure 4.5: Comparing the range of group sizes over which an `eect of group
selection' (see text) can be seen between coexistence and competitive exclusion
dynamics.
4.4 Discussion
The results in the previous section demonstrate that where a stable coexistence of types
occurs at within-group equilibrium, an eect of group selection on global frequencies
can be seen over a much larger range of initial group sizes than in the competitive
exclusion case. In particular, as group size increases in the competitive exclusion case,
any measurable eect of group selection on the global frequency of cooperation rapidly
tends to zero. By contrast, in the coexistence case, some eect on global frequencies is
seen over the entire range of group sizes examined. It must be stressed that no particular
claim about the magnitude of the eect for large group sizes is made here. Rather, the
model implies that there is some measurable eect on frequencies over a large range of
group sizes; how large this eect may be will depend on the properties of the natural
system under consideration. However, the fact that any eect of group selection still
exists over a large range of parameters is signicant, since it suggests that where within-
group dynamics in nature are of the coexistence type, some eect of a group population
structure may always be acting.
Coexistence dynamics allow group selection eects to be sustained over a larger range of
group sizes because of the eect of migrant pool frequencies on between-group variance.
In particular, because group formation constitutes random sampling from the migrant82 Chapter 4 Behavioural Polymorphism and Group Selection
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Figure 4.6: Demonstrating that the same qualitative trends arise where within-
group selection towards selsh behaviour is stronger in the coexistence case than
in Figure 4.5. Here, cs = 1:99 and ss = 2 in the coexistence case, vice versa
for competitive exclusion; all other parameters as in Table 4.1.
pool, initial between-group variance can be approximated by the binomial distribution,
and is then given by pcps=S, where pc is the proportion of the cooperative type in the
migrant pool, ps the proportion of the selsh type, and S the initial group size (Wilson,
1980, p. 27). Since pc + ps = 1, it follows that between-group variance is proportional
to the frequency of the least frequent type, i.e. variance is maximal when both types
are of equal frequency, and zero when one type is at xation. Therefore, where one
type reaches global xation then there can be no variance and hence no group selection.
However, in the coexistence case, where one type cannot reach xation, it follows that
there must always be some variance and hence some possible eect of group selection.
The fact that the variance is proportional to the frequency of the least frequent type is
illustrated by the dierence between Figures 4.5 and 4.6, where the lower within-group
equilibrium frequency of cooperators in Figure 4.6 results in a reduced eect of group
selection for large group sizes.
A further observation from Figure 4.5 is that a gradient towards an increased eect of
group selection also exists over a larger range of group sizes in the coexistence case.
Specically, decreasing group size by a small amount yields an increase in the eect
of group selection for groups of size 20 in the coexistence case. However, there is no
gradient at this size in the competitive exclusion case. The signicance of this is thatChapter 4 Behavioural Polymorphism and Group Selection 83
increasing the eect of group selection increases average absolute individual tness in the
population, due to an increased global level of cooperation. If group size can be partly
determined by individual traits then this may provide an adaptive gradient towards
smaller groups, increased levels of cooperation, and greater tness. In the competitive
exclusion case, however, such a gradient only exists over a much smaller range of group
sizes. The results presented in this chapter therefore suggest that the concurrent evolu-
tion of group size and cooperation is more plausible in cases where a stable coexistence
of types within groups exists. We investigate this hypothesis in detail in Chapter 6.
4.5 Conclusions
Any group selection process requires there to be a variation in group composition. In
aggregation and dispersal style models, this variation arises through the random as-
signment of individuals from the migrant pool into groups. Consequently, it is often
suggested that an eect of group selection on the global frequency of types will only be
seen for very small initial group sizes. However, the models on which this claim is based
typically only consider within-group dynamics that lead to the competitive exclusion of
a cooperative type by its selsh counterpart.
We have shown here that where a stable coexistence of cooperative and selsh types oc-
curs within groups, the range of initial group sizes over which an eect of group selection
can be seen is much larger. Whether coexistence or competitive exclusion occurs in a
particular social group needs to be checked on a case by case basis. Examples of where
this has been done empirically, and coexistence equilibria were found, include cooper-
ative foraging in spiders (Pruitt and Riechert, 2009) and enzyme production in yeast
(Gore et al., 2009), as discussed earlier. The results in this chapter suggest that where
population structure and social behaviour evolve concurrently, an individual adaptive
gradient towards smaller groups and increased cooperation is likely to exist over a much
larger range of group sizes under coexistence dynamics. This is in sharp contrast to
the competitive exclusion case, where the eects of group selection rapidly reach zero as
initial group size increases, excluding the possibility of such a gradient for a large range
of parameters.
It has shown in this chapter that the conventional conclusion that group selection ef-
fects can only be seen for very small groups rests on the assumption that within-group
dynamics lead to competitive exclusion. If instead a within-group coexistence of com-
peting types occurs, then the range of group sizes over which an eect can be seen is
much larger. This result follows from the fact that the variance in group composition
upon which group selection acts is dependent not only on group size but also on the
frequencies of types in the migrant pool. In particular, since neither type can be driven84 Chapter 4 Behavioural Polymorphism and Group Selection
extinct under coexistence dynamics, there will always be some variance in group com-
position when sampling from the migrant pool, which can then be acted on by group
selection. Thus, since it is not necessary to assume that within-group dynamics lead
to competitive exclusion, this result shows that group selection can operate in a wider
range of conditions than previously realised.Chapter 5
Evolutionary Game Theory and
Multi-level Selection
Evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Maynard Smith, 1982) provides a simple and powerful way of conceptualising social
evolution, by abstracting away from the details of the underlying genetics of behaviour,
and instead focussing on the behavioural phenotypes. In its simplest form, the tness
consequences of a single social interaction between 2 individuals are represented in a
payo-matrix that gives, for a particular strategy, the tness that will result depending
on the partner's strategy. The change in frequency of a behaviour due to selection can
then be calculated using the standard replicator equation (Taylor and Jonker, 1978;
Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003):
_ xi = xi
 
(Ax)i   xTAx

; (5.1)
where x is a vector of strategy frequencies in the population, xi is the frequency of
strategy i, _ xi is the dierential of this, and A is the payo matrix. A stability analysis
of this equation, appropriately parametrised, is then performed to nd the equilibrium
strategy frequencies in the whole population; this gives the Evolutionarily Stable State
(ESS)1. Classical evolutionary game theory makes a critical assumption, which is that
the population is unstructured. Thus, it is assumed that any individual has an equal
probability of interacting with any other individual. At rst sight, then, the application
of concepts from evolutionary game theory may not seem applicable to group-structured
populations. However, this is not the case, because in nearly all models of group-
structured evolution it is assumed that interactions within the group are freely-mixed,
1ESS can also mean Evolutionarily Stable Strategy: a strategy which if adopted by all members of
the population, cannot be invaded by a rare mutant (Maynard Smith, 1982). Here, we use ESS to mean
an equilibrium state of the population that is stable under the dynamics of natural selection.
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and so any two group members are equally likely to interact. Indeed, a group is often
dened as the smallest subset of the population in which interactions are freely-mixed,
as is the case with the concept of a trait-group (Wilson, 1975a, 1980). Social interactions
within groups can therefore be conceptualised using n-player evolutionary game theory,
where n is the group size. Between-group selection, i.e., selection between sets of n-
players, can then alter the global ESS. Thus, the ESS in a structured population can
be very dierent from that which solution of the replicator equation yields under freely-
mixed conditions.
Many dierent evolutionary games have been analysed in the literature, corresponding
to dierent kinds of social interaction. The type of game can be categorised in the
following manner, according to whether there are one or more ESSs, and whether these
ESSs contain only one strategy (pure), or more than one (mixed).
 One pure ESS.
 One mixed ESS.
 More than one pure ESS.
 More than one mixed ESS.
Most models of evolution in group-structured populations implicitly assume that the
game under freely-mixed conditions has one pure ESS, corresponding to a selsh type
at xation; the standard equations for the tness of altruistic and selsh types within
groups (e.g., Wright 1945; Levin and Kilmer 1974; Wilson 1975a) can be conceptualised
as such a game (Fletcher and Zwick, 2007). Group selection then has the uphill task of
supporting cooperation globally when it is not an ESS locally. However, if there is more
than one ESS under freely-mixed conditions, representing dierent outcomes in terms
of group tness, then group selection can perform equilibrium selection (Harsanyi and
Selten, 1988) between these groups, which is an easier task since between-group variance
is more easily maintained (Boyd and Richerson, 1990). We will thus show in this chapter
that as we move down the above list, the types of game represent social interactions that
are more amenable to group selection, since they allow more between-group variance to
be maintained. In line with some other recent work (Bergstrom, 2002; Skyrms, 2004;
Doebeli and Hauert, 2005), we will argue that social interactions conventionally modelled
as single pure ESS games would be more appropriately modelled by the other classes of
game. Where this is the case, we should expect group selection to be more eective than
the classical models based on single pure ESS games have suggested. Finally, we will
argue that the dierence between games with one versus multiple ESSs corresponds, to
some extent, to the dierence between the fraternal and egalitarian major transitions,
sensu Queller (1997). Thus, we will suggest roles for dierent types of game in modelling
dierent aspects of the major transitions.Chapter 5 Evolutionary Game Theory and Multi-level Selection 87
5.1 Single ESS: the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games
Table 5.1: Payo matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Cooperate Selsh
Payo to Cooperate b   c  c
Payo to Selsh b 0
Games with a single freely-mixed ESS have occupied the vast majority of the biological
literature on the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, within this class, the Prisoner's
Dilemma game has received the vast majority of attention. The payo-matrix for this is
shown in Table 5.12. The single ESS under freely-mixed conditions is pure, correspond-
ing to every member of the population adopting the selsh strategy (traditionally known
as the defect strategy in the game theory literature). Much work has considered how
various population structures can produce a dierent ESS, where some degree of cooper-
ation is stable. Cases that have been considered include those where there are repeated
interactions between the same pair of individuals, allowing for reciprocity (Trivers, 1971)
such as in the famous \Tit-for-Tat" strategy (Axelrod, 1984). Another well studied case
is that in which interactions are single-shot, but occur in a viscous population where rel-
atives interact; this allows kin selection to promote cooperation (Nowak and May, 1992,
1993). Moreover, the Prisoner's Dilemma forms the basis of most multi-level selection
models (Fletcher and Zwick, 2007), since it is played locally within groups, but the all
selsh ESS can be avoided by between-group selection. This is exactly the situation that
the tness functions in most multi-level selection models capture (Fletcher and Zwick,
2007). Specically, they consider the n-player Prisoner's Dilemma, where n is the group
size; this is also known as the linear public goods game (Bergstrom, 2002). We can gen-
erate tness functions for the n-player Prisoner's Dilemma by multiplying the payos in
Table 5.1 by the frequency of the corresponding strategy within the group. This yields
the following tness functions (see also Fletcher and Zwick 2007):
wc = w0 + pb   c ws = w0 + pb; (5.2)
where w0 is a baseline tness, p is the proportion of cooperators within the group, b is the
benet of cooperating, and c the cost. It is simple to see from these equations that selsh
individuals will always be tter than cooperators within their same group, because they
receive the same benets pb, but do not pay the cost c. This fact explains why the within-
group ESS is all selsh. On the other hand, the greater the proportion of cooperators,
the greater the mean tness (since b > c). Consequently, within-group selection always
favours selshness, and between-group selection always favours cooperation, exactly as
in the vast majority of multi-level selection models.
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In the Prisoner's Dilemma, the two levels of selection are therefore exactly in opposition,
which provides a worst-case scenario for any eect of group selection to be seen. However,
even within the category of single ESS games, this does not have to be the case. For
example, in the Snowdrift game (Sugden, 1986; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005), or Hawk
Dove (Maynard Smith, 1982) game, negative frequency-dependent selection operates,
such that some level of cooperation is supported within a group at equilibrium. The
pay-o matrix for this game is shown in Table 5.2. The story behind this game is that two
car drivers are trapped in a snowdrift, and can either get out and shovel (cooperate) or
stay in their car (selsh). The dierence from the Prisoner's Dilemma is that if the other
driver does not cooperate, then it is better for you to shovel, for at least then you will get
home, even though less eort would be required if both cooperatively shovelled (Sugden,
1986). On the other hand, if the other driver shovels, it is individually advantageous for
you to not do so but to cheat and remain in the warmth of your car. The equilibrium in
a population of players is therefore some individuals cooperating, and some cheating, in
contrast to the all selsh equilibrium of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The Snowdrift game
can therefore be seen as representing a relaxed version of the Prisoner's Dilemma, in
which unilateral cooperation is tter than mutual defection, but unilateral selshness
is still individually tter than mutual cooperation (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). Indeed,
the pay-o matrix in (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005) can represent both types of game; if
1=2 < b < c it yields the Prisoner's Dilemma (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005).
Table 5.2: Payo matrix for the Snowdrift game (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005).
Cooperate Selsh
Payo to Cooperate b   c=2 b   c
Payo to Selsh b 0
What kinds of biological interaction might give rise to the Snowdrift game, rather than
the Prisoner's Dilemma? Essentially, it those where there is some direct benet to
the cooperator of her actions, that is not shared with other group members. When
considering public goods, this would correspond to a producer being able to keep some
fraction of the good that she produces for herself, with the rest being shared with the
group. When this happens, cooperators receive a greater per capita share of the benets
than selsh individuals and so are, all other things being equal, tter. However, for
negative frequency-dependent selection to operate, it must also be the case that the
tness of cooperators declines as they increase in frequency. This can happen if the
costs of cooperating are xed, but the benets become discounted with increasing levels
of cooperation (Hauert et al., 2006; Gore et al., 2009). Thus, although at low frequencies
the benets of cooperation may outweigh the costs, at higher frequencies these benets
become discounted such that this is no longer the case. The result is a single mixed ESS
under freely-mixed conditions, which gives a polymorphism of cooperative and selsh
behaviours within the group.Chapter 5 Evolutionary Game Theory and Multi-level Selection 89
Biological interactions for which the Snowdrift game may be more appropriate than the
Prisoner's Dilemma can be found across taxa and include, as examples, enzyme secretion
in yeast (Gore et al., 2009) and viruses, antibiotic resistance in bacteria (Dugatkin
et al., 2003, 2005), social foraging in spider colonies (Pruitt and Riechert, 2009), and
sentinel behaviour in mammals (see also Doebeli and Hauert 2005 for a review) . In
general, the Snowdrift game applies to any situation where some level of cooperation
is individually advantageous, but where the individual benet tails o with increasing
frequency. It should be noted that non-linear benets to cooperation lead to negative
frequency-dependent selection even in the absence of population structure or a varying
global carrying capacity, which were the mechanisms considered in Ross-Gillespie et
al.'s (2007) recent treatment, and hence negative frequency-dependent selection can
occur locally within single groups and not just at the metapopulation level as has been
considered in previous works.
Crucially, a conict between levels of selection still exists in the Snowdrift game, since
group productivity would still increase if more group members were cooperative than is
supported under within-group selection, a point that has very rarely been noted in the
literature. By failing to take account of this fact, the eect of Snowdrift style interactions
on the ecacy of group selection has been overlooked (see Dugatkin et al. 2005 for an
exception where Snowdrift style interactions are considered in a group structured popu-
lation). In the next section, we will explicitly show that while some degree of cooperation
can be maintained in the Snowdrift game by within-group selection, between-group se-
lection can still increase this further, and will still be opposed by individual selection
within groups. We then show that Snowdrift style interactions increase the range of
conditions over which an eect of group selection can be seen, due to the polymor-
phic within-group equilibrium allowing some between-group variance to be regenerated.
This is an instance of exactly the same mechanism that we considered with respect to
coexistence of species in the Lotka-Volterra model of Chapter 4.
The tness functions for the Snowdrift game within groups, derived from Table 5.2, are
as follows:
wc = p

b  
c
2

+ (1   p)(b   c) + w0 ws = pb + w0; (5.3)
where wc is the tness of group members with the cooperative allele, ws the tness of
those with the selsh allele, p the proportion of the cooperative allele within the group,
b the benet of cooperation, c the cost, and w0 a baseline tness in the absence of
social interactions. In these equations b=c > 1 produces the Snowdrift game, and 0:5 <
b=c < 1 the Prisoner's Dilemma (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). These tness functions are
shown graphically in Figure 5.1, which highlights the fact that in both games, the mean
tness of group members would be higher with a greater proportion of cooperators than90 Chapter 5 Evolutionary Game Theory and Multi-level Selection
is supported at (within-group) equilibrium. Thus, a conict between individual- and
group-level selection exists in both games.
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Figure 5.1: Per capita tness as a function of the frequency of the coopera-
tive allele within the group in a) Prisoner's Dilemma, b) Snowdrift, games. A
polymorphic equilibrium exists in the Snowdrift, but not Prisoner's Dilemma,
game. A polymorphic equilibrium is indicated graphically where the lines of
the tness functions cross, meaning that both types have equal tness. The
Prisoner's Dilemma was produced by setting b = 0:9 and c = 1 in Equation 5.3.
The Snowdrift game was produced by setting b = 1:1 and c = 1.Chapter 5 Evolutionary Game Theory and Multi-level Selection 91
5.2 Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games in group-
structured populations
Most previous work on the Snowdrift game has considered its operation in unstructured
populations (but see Hauert and Doebeli 2004 and Sz amad o et al. 2008, discussed below).
Here, we consider its operation in multi-generational, competing, groups of size n.
We use the aggregation and dispersal model of the previous chapter, where groups of
initial density n0 are formed by random sampling without replacement from a migrant
pool of total density 1000. Reproduction then occurs within these groups for a number
of generations, with tnesses as given by Equation 5.3. The density of a type within the
group in the next generation depends on its tness and is given by Equation 5.4:
nc(g + 1) = nc(g)wc ns(g + 1) = ns(g)ws; (5.4)
where g is the generation within the group, nc is the density of the cooperative type,
and ns the density of the selsh type within the group. We allow these densities to be
continuous numbers, as they are in the Lotka-Volterra equations. After t generations
the groups disperse and form a new migrant pool. We cap the size of the migrant pool
to be equal to the initial population size, thereby allowing for a global carrying capacity.
This is done by rescaling the migrant pool back to the initial population density of
1000, keeping the frequency of cooperative and selsh types the same. At this stage, we
round the densities of the cooperative and selsh types to integers in order to return the
population to its original integer density. Thus, our model is not individual-based, but
instead uses growth equations on continuous densities, in a manner analogous to that in
Fletcher and Zwick (2007).
5.2.1 Results under random group formation
Figure 5.2 shows the eect of group selection on the global frequency of cooperation
in the Snowdrift and Prisoner's Dilemma games, under randomly formed groups of
varying initial sizes. The simulations were run for 1000 aggregation and dispersal cycles,
which was a sucient length of time for a global equilibrium to be reached, and were
repeated 30 times. We dene \eect of group selection" as the (absolute) dierence
between the equilibrium frequency of cooperation in a freely-mixed population, and the
global frequency of cooperation in the group metapopulation after 1000 aggregation and
dispersal cycles (we take the average global frequency over the last 100 aggregation and
dispersal cycles, since the allele frequencies slightly uctuate between cycles due to the
random group formation process). In the Snowdrift game, the greatest possible eect92 Chapter 5 Evolutionary Game Theory and Multi-level Selection
of group selection decreases as the benet-to-cost ratio increases. For example, when
b : c = 1:1 the equilibrium frequency of cooperation in a freely-mixed population is
around 19%, but when b : c = 1 it is around 66%. Thus, the absolute eect that group
selection can have is lower in this second case, according to our metric. This is why the
curves for higher b : c ratios start o lower on the y-axis in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Eect of initial group size in the Snowdrift and Prisoner's Dilemma
games under random group formation, using Equation 5.3. The grey lines show
the Snowdrift game with c xed at 1 and various values of b. The black lines
show the Prisoner's Dilemma produced with b = 0:9 (upper line), and b = 0:75
(lower line). Error bars show the standard error over 30 trials.
We nd that under the Prisoner's Dilemma game, there is no eect of group selection
on cooperation over a large range of initial group sizes. By contrast as initial group
size decreased in the Snowdrift game, some global increase in cooperation could be seen
over the entire range of group sizes examined. The distinction between pure and mixed
ESS games (Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift, respectively) is exactly the same as
that between competition and coexistence in the Lotka-Volterra equations, as exam-
ined in Chapter 4. Specically, a mixed ESS under freely-mixed conditions, and hence
within a group, maintains the possibility of between-group variance being generated
when the groups are reformed from the migrant pool. This can occur even when the
group composition is close to the ESS, as happens when the initial group size is large.
Consequently, a small decrease in initial group size can increase this variance over a large
range, and hence provide a population structure that selects for greater cooperation. By
contrast, in games with a single pure ESS, the possibility for any between-group vari-
ance is destroyed as the groups approach that ESS. Our model results illustrate that
this qualitative dierence between the Snowdrift and Prisoner's Dilemma games holds
for a range of benet-to-cost ratios in both games.Chapter 5 Evolutionary Game Theory and Multi-level Selection 93
Our results on the eect of group-structure in the Snowdrift game should be compared
with those of Hauert and Doebeli (2004), who considered the game played in a viscous
population occupying a spatial lattice. They claimed that spatial structure decreases
the frequency of cooperation in the Snowdrift game, compared to the well-mixed case.
Thus, from their results we might predict that group structure would likewise decrease
the equilibrium frequency of cooperation. Our results have shown this prediction to be
incorrect, however, since we have found that group structure does increase the global
level of cooperation in the Snowdrift game. A recent paper by Sz amad o et al. (2008)
can explain this apparent contradiction. Specically, Sz amad o et al. show that playing
a game on a spatial lattice has two eects: it introduces correlations in the strategy of
interacting individuals, and it reduces the neighbourhood in which competitive interac-
tions take place3. They found that the introduction of correlations in the strategy of
players (that is, between-group variance or relatedness greater than zero) always had a
positive eect on the frequency of cooperation, and that it was the limited neighbour-
hood of interactions that hindered cooperation in Hauert & Doebeli's model. Limited
neighbourhood has analogous eects to the number of generations spent within groups
before dispersal in our model. Specically, a small neighbourhood (coupled with a pop-
ulation at local carrying capacity) means that competitive interactions take place on a
small scale, likewise for a large number of generations before dispersal in our model,
as discussed in Chapter 3. It is now well-known that a limited range of competitive
interactions hinders the evolution of cooperation (Wilson et al. 1992; West et al. 2002,
again as discussed in Chapter 3), and this applies in both the Snowdrift and Prisoner's
Dilemma games (Sz amad o et al., 2008). The global level of cooperation increased in
our model in the Snowdrift game, compared to the well-mixed case, because the group
structure introduced correlations in the behaviour of interacting individuals (which al-
ways favours cooperation, contra to the suggestion of Hauert and Doebeli 2004) whilst
regular dispersal prevents the eects of limited neighbourhood.
5.2.2 Results under assortative group formation
In the previous section we have considered groups that are formed randomly. However,
it is also possible for groups to be formed assortatively, such that individuals with the
same behavioural phenotype tend to found groups together. Such assortativity arises if
the groups are founded by kin, such as sibling groups. It can also potentially arise if
the cooperative allele has some pleiotropic eect on the habitat preference of its bearers
(Hamilton, 1975). We have investigated the eects of assortativity to see if the distinc-
tion between the Snowdrift and Prisoner's Dilemma games discussed above can still be
seen. To do so, we use the model described above, but introduce an assortativity index,
3In the lattice style of spatial model considered by Hauert & Doebeli, the tness of a focal individual is
compared with that of one of k adjacent neighbours on the lattice. An ospring of the selected neighbour
takes over the focal individual's site with a probability proportional to the dierence in tness (payo)
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a, as follows. The rst founder of a group is chosen randomly, as before. Thereafter, the
next founder of a group is chosen to be of the same behavioural type as the previous
member added with probability a, otherwise the next founder is chosen randomly. Thus,
when a = 1 all founders of the group will be of the same behavioural type, whereas when
a = 0 all founders of the group will be chosen randomly as in the previous section.
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Figure 5.3: Eect of varying degrees of assortative group formation in the Pris-
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Regardless of the degree of assortativity in group formation, we can see from Figure 5.3
that the same qualitative distinction between the two games holds. That is, any eect
of group selection still rapidly tails o to zero as the initial group size increases in the
Prisoner's Dilemma, regardless of assortitivty. By contrast, in the Snowdrift game the
decline in between-group variance was much more gentle, and some eect of group se-
lection could be seen over the entire range of initial group sizes we examined. Thus,
the Snowdrift game preserving between-group variance applies equally under popula-
tion structures where group formation is random or assortative. We also nd that as
the assortativity increases, the eect of group selection tails o less rapidly with increas-
ing initial group size. This is to be expected from classical theory, since assortativity
increases the initial between-group variance, and so counteracts the eect of increasing
initial group size.
5.3 A classication of games and their eect on group se-
lection
The type of social interaction can be classied in game theory along the following two
axes:
 whether there is more than 1 ESS;
 whether the ESS is pure or mixed.
In general, much of the biological literature on social evolution has been preoccupied
with the case where there is one pure ESS, corresponding to the most selsh type at
xation and mean population tness at its lowest. Such a case corresponds to both
strong altruism, and to the classical conception of tragedy of the commons / public
goods scenarios. Indeed, explaining strong altruism has often been the motivation for
investigating the possibility of group selection, even though there are many other kinds
of traits that could be promoted by between-group selection (Wilson, 1997). As has
been shown in both this and the previous chapter, the case of one pure ESS corresponds
to something of a worst-case for group selection, not only because it represents strong
within-group selection, but because it necessarily curtails the range of parameters over
which between-group variance can be generated compared to other games, a point that
we have developed in this dissertation for the rst time. Furthermore, it represents an
extreme kind of biological cooperation, where the social dilemma between the \good of
the individual" and the \good of the group" is most acute (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005).
In particular, it assumes that there is not even a small amount of unilateral benet to
performing a cooperative act, and that even if cooperation is xed in a population, it
must still be vulnerable to a cheating type arising by mutation. These two worst-case
assumptions are relaxed in the Snowdrift, and Stag Hunt games, respectively.96 Chapter 5 Evolutionary Game Theory and Multi-level Selection
Table 5.3: Payo matrix showing relationship between the Prisoner's Dilemma,
Snowdrift, and Stag Hunt games. R is the reward for mutual cooperation, P
the punishment for mutual defection, S the sucker's payo for cooperating when
your partner does not, and T the temptation for defecting when your partner
cooperates. T > R > P > S denes the Prisoner's Dilemma, T > R > S > P
the Snowdrift game, and R > T > P > S the Stag Hunt (see, for example,
Santos et al. 2006.)
Cooperate Selsh
Payo to Cooperate R S
Payo to Selsh T P
The payo matrix in Table 5.3 shows the relationship between the Prisoner's Dilemma,
Snowdrift, and Stag Hunt games (Santos et al., 2006). The Snowdrift game relaxes
the assumption that there are no unilateral benets to performing a cooperative act.
This is shown in the payo matrix by the fact if the actor's partner is selsh, then
the actor will be tter by being cooperative, rather than selsh himself (S > P). As
discussed above, this leads to a single, mixed, ESS in a freely-mixed population. Such
a scenario can occur when cooperators can internalise some of the benet that they
produce (Gore et al., 2009), for example, keep some of the good that they produce for
themselves rather than sharing it with the whole group. Where such a mixed ESS is
supported under within-group selection, we have argued that between-group selection
will have some eect of globally raising the frequency of cooperation over a larger range
of conditions. Thus, even loose forms of population structure can aect the equilibrium
frequency of cooperation in mixed ESS games.
A numerical example payo matrix for the Stag Hunt game is shown in Table 5.4; this
is a particular class of coordination game where cooperation involves coordination of
behaviour. The intuitive story behind the game is that an individual can choose to
hunt either a stag or a hare (Skyrms, 2004). Successfully hunting the stag yields the
highest tness, but requires that both individuals cooperate to do so; if one individual
does not, then the other would have been better o (selshly) hunting the hare. The
Stag Hunt game relaxes the assumption that if all other individuals cooperate, then
it pays to behave selshly. This is shown in Table 5.3 by the fact that if the actor's
partner cooperates, then the actor is tter by himself cooperating rather than changing
his behaviour to selshness (R > T). In other words, the temptation to defect from
mutual cooperation is removed (Santos et al., 2006). This results in all cooperate being
a stable equilibrium as well as all selsh, with all cooperate leading to greater tness
for all of the individuals. There are thus two pure ESSs of dierent total tness in a
freely-mixed population, both hunt hare, or both hunt stag. If unilateral selshness is
tter than unilateral cooperation (T > S), then the all selsh ESS will have the largest
basin of attraction, and so will be reached from a larger range of starting behavioural
frequencies in the population. In the language of classical game theory, all cooperate is
the payo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Table 5.4: Payo matrix for the Stag Hunt game, adapted from Skyrms (2004).
There are two equilibria: both hunt stag (optimal, payo dominant), or both
hunt hare (suboptimal, risk dominant)
Stag Hare
Payo to Stag 5 1
Payo to Hare 3 2
payo (tness) to each individual. On the other hand, all selsh is the risk dominant
equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). This is intuitively because it is safer to play
selsh if you do not know the behaviour of your partner (the formal denition of risk
dominance is that it has the largest basin of attraction Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
The choice of risk- or payo- dominated equilibrium by the individuals is known as
equilibrium selection (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988). Group structure can increase the
likelihood that the equilibrium optimal for the group (e.g., stag) is reached, by the fol-
lowing mechanism. Groups whose members cooperatively hunt stags will outcompete
those whose uncoordinated members selshly (or unilaterally) hunt hares (Canals and
Vega-Redondo, 1998; Weibull and Salomonsson, 2006). This means that the stag strat-
egy will increase in frequency in the global population when the groups mix. As a result,
when new groups are formed they will, on average, contain a higher proportion of stag
hunters, and of more of the groups will be in the basin of attraction for stag. Conse-
quently, the greater mean tness of the stag ESS can set up a positive feedback process
that leads to its xation in all groups. In this way, group selection selects for the payo
dominated equilibrium (Canals and Vega-Redondo, 1998). From a biological viewpoint,
this is intuitive; group selection is favouring those groups whose members behaviour
is well coordinated, and workers such as Wilson (1997) and Seeley (1997) have argued
that behaviours such as coordination are a group-level adaptation (but see also Chap-
ter 2 of this dissertation). Moreover, this kind of group selection is likely to work over a
broader range of conditions than is conventionally understood in biology, since the initial
between-group variance when the groups are founded can be magnied by within-group
selection taking the groups to dierent ESSs (Boyd and Richerson, 1990; Wilson, 1992).
By contrast, in a single ESS game, within-group selection will drive all groups towards
the same ESS, thereby reducing any initial between-group variance. Thus, we would
expect games with more than one ESS to, all other factors being equal, lead to the
generation of more between-group variance than single ESS games. Therefore, an eect
of group selection should be seen over a larger range of conditions.
Interestingly, between-group selection is favoured in multiple ESS games when the groups
do reach equilibrium, so enough generations must be spent within the groups before
dispersal (or equivalently, the intergroup migration rate must be suciently low) to allow
equilibrium behavioural frequencies to be reached (Boyd and Richerson, 1990). This is
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is reached if an eect of group selection is to be seen. Rapid within-group selection
therefore supports between-group selection in multiple ESS games. Boyd and Richerson
(1990) have suggested that processes of cultural evolution, in which group social norms
are established and rapidly become xed by imitation, should be particularly conducive
to such group selection. Another way in which within-group selection can happen on a
much faster time scale than intergroup mixing is if the groups start out as separately
isolated populations that slowly spread out into contact with each other. Within-group
selection could then reach an ESS before the populations meet, and between-group
selection would then favour the population that reached the ESS with greatest mean
tness (Snowdon et al. 2009, see also McElreath et al. 2003). Such a process could occur
with genetic evolution, without requiring cultural imitation (Snowdon et al., 2009).
However, although multiple equilibria games such as the Stag Hunt have been well stud-
ied in economics (e.g., Harsanyi and Selten 1988; Van Huyck et al. 1990; Kandori et al.
1993; Oechssler 1997), including the eects of group structure on equilibrium selection
(Canals and Vega-Redondo, 1998; Weibull and Salomonsson, 2006), little attention has
been paid to them as biological models of social behaviour (for exceptions see Weibull
and Salomonsson 2006 and Pacheco et al. 2009). We, along with authors such as Skyrms
(2004) and Santos et al. (2006), argue that this is a mistake, and that coordination of
behaviour is a fundamental kind of biological social interaction whose evolution does
indeed need explaining. One important example of the general coordination game is
establishing word-meaning pairs in the origin of human language (where the origin of
language is itself a major transition in evolution; Maynard Smith and Szathm ary 1995)
(Szamado and Szathmary, 2006). Pacheco et al. (2009) suggest that the stag-hunt game
is a model of the coordinated hunting actions of a range of animals, including lions and
chimpanzees. It has also been suggested as a model of symbiotic interactions, where the
relationship between symbiont and host can evolve into one of either mutualism (stag),
or parasitism (hare) (Law, 1991; Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995). Population
structure plays a key role in such interactions, since localised social interactions coupled
with global competition (for example, an aggregation and dispersal process) can allow
the payo dominant (cooperative), rather than risk dominant (selsh) equilibrium to be
reached, just as it allows cooperation to evolve in single ESS games.
Our argument is not simply that cooperation is easier to evolve in types of game other
than the Prisoner's Dilemma. Rather, it is that the range of group structures that have
an eect on social evolution is likely to be much larger if interactions within groups take
the form of a mixed or multiple ESS game. In particular we suggest that the three types
of game discussed above, to wit, one pure ESS (Prisoner's Dilemma), one mixed ESS
(Snowdrift), and multiple pure ESSs (stag-hunt), can be viewed on a sliding scale, in
that order, of how amenable they are to group selection. The fundamental reason for this
is that as this scale progresses, so does the eect of within-group selection on preserving
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the limit, completely destroy any initial between-group variance. In the Snowdrift game,
some between-group variance can be preserved when the groups are reformed, since one
type cannot be driven extinct. Where there are multiple ESSs, the initial variance
in group composition can actually magnied by within-group selection taking dierent
initial group compositions to dierent equilibria. It has been argued that the Snowdrift
game may be a more appropriate model of public goods scenarios than the Prisoner's
Dilemma in many cases (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Gore et al., 2009), and it has also
been argued that the Stag-Hunt is a more appropriate model of interactions such as
cooperative hunting Skyrms (2004); Pacheco et al. (2009). These assertions about how
we should best conceptualise and model cooperative interactions have the important
implication that group selection should be more eective than previous models, based
nearly always on the single pure ESS case, have indicated.
5.4 The role of dierent game types in modelling the ma-
jor transitions
Following Queller (1997), the major transitions in evolution can be divided into two
classes: fraternal and egalitarian. In the fraternal case, the lower-level units are of the
same type and are hence fungible, that is, they can stand in for each other in terms
of function. This creates the opportunity for both benet and conict. The potential
benet is that a reproductive division of labour can occur, for each unit carries the
same genes (bar mutation), and so not all units need to reproduce to pass these genes
on (Queller, 1997). Examples of such reproductive division of labour include the germ-
soma separation in multicellular organisms, and the existence of sterile worker castes in
eusocial insects (Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995). However, this also creates the
opportunity for conict, for selsh mutants can arise that reproduce at a faster rate, to
the detriment of group productivity (Michod, 1999). Indeed, by denition a reproductive
division of labour involves strong altruism.
For modelling such a division of labour, we suggest that the Prisoner's Dilemma is the
most suitable game, for in its n-person variety it represents strong altruism whenever
the benet:cost ratio is less than the group size (Fletcher and Zwick, 2007). It has
been shown here, and elsewhere (e.g., Fletcher and Zwick 2007), that the conditions for
cooperation to evolve in this game are very stringent, for it represents the strongest form
of social dilemma. In particular, group formation must typically be highly assortative4 if
between-group selection is to overcome within-group selection in this case. However, in
many of the fraternal transitions, the groups are founded by one or a few individuals. For
example, metazoans are cell-groups that develop from a single cell. Development from
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a single cell means that all the variance is between cell-groups, and there is no within-
group variance or selection (bar mutations), hence cooperation as dened by a Prisoner's
Dilemma game can indeed evolve (Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995; Queller, 1997,
2000). Similarly, eusocial insect colonies develop from one or a few queens, and so there
can again be sucient between-group variance, and low within-group variance, to allow
a reproductive division of labour to evolve under a Prisoner's Dilemma model.
Reproductive division of labour, however, is not the only cooperative trait relevant to
the fraternal transitions. In particular, \Tragedy of the Commons" type situations, such
as public goods production and resource exploitation, can occur. As argued above, in
such cases the Snowdrift game may in fact be a more appropriate model of within-group
competition, or in general, a game with a mixed ESS. The results presented in this
chapter show that group selection is eective over a much wider range of parameters
in such cases. This agrees with the fact that such types of cooperation are seen much
more frequently in nature than are strongly altruistic traits (such as division of labour).
While it can be argued that reproductive division of labour is the hallmark of a frater-
nal transition, other types of cooperation such as ecient resource utilisation are also
essential, and are likely to evolve rst.
We have postulated here that the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games are suit-
able models of dierent types of cooperation that occur during the fraternal transitions.
What, then, of the egalitarian transitions? In these transitions (for example, the pack-
aging of genes into chromosomes, and the origin of the eukaryotic cell Queller, 1997),
the pre-transitional units are of dierent types, and perform dierent functions. Re-
productive division of labour is therefore not possible, since an individual of one type
cannot pass on the genes of another. However, since the pre-transitional organisms are
of dierent species, they can already perform dierent functions when brought together,
and this combination of functions can provide the initial selective advantage to group
membership (Queller, 1997).
We suggest that one of the diculties is then in nding sets of compatible types that
perform complimentary, and hence synergistic, functions. We then argue that such
situations are most appropriately modelled by a game that has multiple mixed ESSs.
The ESSs should be mixed, since a coexistence of dierent types occurs by denition in
the egalitarian transitions. Each mixed ESS can then represent a dierent (compatible)
combination of types. Some of these ESSs will yield a higher group tness (in terms of
group productivity) than others, and group selection can act between these (Boyd and
Richerson, 1990; Wilson, 1992). However, there may be a combinatorial number of such
ESSs (Watson et al., 2009; Mills and Watson, 2009), which can frustrate the evolution of
high tness groups through the sheer number of possible combinations. Moreover, some
of these ESSs may be suboptimal but risk dominant, causing the high tness ESSs to
have small basins of attraction; this would be a generalisation of the Stag Hunt game to
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tness. It should be noted there may still be a \Tragedy of the Commons" scenario
in such transitions as well. For example, the dierent species may share a limiting
resource that their growth most depends upon; see, for example, Szathm ary 1999 where
this occurs due to dierent types of replicator sharing common metabolic products
on a surface or in a protocell. Thus, both single-ESS games representing a \Tragedy
of the Commons", and multi-ESS games representing coordination of function, may
be appropriate. The appropriateness, of course, needs to be carefully checked against
biological facts in each case. In general, we stress the appropriateness of dierent kinds of
game for modelling dierent types of social interaction, and think that, like economists,
social evolutionists would do well to explicitly consider other types of social interaction
apart from the n-player Prisoner's Dilemma.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have taken a game theoretic approach to conceptualising the social
interactions that take place within groups. Although game theory is more abstract
than the models considered in the previous chapters, we have used this abstraction
to shed light on the underlying nature of social interactions. In particular, nearly all
previous models of evolution in group structured populations implicitly assume that
social interactions within a group take the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma (Fletcher and
Zwick, 2007). Yet, this assumption represents a worst case social dilemma, and we
have shown that it necessarily curtails the range of conditions over which between-group
variance can be generated. The social dilemma in the Prisoner's Dilemma game can be
relaxed in two ways. First, unilateral cooperation can be tter than mutual selshness,
as in the Snowdrift game. This creates a single mixed ESS, which allows the possibility of
between-group variance being generated when the groups are reformed. Second, mutual
cooperation could be tter for each individual than unilateral selshness, making all
cooperate an ESS, as in the Stag Hunt game. This creates two ESSs, and group selection
can perform equilibrium selection between them, which favours the payo dominant all-
cooperate ESS. The existence of more than one ESS provides another mechanism by
which between-group variance can be generated.
We would argue that taking a game theory approach highlights these dierent kinds of
social interactions, and that the default prisoner's Dilemma case may not be appropriate
for a range of biological cooperation. For example, if cooperators can internalise some
of the benet in a public goods scenario, then the mixed ESS Snowdrift game may be
a better model (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Gore et al., 2009). The multiple ESS Stag
Hunt game may be a better model of ecological interactions such as cooperative hunting
(Pacheco et al., 2009), or symbiotic living (Law, 1991; Maynard Smith and Szathm ary,
1995). Game theory gives us simple equations to model these dierent kinds of social
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function, which dates back to Wright (1945) and implicitly represents the Prisoner's
Dilemma. We have argued that other types of social interaction are inherently more
conducive to group selection, not because it is easier to evolve cooperation in them, but
because they generate more between-group variance. Thus, population structure is more
likely to have some eect on the evolution of social traits in such games.Chapter 6
The Concurrent Evolution of
Population Structure and
Cooperation
In this chapter, we develop a model that illustrates how social niche constructing individ-
uals can evolve from living in a population structure where selsh behaviour dominates
to one where cooperation is selected for. This model builds on the one presented in
Chapter 3, by allowing new initial group size preferences to be generated over the course
of evolution by mutation. We can therefore use this model to investigate conditions
under which changes in population structure can occur by selection for a series of small
mutations, in contrast to the large dierences in group sizes that we considered in Chap-
ter 3. We thus consider not only the joint equilibrium of structure and social behaviour,
but also whether an individual adaptive gradient exists towards that equilibrium. In line
with the argument developed in chapters 4 and 5, we hypothesise that such a gradient
should occur from a much wider range of initial conditions where within-group selection
on social behaviour exhibits negative frequency-dependence. In this chapter, we model
the dierence between frequency-dependent and directional selection on social behaviour
using the Snowdrift and Prisoner's Dilemma games, respectively. We would thus pre-
dict that the evolution of initial group size towards that supporting greater cooperation
should be more plausible where within-group social interactions take the form of the
Snowdrift game.
6.1 Introduction
Typically, theoretical studies of social evolution selection have considered whether a
given population structure can provide sucient between-group variance for an individually-
costly, but group-benecial, cooperative trait to evolve (or equivalently, whether there is
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a sucient degree of relatedness between interacting individuals). Thus, the population
structure, and hence the amount of between-group variance that can arise, is assumed
to be static, with only social behaviour being subject to evolutionary modication. By
contrast, we are interested in the following question: how do the population structures
that support cooperation themselves arise? One possibility is that they are provided
by physical features of the environment. Indeed, organisms very rarely live in perfectly
well-mixed conditions, and so some kind of population structure providing localised in-
teractions will typically be present (see also the concept of Wilson's trait groups (Wilson,
1975a, 1980)). For example, a resource may be distributed in a patchy manner across
a landscape, creating groups of organisms that feed from the same patch. Cooperative
feeding traits, such as a reduced consumption rate to increase yield (Pfeier et al., 2001;
Kreft, 2004) may then evolve through between-group variance and competition, as dis-
cussed above. However, in addition to that provided by the environment, we explicitly
account in this model for the fact that individuals can also evolve their own population
structure. In particular, we consider the evolution of a genetic trait that aects between-
group variance and hence the balance between levels of selection. An example of such a
trait includes a preference for the number of other conspecics with which an individual
founds a group, for a smaller initial group size should increase between-group variance.
Another example is a trait aecting the propensity of the bearer to disperse from their
group, which aects the frequency with which individuals from dierent groups mix.
We are interested here in whether such traits can evolve to increase between-group
variance, and hence create the conditions for cooperation. If so, then we can provide
an evolutionary explanation for how the population structures supporting cooperation
arise. This is in contrast to most models of social evolution, where there is an implicit
assumption that the population structure is exogenous (Peck and Feldman 1988; Peck
1992 and Avil es 2002; Avil es et al. 2002 are notable exceptions). Here, we treat such
structure as endogenous and hence subject to natural selection. This then allows us to
seek an explanation for how cooperation evolves without having to rely on all of the
necessary structure being provided by the environment. Our treatment of population
structure as an endogenous factor is analogous to the way in which mutation rates were
originally assumed to be constant, but are now viewed as a factor that can co-evolve
with other traits (Okasha, 2006).
In this chapter we develop a logical argument, supported by a conceptual model, for
how evolution can create a selective environment favouring cooperation, by selection for
a series of gradual mutations, each creating conditions more conducive for cooperation
than the last. By way of illustration, we consider the individual trait of initial group size
preference, that is, the number of other conspecics with which an individual founds a
group or colony. A smaller initial group size preference should lead to a greater between-
group variance in behaviour if the distribution of the behavioural trait follows a binomial
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sampling meaning that each group will be less representative of the global population.
The initial variance is then amplied as multiple generations of reproduction occur
within the groups (Wilson, 1987; Fletcher and Zwick, 2004), leading to a greater positive
assortment of behaviour in the groups that were initially of a smaller size. A smaller
initial group size preference thus creates a selective environment favouring greater levels
of cooperative behaviour, but how can this preference evolve? One argument suggests
a priori that it cannot, for the following reason. Cooperative individuals should enjoy
a greater relative tness within (initially) smaller groups, since such groups will show
greater positive assortment, meaning that the cooperative type experiences a greater
per capita share of the benets of cooperation through being clustered together. On
the other hand, however, selsh individuals should enjoy a greater relative tness in
larger groups that show less positive assortment, for they will increase their share of the
benets of cooperation in such groups. Thus, if both types can evolve their initial group
size preferences, then we might expect the behaviour that is in the greatest frequency in
the metapopulation to modify the population structure to one that makes itself tter. To
sum up, how can a selective environment that favours cooperation be created when most
individuals are initially selsh, and hence intrinsically opposed to such an environment?
Here we construct a simple conceptual model which demonstrates that this argument
is fallacious, by showing that a selective gradient on the size preference allele towards
a smaller size that favours increased cooperation can exist, even when the metapopula-
tion is initially composed mostly of selsh individuals. Our model and logical argument
show that the kind of selection that operates on the behavioural trait within groups is
a key determinant of whether or not an adaptive gradient on initial group size (or any
other trait that aects the selective environment on behaviour by aecting assortativ-
ity) exists. Specically, we show that a gradient towards a population structure that
supports increased cooperation is much more likely to exist if selection on behaviour
exhibits negative frequency-dependence, leading to a protected polymorphism of be-
haviours. Such selection occurs in the Snowdrift (or Hawk Dove) game (Sugden, 1986;
Doebeli and Hauert, 2005), and has recently been argued to occur in a number of natural
environments, as discussed in Chapter 5.
We assume that the metapopulation is initially in a state where groups are founded
by many unrelated individuals, hence group-level selection is a weak evolutionary force.
This assumption then allows us to show how increased group-level selection can evolve
through evolution of an individual trait, namely, initial group size preference. Concep-
tually, our starting point is that individuals initially have tness-aecting interactions
with many others, but can evolve to bring who they interact with under their control
(indirectly) through the evolution of initial group size preference. This corresponds to
the modelling of social interactions that are largely obligatory, such as resource con-
sumption strategy, where an individual cannot help but aect others and in turn be
a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will nearly always be present (Wilson, 1975a), since interactions are rarely perfectly
well-mixed. We then investigate whether this structure can evolve to one that is more
conducive for cooperation. On the other hand, some other work on the evolution of
social systems (such as Avil es 2002) considers social interactions that are facultative,
such as communal brood care. Such models therefore start out with an assumption that
individuals have no tness-aecting interactions for the trait in question, and then show
how these facultative behaviours can evolve in tandem with grouping. Both obligatory
and facultative interactions are important in the evolution of social systems, and hence
such models are complimentary to that presented here.
6.2 The concurrent evolution of population structure and
social behaviour in a mutation model
We have a developed a simulation model where an individual's (haploid) genotype codes
not only for its social behaviour, but also for a trait that aects group structure and hence
the balance between individual- and group- level selection. Specically, an individual's
genotype contains two loci. The rst of these loci is binary and codes for whether or
not an individual cooperates within its group, that is, increases the productivity of its
group at a cost relative to non-cooperative individuals within the same group 1. The
second locus codes for an initial group size preference, that is, the number of other
conspecics with which an individual founds a group. This locus inuences the balance
between levels of selection, because a smaller initial group size will increase between-
group variance due to the eects of sampling error (assuming non-assortative group
formation). Our model uses a multi-allelic integer representation for this locus, which
in the simulations presented below can take values between 1 and 40. Mutations are
allowed to occur separately on both of these loci: mutation on the rst involves switching
behaviour, mutation on the second increasing or decreasing the size preference by 1 (with
equal probability).
The metapopulation in our model behaves according to Algorithm 6.1. This algorithm,
along with the detailed description of each step in the following subsections, fully species
our model.
The dierences from the model in Chapter 3 are:
 Initial group size preference can now vary over an integer range, rather than being
binary \large" or \small".
1As discussed in Chapter 1, this denition accords with Wilson's (1979; 1990) weak altruism and
Pepper's (2000) whole-group traits, but it should be stressed that both weak and strong altruism exhibit
similar dynamical behaviour when groups exist for multiple generations before dispersal. That is, both
decline in frequency within each group, and hence the distinction becomes less important (Fletcher and
Zwick, 2007). In particular, the arguments by Grafen (1984) and Nunney (1985) about weak altruism
evolving by individual selection in randomly formed groups do not apply to multi-generational groups.Chapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation 107
Algorithm 6.1 Aggregation and dispersal model with mutation and varying initial
group size
1. Initialise the migrant pool with a total density of N individuals, as stated in
Section 6.2.2.
2. Form groups from the migrant pool, according to Algorithm 6.2 below.
3. Reproduce within the groups for t generations, according to Equation 6.2 below.
4. Disperse all groups to form a new migrant pool, as stated in Section 6.2.4.
5. Mutate M% of the individuals in the migrant pool, as stated in Section 6.2.5.
6. Repeat from step 2 for T aggregation and dispersal cycles.
 New group size preferences can be generated by mutation.
 Groups are formed based on size preferences according to Algorithm 6.2, since not
all individuals will now end up in the size of group that they specify, due to the
range of group size preferences.
 The game-theoretic tness function in Equation 6.1 can produce both directional
and negative frequency-dependent within-group selection on social behaviour. Thus
allows us to investigate how negative frequency-dependent selection aects the
range of condiitons under which social niche construction occurs.
 Mutation can change social behaviour between cooperate and selsh, and vice
versa.
This model therefore relaxes several of the simplifying assumptions made in Chapter 3,
notably, that within-group selection must be directional against cooperation, and that
group size preference is binary and not subject to mutation. In this chapter, we investi-
gate what relaxing these assumptions tells us about social niche construction and when
it can occur.
The next subsections describe the steps of Algorithm 6.1 in detail.
6.2.1 Migrant pool initialisation
At the start of a simulation run, we x all individuals in the migrant pool to have the
same size preference allele; this is 20 in the experiments reported here. The frequency of
the cooperative allele is then set to be its equilibrium under the aggregation and dispersal
process if all groups were xed at an initial size of 20. We thus start all individuals out
in the same population structure, and start the behavioural allele at its equilibrium for
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and social behaviour, by allowing both initial group size and behaviour to be subject to
mutation and selection over many aggregation and dispersal cycles.
6.2.2 Group formation
The metapopulation in our model is based around the aggregation and dispersal process
in Chapter 3, with the addition of multiple values for the group size preference allele,
and a corresponding process of group formation. Groups are formed with respect to size
preference so that, to a rst approximation, individuals live in a size of group that meets
their preference. Subject to this constraint on the size preference allele, the assignment
of the behaviour allele to groups follows a hypergeometric distribution, i.e., random
sampling without replacement. Procedurally, this assignment of genotypes to groups is
carried out in according to Algorithm 6.2.
Algorithm 6.2 Group formation algorithm.
1. Create a list of all individuals in the migrant pool.
2. Sort this list in reverse order of group size preference, such that the individuals
with the largest size preference are at the front of the list. Within each sub-list of
individuals with the same size preference, randomise their position in the list with
respect to their social behaviour (cooperative or selsh).
3. Create a new group, and add the individual at the front of the list to this group.
Remove the added individual from the list.
4. Continue adding individuals in order from the list, while the following condition is
met: the mean size preference of the group members is less than the current group
size. When this condition does not hold, advance to step 5.
5. If there are still individuals in the list, go back to step 3, else all groups have been
formed.
Regarding step 2 in this algorithm, randomising the order of each sub-list of individuals
with the same size allele means that the behaviours are assigned to groups according to
a hypergeometric distribution, and not assortatively. More precisely, there is a separate
hypergeometric distribution of behaviour for each value of the group size allele. Sorting
the list in reverse size order handles the special case of the last group. This is because
the last group will contain the handful of remaining individuals in the migrant pool. If
the list was sorted in increasing order, then this last group would be small but would
contain the individuals with the largest size preference. Sorting in reverse order means
that the small last group contains the individuals with the smallest size preference.
Although at rst appearance our procedure of forming groups may not seem particularly
biologically plausible, since it contains a global sorting step, it should be remembered
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size preference and the size of group that they end up in. In general, if an allele that
codes for a preference for a particular kind of population structure means anything,
then it must mean that individuals with that allele should (in the absence of other
constraining factors) tend to end up in that structure more frequently than if they did
not posses the allele. Thus, there must be some degree of assortativity on the structure
allele, since individuals with a particular structural allele will want to live in the same
structures. So, we should expect individuals with a certain group size allele to tend to
end up in the same groups to some degree by denition, and this is what the above
algorithm produces. There may be other ways of achieving this that do not rely on a
global procedure, but the algorithm we use is transparent that, a) there is assortativity
on the group size allele, and b) there is not assortativity directly on the behavioural
allele.
6.2.3 Reproduction within groups (within-group selection)
Once the groups have been formed, we do not consider discrete individuals. Rather, we
take the number of individuals with each genotype within a group to be the initial den-
sity of that genotype in the group. We then allow these densities to vary continuously
as reproduction occurs within the group (as, for example, does Wilson 1975a), avoiding
the need to discretise back to an integer representation of genotype density at each gen-
eration, as would occur in a strictly individual-based model. Instead, we only discretise
the densities back to integers when the migrant pool is formed. Our use of densities
rather than numbers within groups is analogous to the use of continuous densities in the
Lotka-Volterra equations.
Asexual reproduction occurs within the groups for a number of generations, t, and
causes the genotype densities to change. We use the game theory tness function from
Chapter 5 that can produce both the n-player Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games.
This tness function is repeated again below for clarity:
wc = p

b  
c
2

+ (1   p)(b   c) + w0 ws = pb + w0; (6.1)
where wc is the per capita tness of all genotypes with the cooperative allele within the
group, ws the tness of all genotypes with the selsh allele in the group, p the proportion
of the cooperative allele in the group, b the benet of cooperation, c the cost, and w0
a baseline tness in the absence of social interactions. Setting 0:5 < b=c < 1 produces
the Prisoner's Dilemma, b=c > 1 the Snowdrift game (Doebeli and Hauert, 2005). In
terms of within-group selection, the size preference allele is neutral; it only changes in
frequency (due to selection) when the groups compete to form the migrant pool. Thus,
all genotypes with the same behavioural allele have the same 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group, and so for a given behavioural allele in a given group, the frequency distribution
of size alleles that it is paired with does not change. This is shown in the dierence
equation below, which states how genotype densities change according to tness:
nc(g + 1) = nc(g)wc ns(g + 1) = ns(g)ws; (6.2)
where nc(g) is the density of all genotypes with the cooperative allele in the group at
generation g, and ns(g) is the density of all genotypes with the selsh allele in the group
at that generation. Evolution within groups according to this equation is deterministic;
we do not consider genetic drift or other stochastic forces.
After every generation within groups, i.e., after Equation 6.2 has been iterated once in
all groups, we rescale the size of each group to main a constant population size. This
is done by normalising the size of each group in a proportionate manner, such that
the sum of all group densities adds up to the original population size, keeping their size
dierentials after the generation of growth intact. Within any one group, the proportion
of genotype densities remains the same.
In the rst version of our model there is no intrinsic pressure for large or small groups, i.e.,
group size does not directly inuence individual tness, but only indirectly through its
eect on between-group variance and hence the frequency of cooperation. Thus, the only
component of selection on population structure that can potentially exist is due to social
behaviour. However, there may also be other selection pressures on population structure
that may oppose the component due to social behaviour. Here, as in Chapter 3, we
consider the possibility of an Allee eect that favours groups of a larger initial size (Allee,
1938; Odum and Allee, 1954); for example, due to better defence against predators in
larger sized groups, or access to resources that smaller groups cannot obtain (Avil es,
1999). To incorporate the Allee eect into the model, we add the following sigmoidal
function to the above tness functions:
n =

1 + e n  

2
; (6.3)
where n is the current group size at generation g,  the gradient (which determines how
quickly the benet tails o as the group grows), and  a parameter which determines the
maximum benet. Using this tness function, we are able to investigate how an Allee
eect favouring larger groups plays o against the advantages of greater cooperation
(due to greater group-level selection) when groups are founded by fewer individuals.Chapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation 111
6.2.4 Migrant pool formation (between-group selection)
After t generations, all groups disperse and form a migrant pool which then seeds the
next generation of groups. When this migrant pool is formed, groups that have grown
to a larger size will constitute a larger fraction; this is between-group selection. This
between-group selection operates on the behavioural allele in the standard manner: if
groups with more cooperators have grown to a larger size, then the cooperative al-
lele may (depending on the strength of within-group selection) increase in frequency in
the metapopulation (compared to the previous migrant pool), as in Simpson's Para-
dox (Simpson, 1951; Sober and Wilson, 1998). In addition, the frequency of the size
preference allele can also change as a result of selection. For example, if groups of an
initially smaller size have done better than those of a larger initial size (i.e., have grown
to a greater nal size after t generations, for example due to more cooperation through
greater group selection), and individuals in the small groups tended to have a small
allele, then the small allele will increase in frequency in the migrant pool (compared
to the previous aggregation and dispersal cycle) and hence in the metapopulation as a
whole.
When the migrant pool is formed, we discretise the genotype densities by rounding them
to the nearest integer. The genotype densities can then be treated as individuals for the
purposes of mutation and group formation.
6.2.5 Mutation
Mutation occurs after the migrant pool densities have been rescaled and discretised
into an integer number of individuals. At this stage, a fraction M of individuals in
the migrant pool are randomly chosen to be mutated. Of this subset of the population
chosen for mutation, a fraction m have their size preference allele mutated, the remaining
1 m fraction their behavioural allele mutated; only one locus is mutated per individual.
Mutation on our integer representation of the size preference allele occurs by decreasing
its value by 1, with 50% probability, or otherwise it is increased by 1. If the size allele
is already at the upper or lower limit (40 or 1 with the parmater settings used here,
respectively), then it is always has 1 subtracted or added, respectively, if selected for
mutation. Mutation on the binary behavioural allele (cooperative or selsh) occurs by
switching to the other behaviour.
After mutation has occurred, the next generation of groups is formed as specied in
Algorithm 6.2, and the aggregation and dispersal process is repeated for a sucient
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6.3 Results
We have investigated the concurrent evolution of group size preference and social be-
haviour, to determine conditions under which a size preference can evolve to reinforce
group-level selection. In particular, we have focussed on the eect that the type of social
interaction between group members has, i.e., whether it follows a Prisoner's Dilemma
or a Snowdrift game.
6.3.1 Parameter settings
In the experiments described below, we use the parameter settings in Table 6.1. We
set c = 1, with b = 0:9 to yield Prisoner's Dilemma interactions, and b = 1:1 to
produce a Snowdrift scenario (this is close to the qualitative threshold between the
two games that occurs at b=c = 1). In all of the simulations, we follow a population
of total density 1000 through 6000 group formation and dispersal cycles (preliminary
experimentation revealed that this was a sucient length of time for an equilibrium at
the metapopulation level to be reached), and record the average population trajectory
over 100 Monte Carlo trials. Group dispersal is set to occur after t = 5 generations
of selection and reproduction within groups. The initial frequency of genotypes in the
metapopulation is set as described in Section 6.2.1, with the population initially xed
for a size preference allele of 20. The greater rate of mutation on the size preference
locus (compared to the behavioural locus) is motivated by the fact that in an explicit
genetic system it may well be represented by many loci, where a change at any one of
these loci could potentially aect the size preference phenotype.
6.3.2 Results with no Allee eect
We initially considered the simplied model where there is no Allee eect, meaning
that the advantages of group living come entirely from interactions with cooperative
individuals - there is no intrinsic advantage in numbers. Thus, the tness of an individual
is aected directly only by the composition of its group. A smaller initial group size can
potentially evolve in such a situation, as illustrated by the following argument. Groups
founded by fewer individuals exhibit greater between-group variance. As a result, such
groups are more aected by group selection, and hence are more cooperative than those
founded by a larger number of individuals. Consequently, a smaller size preference allele
causes its bearers to live in, on average, groups with a greater frequency of cooperation.
Therefore, individuals possessing the smaller size allele enjoy a greater frequency of
cooperation, and are hence tter than those bearing a larger preference allele. This
can then create directional downward selective pressure on the size allele, whereby a
smaller size preference will (largely) x in the population, until a yet smaller preferenceChapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation 113
Table 6.1: Parameter settings used throughout Chapter 6.
Parameter Value
Cost to cooperating, c 1
Benet to cooperating (Prisoner's Dilemma), b 0.9
Benet to cooperating (Snowdrift), b 1.1
Fraction of population mutated, M 0.01
Probability any mutation is on size preference allele, m 0.9
Generations within groups before dispersal, t 5
Value of size allele xed in initial population 20
Smallest possible size allele 1
Largest possible size allele 40
Frequency of cooperative allele in migrant pool at initialisation (Pris-
oner's Dilemma)
0
Frequency of cooperative allele in migrant pool at initialisation
(Snowdrift)
0.1667
Gradient of sigmoidal tness bonus function from Allee eect,  0.4
Determinant of maximum benet from Allee eect,  1
Migrant pool density, N 1000
Number of aggregation and dispersal cycles, T 6000
arises by mutation and the process repeats. This eect implies the existence of an
individual adaptive gradient towards a smaller initial group size, greater group selection,
and greater cooperation.
6.3.2.1 Prisoner's Dilemma social interactions
We have investigated whether such an adaptive gradient exists and whether it can be
followed when smaller size alleles arise at mutation frequency. We rst studied Prisoner's
Dilemma interactions, and found that, from an initial value of 20, the initial size pref-
erence allele would always evolve down to the minimum possible (Figure 6.1A), i.e., 1,
with the cooperative allele almost reaching xation (Figure 6.1C). Taken at face value,
this result would imply that the argument given above tells the whole story, and that
the evolution of group size towards increased group selection and cooperation can pro-
ceed unhindered. However, the plot of size allele frequencies over time in Figure 6.2A
shows that this argument is not entirely correct. This is because the allele frequencies
do not gradually shift downwards as mutations accumulate, instead, size preferences
spread out equally in both directions until such a time as a very small preference arises
by mutation, at which point that very small size rapidly xes in the population. This is
shown by both Figure 6.2A and the step change in the mean value of the size allele in
Figure 6.1A, which shows that no selection occurs until a very small size preference is
reached (we show representative runs rather than the mean in Figure 6.1A to highlight
this step change, which would be smoothed out when taking an average over multiple
runs, since it happens at dierent times on dierent runs due to the stochasticity of the114 Chapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation
mutation process). The fact that the allele frequencies initially spread out in both direc-
tions shows that an adaptive gradient on this allele is not present at the start. Instead,
the results imply that the size allele is neutral over most of its values, and hence changes
as a result of drift rather than selection.
Why, then, is the size allele largely neutral? If a mutant smaller size preference is
to be selectively advantageous, it must be the case that groups of that size are more
aected by group selection, and hence their members experience a greater frequency of
cooperation, than those of the current size. So, for an adaptive gradient to exist, groups
of initial size n0 1 must enjoy more cooperation than those of initial size n0. The black
line in gure 6.3 explores this under Prisoner's Dilemma interactions by calculating the
frequency of cooperation in the metapopulation over a range of xed consecutive initial
group sizes, with all other parameters the same as in the previous simulation (i.e., no
assortment on behaviour during group formation, 5 generations within groups between
dispersal episodes, and b=c = 0:9). This shows that, for n0 > 6, no adaptive gradient
on the size allele can exist, since above this threshold moving to a slightly smaller size
preference does not increase cooperation, and so size allele n0   1 will not, on average,
be tter than size allele n0. This threshold for the start of an adaptive gradient can also
be seen in gure 6.2A, where allele frequencies only became concentrated around a few
values once mutants with a size preference of 5 or less had arisen.
The above results suggest that an adaptive gradient on a trait increasing group selec-
tion will only exist over the very small range of parameter space where group selection
is already quite eective. Thus, they suggest that we should not expect a population
to evolve from a structure where group selection is weak to one where such selection is
strong, for the process would seem to rely on drift from most initial conditions, and so
would be unable to overcome any slight opposing selective force. However, this conclu-
sion assumes Prisoner's Dilemma style social interactions, corresponding to directional
selection against an allele for cooperation within each and every group. As discussed
above, not only do such interaction dynamics represent a worst-case scenario for group
selection, but there is also a growing recognition that they may not actually be the best
model for many types of cooperative behaviour. Instead the Snowdrift game, which
corresponds to negative frequency-dependent selection for a stable polymorphism of be-
haviours within each group, may be a better model. Where this is the case, we nd that
the results are markedly dierent.
6.3.2.2 Snowdrift social interactions
To investigate the eects of Snowdrift interactions, we changed b=c from 0.9 to 1.1 and
then reran the experiments in the previous section. The end state was the same as
in the Prisoner's Dilemma case, that is, initial group size evolved down to 1, which in
turn selected for maximal cooperation between group members during subsequent groupChapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation 115
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Figure 6.1: Concurrent evolution of initial group size preference and cooper-
ation with no intrinsic advantage to any group size (i.e., no Allee eect). A)
Mean value of size preference allele under Prisoner's Dilemma interactions in
5 representative runs. B) Mean value of size preference allele under Snowdrift
interactions in 5 representative runs. C) Proportion of cooperative allele in
metapopulation, averaged over 30 runs (error bars show the standard error).
growth. However, as gures 6.1B and 6.2B show, the dynamics on the transient to reach
this equilibrium were very dierent. Rather than the size preference allele drifting in
both directions, the mass of the allele frequencies showed a trend of moving downwards116 Chapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation
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Figure 6.2: (A) Size allele frequency evolution during a typical run under Pris-
oner's Dilemma interactions (lighter shades represent greater frequency of the
allele value in the metapopulation). B) Size allele frequency evolution during a
typical run under Snowdrift interactions.
from the start. In particular, the ratchet eect described in the logical argument can be
seen, whereby a mutation for a smaller size preference arises and increases in frequency,
until a yet smaller mutant arises by mutation - there is no evolution back towards larger
preferences, even when such larger preferences were previously xed in the population.
This implied that selection was responsible for the change in size preference allele fre-
quencies, and hence the existence of an adaptive gradient on this allele even from the
initial metapopulation state.
To conrm this, we again considered whether moving from initial size preference n0 to
n0   1 would increase the amount of cooperation its bearers experienced. The grey line
in gure 6.3 shows that from the starting condition of n0 = 20, decreasing initial group
size by 1 would always yield some increase in cooperation due to an increased eect of
group selection. The question is then: why does this occur under Snowdrift, but not
Prisoner's Dilemma, interactions? We have shown in chapters 4 and 5 that negativeChapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation 117
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Figure 6.3: Eect of moving to a smaller initial group size on the frequency of
cooperation under Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift interactions.
frequency-dependent selection within groups maintains some between-group variance
over a much larger range of conditions, such as initial group sizes, than if selection is
directional. This is because between-group variance is proportional to the frequency of
the least frequent behavioural allele in the metapopulation, and while this tends to zero
under directional selection, it does not do so under negative frequency-dependence. This
preservation of between-group variance means that some eect of group selection can
be seen over a much larger range of conditions and, consequently, moving to a smaller
initial group size increases the eect of group selection over a much larger range.
Our results therefore show that an allele coding for smaller initial group size, and hence
greater between-group variance, can in fact be selected for. However, this can occur from
a much wider range of initial metapopulation states if social interactions give rise to
negative frequency-dependent selection, as modelled here by the Snowdrift game. These
results are based on a simplifying assumption that the benets of group living come only
from the proportion of the cooperative allele, and not from any intrinsic advantage of
numbers. This simplied the above experiments, by making increased cooperation the
only force in the evolution of initial group size. However, in many situations a group
founded by only a small number of individuals may be more vulnerable than one founded
by a larger cohort. This then provides two opposing selective forces on initial group size:
a short term benet of having more members when the group is founded, versus a long
term benet of increased tness through greater cooperation if the group is founded
by fewer individuals. In the next section we examine the trade-o between these two
conicting forces by explicitly incorporating the Allee eect term of equation 6.3 into
individual 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6.3.3 Results with an opposing component of selection on population
structure due to an Allee eect
An Allee eect would favour larger numbers during the early stages of group growth,
which we model using the function in equation 6.3. This benet function is sigmoidal and
hence its gradient rapidly reaches zero as group size increases - this represents the fact
that, above a certain size, the advantages of number become cancelled out by the eects
of increased crowding (Odum and Allee, 1954). In the absence of any group selection
eects on cooperation, an initial group size of 20 or greater would be favoured using the
parameter settings for the sigmoidal function described above, since this is the group
size for which the gradient reaches zero. However, given that group selection eects
can occur to increase cooperation, individual tness would actually be increased at a
smaller initial size that produces more between-group variance and hence stronger group
selection favouring cooperation. We investigate below whether an adaptive gradient
towards such an intermediate group size exists and can be followed by mutation and
selection.
The results in Figure 6.4 show how the evolution of initial group size is aected by the
incorporation of an Allee eect. Initial group size preference evolves downwards, and
cooperation increases, under Snowdrift but not Prisoner's Dilemma types of interaction
(Figure 6.4A and Figure 6.4B). This is because under Prisoner's Dilemma interactions,
no adaptive gradient exists on the size preference allele (Figure 6.5A), in accordance
with our previous results. Because of the opposing selective force towards larger groups
generated by the Allee eect, the size preference allele is no longer able to drift down-
wards. On the other hand, under Snowdrift interactions an adaptive gradient towards a
smaller size preference still exists (Figure 6.5B), even given the immediate advantages
of numbers from the Allee eect. Thus, these results highlight the importance of an
adaptive gradient, since genetic drift is unable to overcome the opposing selective force
provided by the Allee eect, leaving the population at an equilibrium with suboptimal
individual tness under Prisoner's Dilemma interactions. Finally, Figure 6.4A suggests
that the mean value of the size preference allele starts to increase again under Snowdrift
interactions once the cooperative allele has reached a high frequency. This is because
linkage disequilibrium evolves between the size preference and behavioural alleles, such
that the selsh allele becomes associated with a large size preference, and the coopera-
tive allele with a small preference, for reasons discussed below. It is this association of
the selsh allele with a larger preference that pushes the mean value of the size allele
slightly upwards towards the end of a run.
Further analysis of the results is shown in Figure 6.6. Figure 6.6A shows how group
size preference evolves to increase between-group variance under Snowdrift interactions,
thus increasing the eect of group selection. Figure 6.6B shows that, where initial
group size evolves in this manner, linkage disequilibrium is generated between the sizeChapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation 119
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Figure 6.4: Concurrent evolution of initial group size preference and cooperation
with an opposing selective force provided by an Allee eect. Error bars show
standard error from 100 trials. A) Mean value of size allele. B) Cooperative
allele frequency in metapopulation.
preference and behaviour loci. In particular, the cooperative allele becomes associated
with a small size preference, and the selsh allele with a large preference. We found
the mean linkage disequilibrium over 100 trials, calculated using Lewontin and Kojima's
(1960) normalised method, to be 0.62 after 6000 aggregation and dispersal cycles (by
contrast under Prisoner's Dilemma interactions the linkage disequilibrium was 0.12).
Our original logical argument for the evolution of initial group size can explain why this
occurs, as follows. A smaller size preference allele causes its bearers to live in groups
more aected by group selection. Because of this increased group selection, increased120 Chapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation
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Figure 6.5: Size allele frequency evolution (lighter shades represent greater fre-
quency of the allele value in the metapopulation). A) Representative run under
Prisoner's Dilemma interactions. B) Representative run under Snowdrift inter-
actions.
cooperation is selected for in such groups. Since bearers of a smaller size preference allele
nd themselves in such groups more often than bearers of a larger preference allele, an
association between cooperation and a smaller preference builds up. Indeed, it is this
association which allows the smaller preference allele to be selectively advantageous,
since it causes its bearers to receive, on average, more of the benets of cooperation.
It can also be seen from Figure 6.6B that as equilibrium genotype frequencies are reached
in the metapopulation, most of the selsh alleles are associated with a size preference very
much larger than the cooperative allele. This follows on from the previous argument,
since selsh individuals are (largely) purged from groups that are initially very small
by group selection. Hence, when the cooperative allele evolves such a preference, the
selsh allele can only be maintained if its bearers have a preference for groups much less
aected by group selection, i.e., groups with a large initial size. This trend then explainsChapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation 121
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Figure 6.6: Further analysis of Allee eect results. A) Evolution of between-
group variance. B) Evolution of linkage disequilibrium between group size and
behavioural alleles under Snowdrift interactions.
the occasional upward shift in size preference by cooperative individuals at equilibrium,
seen in Figure 6.5B. This is because when no selsh individuals have a slightly larger size
preference, the Allee eect can provide a pressure for initial size to increase. However,
this is not maintained, since selsh mutants can arise and increase in frequency under
such a larger size preference, causing cooperators with a smaller preference to once again
outcompete cooperators with a larger preference, thereby restoring the equilibrium. In
general, such cyclic dynamics rarely occurred in our model, and were only transitory,
with the equilibrium genotype frequencies always restored.
We have also investigated whether the size preference allele was being used as a proxy122 Chapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation
mechanism for assortative group formation, since individuals with the same size pref-
erence tended to nd themselves in the same groups. Could our results be explained
entirely by this fact? To test this, we used the same group formation mechanism, ex-
cept for the replacement of the size preference allele with an arbitrary numerical tag.
Thus, individuals with the same tag would tend to nd themselves in the same group,
but the initial group size was xed at the starting value of 20 so that the tag had no
eect on group size, thereby mimicking the assortative aspects of our group formation
mechanism without their eect on size. We found that in this case, no linkage disequi-
librium evolved between tag and behaviour, and hence cooperation did not increase in
frequency. This is because although one value of the tag would temporarily be linked
more to the cooperative allele by stochastic eects, this could not be maintained under
selection, since selsh individuals would also evolve the same tag, as theory predicts will
happen with such greenbeard eects (see, for example, Okasha 2002 for a discussion of
the vulnerability of greenbeard genes). Linkage disequilibrium could only be stable when
the tag itself aected the strength of group selection, as an increase in group selection
would select against selsh individuals with the same tag, as occurs here when the tag
corresponds to group size preference. Thus, assortative group formation alone does not
provide an explanation for our results.
6.3.4 Sensitivity to parameter settings
In this chapter we have shown how a trait aecting the strength of group selection
can evolve concurrently with social behaviour, and how a sharp qualitative distinction
arises between Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift style social interactions. In particular,
the distinction is over whether an adaptive gradient towards stronger group selection
exists and can be followed by a series of mutations. The quantitative range over which
this gradient occurs depends upon the range of parameter space over which an eect
of group selection can be seen, and hence on the range over which some between-group
variance is present. In the model presented here, the other factors apart from initial
group size that determine this are the initial state of the metapopulation (size preference
and cooperation allele frequencies), the degree of assortativity in group formation, the
number of generations spent within groups before dispersal, and the cost-to-benet ratio
of cooperating. All of these factors matter, however, only in so far as they change the
quantitative range over which an adaptive gradient towards smaller initial group size
exists; the qualitative arguments presented here still hold for other settings of these
parameters. In a similar manner, the parameters of the sigmoidal size benet function
representing the Allee eect determine the trade-o between the advantages of smaller
initial size arising from greater group selection and cooperation, versus the raw benets
of living with more individuals. However, while the exact position of this trade-o
determines the nal size preference that will evolve, it does not aect the qualitative
result that a smaller initial group size can evolve due to the benets of increased groupChapter 6 The Concurrent Evolution of Population Structure and Cooperation 123
selection, nor the distinction between Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift style social
interactions.
6.4 Discussion
We have shown here how population structure can evolve to create the conditions for
eective group-level selection and hence high levels of cooperation between group mem-
bers. Crucially, this evolution of population structure can, under some conditions, occur
as a result of natural selection on individual genetic traits. Thus, we have shown, both
by logical argument and computer simulations, that selection on individual traits can
reinforce group selection, even when group and individual selection on a behavioural
trait are in opposition.
Our results complement existing work on multi-level selection, which typically either
explores the range of conditions under which group selection can be eective (e.g., Levin
and Kilmer 1974; Wilson and Colwell 1981; Wilson 1987; Fletcher and Zwick 2004; Peck
2004), or considers the population structure of a particular organism and determines
whether group selection is likely to be important in the evolutionary history of the
organism, given that population structure (e.g., Avil es 1993). However, these models
do not consider that population structure can be inuenced by individual genetic traits
and can hence itself evolve. By contrast, we have explicitly modelled how the strength
of group selection can change over evolutionary time. Furthermore, we have shown
that an adaptive gradient towards the conditions for eective group selection (such as a
small initial group size) can exist and be followed by a series of mutations. Thus, while
previous work has shown the conditions for eective group selection, we have shown here
how those conditions can themselves evolve.
It is worth pointing out that our results can also be interpreted under a kin selec-
tion framework, since the metric of between-group variance is equivalent to that of
genetic relatedness (Queller, 1992b). This is particularly evident when considering ini-
tial group size, for the smaller the initial group size, the greater the relatedness of group
members in subsequent generations due to descent from a smaller number of common
ancestors. We have thus shown here how the evolution of genetic traits can lead to an
increased relatedness between interacting individuals, and hence how a population struc-
ture that supports cooperation according to Hamilton's rule (Hamilton, 1964a) can itself
evolve. Thus, while Hamilton's rule predicts the conditions for cooperation to evolve,
we have shown here how a population structure that satises those conditions can arise
by adaptive evolution. It should be stressed that restating our results in a kin selection
framework in no way invalidates the group selection explanation that we have given
(Queller, 1992b; Dugatkin and Reeve, 1994; Foster et al., 2006b; Wilson and Wilson,
2007). Rather, it serves to highlight the fact that kin selection is e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a high relatedness between group members, and hence a high between-group variance.
Thus group structure, and variance in the composition of the groups, is an essential part
of either explanatory framework (Wilson, 1975a; Wade, 1980; Michod, 1982).
The arguments developed in this chapter begin with an initial population whose mem-
bers interact in larger groups founded by many individuals. This assumption is valid
for cases where tness-aecting interactions between organisms are obligatory, rather
than facultative. Many types of interaction are of this form, where it is a fact of life
that an organism aects, and is aected by, others. Obvious examples of this type of
interaction include predation (a prey organism cannot choose to simply not be aected
by a predator) and consumption (when an organism consumes a resource, then less is
available for other conspecics). Indeed, two types of social interaction often considered
when modelling the evolution of cooperation are a growth rate versus yield trade-o in
resource consumption (Pfeier et al., 2001; Kreft, 2004), and public goods production
(Grin et al., 2004; Greig and Travisano, 2004; Gore et al., 2009). Both of these cases
may involve obligatory interactions. For example, if organisms depend upon a shared
resource then an individual cannot help but be aected by the rate and yield at which
others use that resource, and vice versa. Likewise, an organism may need to utilise
extra-cellular products to survive, and hence cannot help but either manufacture those
products itself, or use those supplied by other individuals in the vicinity. Thus, some
kind of loose trait-group structure (in the sense of Wilson 1975a, 1977), whereby indi-
viduals interact with many others, will often be present. We have shown here how this
loose structure can evolve to increase the eect of group-level selection.
It is worth contrasting our approach with that of other work on the evolution of social
systems, such as that by Avil es (2002). This other work typically considers social inter-
actions that are facultative, and hence a reasonable assumption is that individuals have
no such interactions at the beginning of the model. Such facultative interactions include
communal brood care (Kokko et al., 2001) and coordinated group hunting (Packer and
Ruttan, 1988). Because of the assumption of faculatative social interactions, this work
assumes that individuals do not belong to any group at the outset, and then shows
how the benets of performing and receiving the facultative act can be a driver for the
evolution of group living. By contrast, we consider obligatory social interactions, which
in turn means that some type of trait-group structure will nearly always be present. We
then show conditions under which this structure can evolve to increase between-group
variance. Both obligatory and facultative social interactions are undoubtedly important
when explaining the evolution of group living, and hence both approaches are compli-
mentary.
In this chapter, we have modelled the evolution of initial group size to illustrate how
the balance between opposing levels of selection can evolve. Roze and Michod (2001)
have also considered competition between two dierent initial group sizes, in the form of
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showed that, if selsh mutations arise within otherwise cooperative groups, then a
smaller initial propagule size can be selected for because it increases between-group
variance and hence the ability of group selection to purge selsh mutants. In agreement
with the results above, they showed that this could occur even when there were some
intrinsic advantages of a larger propagule size, which in their case corresponded to a
larger size of the adult multi-cellular organism. Our work, however, diers from theirs
in several respects. The most signicant of these is that they considered competition
between two xed initial group sizes which were quite far apart (5 and 1), whereas we
consider how initial group size can evolve via a series of small mutations. This in turn
means that we explicitly consider whether an adaptive gradient exists on initial group
size and whether it can be followed by a series of mutations. On the other hand, Roze
and Michod (2001) only competed two xed sizes and hence were not concerned by the
presence of an adaptive gradient. We have shown here that whether or not an adaptive
gradient is likely to be present depends on the type of social interaction, and that the
lack of such a gradient can frustrate the evolution of group size, even when a smaller
group size would be tter if it could be reached. Thus, our work has shown the impor-
tance of the type of social interaction, which performing static analysis by competing
only two xed group sizes does not highlight. Thus, our work is complimentary to that
of Roze & Michod, for they have shown that a smaller initial group size can in princi-
ple be selectively advantageous, while we have shown by dynamical analysis conditions
under which such a smaller size can and cannot be reached.
Apart from initial group size, there are other aspects of population structure that aect
the balance between levels of selection and which can also be inuenced by individual
genetic traits. Examples include the between-group migration rate (here 0 between
dispersal episodes, and 1 at the dispersal stage), the number of generations within groups
prior to dispersal (here 5), and the degree of assortativity at the behavioural locus during
group formation (here 0). Traits aecting these factors could also evolve alongside social
behaviour in a manner analogous to that modelled in this paper. Of particular interest
is the dynamics that could occur when more than one of these population structure
modifying traits evolves concurrently; we intend to make this the subject of a future
study.
It is also worth discussing how the assumptions of our model inuence the results pre-
sented here. The metapopulation structure that we have modelled is based on the classic
Haystack model, and represents organisms that live on ephemeral resource patches which
last for a number of generations. While this ts the biology of some organisms partic-
ularly well, it is of course the case that other population structures, such as \stepping
stone" or \island" style migration between non-ephemeral patches (Wilson, 1992), may
be a closer model for other organisms. However, we have used the Haystack model here
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the way in which it was used by Sober and Wilson (1998) to explicate the general ten-
sion between opposing levels of selection. Logical argument suggests that the qualitative
conclusions of our study should be little aected by the exact nature of the organism's
population structure. In particular, negative frequency-dependent selection, as occurs
in the Snowdrift game, should always allow for the possibility of some between-group
variance to be maintained, since no behaviour can be driven extinct. Therefore, such
interactions should still be more conducive to providing an adaptive gradient towards
increased group selection. Testing this hypothesis through the application of our model
to other metapopulation structures provides an interesting avenue of future research.
Another assumption of our model is that of asexual reproduction. This is important,
in so much as linkage disequilibrium is generated between the size preference and social
behaviour alleles in our model. An interesting future study would be to determine how
sexual reproduction, which has the potential to disrupt linkage disequilibrium, would
aect our results. However, since the linkage disequilibrium in our model is generated by
selection, in particular by a smaller size preference allele causing increased cooperation
amongst its bearers to be selected for, we hypothesise that sexual reproduction should
make only a quantitative dierence to our results. Finally, a global carrying capacity
is imposed in our model by capping the total population size, rather than by limiting
the number of groups (which would correspond to a limit in the number of resource
patches upon which groups live). Limiting the number of groups may create an upward
pressure on initial group size, resulting in a trade-o with the eect of group selection,
in a manner similar to the trade-o arising due to the Allee eect. Either or both of a
carrying capacity limiting the number of individuals, or limiting the number of groups,
may occur in natural populations.
When considering the wider implications of our results, they reinforce the need to se-
lect an appropriate model for the particular type of cooperative behaviour occurring in
any given ecological scenario. In the past the Prisoner's Dilemma has typically been
assumed to be a suitable model for many types of cooperative act, particularly in multi-
level selection models where it is usually implicit in the within-group tness equations
(Fletcher and Zwick, 2007). More recently, however, the validity of Prisoner's Dilemma
interactions has been questioned for a number of ecological behaviours, including a va-
riety of public goods scenarios. For example, it can be the case that cooperators receive
a greater per capita share of the public good that they produce. Signicantly, this can
occur even in the absence of positive assortment, since a cooperator may, for example,
be able to internalise a fraction of the good that it produces, such that only it bene-
ts, as has been shown to be the case with digestive enzyme production in yeast (Gore
et al., 2009), and antibiotic resistance in bacteria (Dugatkin et al., 2003). If the per
capita benets of the public good decrease with increasing frequency, then this will lead
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modelled here with the Snowdrift game. This dynamic can occur even when interac-
tions are freely-mixed, and hence can operate within single groups2 . Crucially, this still
creates a situation where individual- and group-level selection are in opposition, since
the group will benet from a higher level of the public good than can be maintained
under individual selection (see also Dugatkin et al. 2005 for a study of this phenomenon
in single generational trait-groups). In chapters 4 and 5 we have shown that when
social behaviour gives rise to this kind of dynamic, then between-group variance on the
behavioural trait can be maintained over a much larger range of parameters. This is
because a polymorphism of behaviours allows for some between-group variance to be
regenerated when new groups are formed. Here we have shown that this maintenance
of between-group variance, and hence of group selection, is crucial for the presence of
an adaptive gradient on a group-structure modifying trait. Thus, such behavioural dy-
namics allow for the adaptive evolution of population structure in support of group
selection.
6.5 Conclusion
Most models of social evolution assume that population structure is xed, or changes
only as a result of external disturbances. However, organisms across all taxa can in
fact modify their population structure to varying degrees, for example, by inuencing
assortativity on behaviour, migration rate, or group size. We have shown here that
explicitly incorporating such eects into a model of social evolution can have important
consequences. In particular, we have shown that individual modication of population
structure can create the conditions for eective group selection and, consequently, co-
operation. Thus, while many previous models have shown the conditions under which
cooperation can evolve, we have demonstrated here how those conditions can themselves
arise as a result of individual adaptation.
2Negative frequency-dependent selection can also operate within multi-species groups, as modelled
by coexistence of competing species in Lotka-Volterra competition equations, for example (see Powers
et al., 2008).Chapter 7
Social Niche Construction and
the Major Evolutionary
Transitions
A change in population structure is central to most of the major transitions in evolution.
That is, the population structure of the pre-transitional individuals changed such that
they went from a solitary existence to living in highly cooperative groups. Some part
of this structure can sometimes be provided by the physical environment. Consider,
for example, the hypothesis by Michod (1983) (and advanced by Maynard Smith and
Szathm ary 1995) that the rst replicators were randomly washed onto a \rocky shore",
and that being on this shore created spatially localised interactions as compared to
existing in a well-mixed solution. The replicators were then periodically washed away
and freely-mixed, before being returned to the surface. In eect, a trait-group structure
was created \for free" by the environmental conditions (Michod, 1983), and this allowed
cooperation to evolve. Our contention, however, is that such a degree of population
structure need not always be provided by the physical environment. Rather, the social
niche construction thesis developed in this dissertation predicts that it can be created
by the evolving individuals themselves. Moreover, we have argued that the component
of selection on population structure due to social behaviour must be in the direction of
creating conditions for greater cooperation. Thus, social niche construction will act as
a driver towards creating the kinds of cooperative groups seen in the major transitions.
Of course, how far it succeeds in this depends upon the degree of opposing selective
forces provided by other ecological factors, such as crowding and resource competition.
Generally, however, we argue that social niche construction provides a new perspective
for understanding the process of a transition, for it can provide an adaptive explanation
for how individuals create the highly cooperative groups that develop in many of the
transitions.
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We have provided a general logical argument for how social niche construction will create
a component of selection on population structure in favour of cooperation in Chapter 1.
We have also illustrated this argument with models of the evolution of the example trait
of initial group size preference. Here, we discuss examples of other kinds of social niche
construction, and their applicability to the major transitions.
7.1 Social niche construction and the fraternal transitions
The models in this thesis have been mostly concerned with the trait of initial group size
preference, that is, the number of individuals that found a group or colony. A key feature
of many of the fraternal transitions is, as discussed in Chapter 5, founding of the group
by one or a few individuals. For example, most multicellular organisms develop from
a single fertilised egg (Wolpert and Szathm ary, 2002). Why is this the case? Surely,
if multicellularity has an adaptive advantage, there must be some benets in number,
i.e., in being in a group size greater than 1. In particular, the Allee eect (Allee, 1938)
suggests that very small groups should be more vulnerable to extinction, for example, due
to increased predation or diculty in accessing resources (Grosberg and Strathmann,
1998). So, it is not obvious why cell-groups are indeed founded by only 1 individual
(Grosberg and Strathmann, 1998; Wolpert and Szathm ary, 2002). Moreover, such a
bottleneck in development is common to several of the transitions (Maynard Smith and
Szathm ary, 1995; Queller, 2000), for example, eusocial insect colonies develop from one
or a few queens (Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995; Queller, 2000). The fact that
this is a general pattern adds further support to the claim that it is an adaptation.
Indeed, a developmental bottleneck is seen by Godfrey-Smith (2009) as a hallmark of
an evolutionary individual
Michod and Roze (2000); Roze and Michod (2001) have shown that a smaller initial
cell-group size can be selectively advantageous because selsh mutants that arise during
development can be more eectively purged. The spread of such selsh mutants is
favoured by within-group (within multicellular-organism) selection (P al and Papp, 2000;
Roze and Michod, 2001). Roze and Michod (2001) argue that the greater between-group
variance that results from development from a single cell increases the eectiveness of
group selection in purging these mutants. This is because the presence of selsh mutants
lowers cell-group functionality and hence the success of the group in competition with
others. In general, the deleterious mutational load experienced by cell-groups increases
with the number of cells that found the group (Kondrashov, 1994).
It is insightful to consider the two dierent perspectives from which authors have consid-
ered single-celled development. Authors such as Roze and Michod (2001) emphasise the
role of single-celled development in increasing the ecacy of between-group selection.
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of all variance in tness to the group level, as the hallmark of a major transition. On the
other hand, authors such as Maynard Smith and Szathm ary (1995), P al and Szathm ary
(2000) and Queller (2000), emphasise the perspective of genealogical relatedness rather
than between-group selection. For them, the fact that multicellular organisms develop
from a single cell means that there is no evolutionary conict of interest between the cells
that make up the group, for they are genetically identical. Because of this, they argue
that selsh mutants would not be selectively favoured. This provides a nice example of
the dierence between kin and group selection perspectives of looking at the same pop-
ulation structure. Kin selection emphasises that there is no conict between cell-group
members because they are genetic clones, whereas the group selection perspective em-
phasises that this shared interest is realised through competition with other cell-groups.
In particular, we would argue that the group selection perspective is particularly valu-
able in explaining the maintenance of the integrity of the multicellular organism in the
face of selsh mutants, since deleterious mutations are purged by cell-groups with a lower
mutational load outcompeting those with a higher load (Roze and Michod, 2001). This
seems particularly relevant before a germ-soma separation evolved, since selsh mutants
could then be passed down through the lineage to ospring, whereas after a germ-soma
separation they can only reduce the survival and / or fecundity of the one cell-group in
which they reside. On the other hand, the kin selection perspective seems particularly
useful in understanding the origin of multicellularity (Maynard Smith and Szathm ary,
1995; P al and Szathm ary, 2000; Wolpert and Szathm ary, 2002), since the fact that the
rst multicellular organisms may have developed clonally (i.e., with a relatedness of 1)
meant that selsh behaviour was much less of an issue. A reproductive division of labour
could evolve, also due to clonality, because one cell could carry the genetic information
of the entire group, and so not all cells would need to reproduce in order to pass on
their genes, hence some could specialise in vegetative functions (Queller, 1997; Michod,
1999). By contrast, in multicellular forms that develop by aggregation of unrelated cells,
such as cellular slime moulds (P al and Papp, 2000), selsh behaviour is much more of
an issue and frustrates the functional integration of the cell-group to a much greater
extent.
The origin of a unicellular bottleneck in the development of multicellular organisms
needs explaining. In particular, Michod and Roze (2000) suggest that the ancestors of
metazoans were colonies of choanoagellates that likely reproduced by fragmentation,
that is, by breaking o a propagule of several cells. Hence, the initial size of the cell
groups is postulated, under this theory, to be greater than 1. If this natural history
hypothesis is correct, then the evolutionary origin of a cell-group being founded by a
single individual needs explaining, for that population structure was not necessarily pro-
vided \for free" by the environment. Social niche construction can provide an adaptive
explanation for the origin of a unicellular bottleneck in multicellular development, by
showing how a series of mutations that decreased initial group size could be selectively
advantageous. Our model of the evolution of initial group size in Chapter 6 is closely132 Chapter 7 Social Niche Construction and the Major Evolutionary Transitions
analogous to this. For example, where there is no Allee eect, and hence no opposing
selective force on group size, we found that individuals evolve to live in groups founded
by a single individual. We showed (in the case of the Snowdrift game) the presence
of a selective gradient towards this, illustrating that it can be adaptive. Because there
were no other components of selection on group size, it was adaptive precisely because
it increased between-group variance and hence cooperation. The ip side of this is that
it reduced within-group variance, and hence reduced selection favouring selshness, ul-
timately eliminating it entirely, exactly as occurs in multicellular development from a
single cell. More generally, our logical argument in Chapter 1 shows that in the absence
of other opposing selective forces this must occur, since living in an environment with
greater cooperation raises tness, by denition, and so individuals who live in those
environments must be favoured over those that live in environments selecting for self-
ishness, all other factors being equal. We also investigated the presence of an Allee
eect, and found that under the model parameters studied, this pushed the equilibrium
initial group size upwards from 1. This has not occurred in metazoans, for two possible
reasons. Firstly, the ecological parameters may be such that the Allee eect does not
outweigh other advantages of single celled development, be they purging selsh mutants
(Roze and Michod, 2001) or allowing for a developmental programme (Wolpert and Sza-
thm ary, 2002). Secondly, metazoans may have evolved mechanisms for overcoming the
ecological disadvantages of single celled reproduction, for example, by increased parental
care of ospring (Grosberg and Strathmann, 1998).
One important dierence between the model in Chapter 6 and the way that metazoan
development occurs is that we have modelled group formation by the aggregation of
unrelated individuals. By contrast, the early ancestors of metazoans founded groups
by propagules of related cells, all descended from the same parent group. Thus, within-
group variance, and hence selection for selsh behaviour, would initially be much greater
in our model. In that sense, the initial conditions in our model are less favourable for
cooperative behaviour than they likely were at the start of the transition to multicel-
lularity. Nevertheless, we would argue that our model highlights the general argument
that cooperation can drive the evolution of population structure in scenarios like the
transition to multicellularity, by creating an adaptive gradient on structure-modifying
traits. In this transition, social niche construction takes the form of selection against
selsh mutants driving the evolution of a smaller propagule size, ultimately leading to
unicellular development. Despite the fact that all group members were related by de-
scent in the ancestors of metazoans, selsh mutations still occurred as the cell-groups
grew, and the adaptive advantages of purging them could create selective pressures for
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7.2 Social niche construction and the egalitarian transi-
tions
The start of a fraternal transition appears to be related individuals that lived close
together forming groups. In some sense, then, social niche construction involves tinkering
with this population structure that was already provided by spatial collocation. In the
egalitarian transitions, however, the role of social niche construction is perhaps more
pronounced. This is because the pre-transitional individuals were of dierent types,
and hence not related (Queller, 1997). Thus, a population structure already giving
high between-group variance, and low within-group variance, was not provided by the
environment, as it is in the fraternal transitions. This is why, for example, Queller (1997,
2000) views control of conicts as the greatest hurdle in the egalitarian transitions. From
this point of view, there is more for social niche construction to do in such transitions.
The trait of initial group size that we considered above involved the indirect evolution
of associations between individuals. That is, by evolving a smaller initial group size,
individuals increased the genetic homogeneity of their group. In so doing, they began
to bring an aspect of their selective environment under their own control, namely the
genetic context in which social interactions took place. A more extreme form of this
would be the evolution of specic associations (Watson et al., 2009; Mills and Watson,
2009), whereby in an egalitarian transition individuals could evolve associations with
particular other species, ensuring that their lineages carried on interacting down through
the generations. For example, when genes evolved to form chromosomes, they ensured
that the other genes that they were co-adapted with would be passed down with them to
the next generation (Maynard Smith and Szathm ary, 1995). In this way, they stabilised
their selective environment, allowing for greater co-adaptation. In general, stabilising
the selective environment by evolving some kind of associations should increase the t
between organisms and their environment, for two reasons. First, if two types are co-
adapted, then increasing their frequency of interaction increases how useful a particular
co-adaptation is, in the sense that it can be used more frequently. Second, once the
selective environment is stabilised, greater co-adaptation can occur, even to the point
that organisms can evolve adaptations that mean they depend on the presence of each
other.
7.3 What constrains social niche construction?
The type of social niche construction that can occur is constrained by the type of evolu-
tionary game that group members play (and more than one game may be appropriate,
see Chapter 5 for a discussion of how both coordination of function and a \Tragedy
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transitions). In particular, the evolution of direct associations between individuals is
problematic in single ESS games, since all types of individual are tter if they interact
with a cooperator (this is true in both the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games).
Thus, in general we would not expect directly assortative interactions to be stable in
such games. For example, we would not expect cooperators to be able to evolve a marker
trait to recognise and form groups with each other, since there would be selection pres-
sure for selsh individuals to evolve that same marker. Moreover, selsh individuals
with that marker would then be tter than cooperators with the marker. This is exactly
what we saw in Chapter 6 when group size preference was replaced with an arbitrary
marker, which was unable to create a population structure that sustained cooperation.
Social niche construction therefore takes more indirect routes to stabilising the selec-
tive environment in such cases. In particular, the evolution of increased assortativity
occurs by indirect means, such as by evolving group size or migration rate. We suggest
that these are the types of population structure-modifying traits that are likely to be
important in the fraternal transitions.
On the other hand, in games with multiple ESSs we would expect the evolution of direct
assortativity to be stable (see, for example, Snowdon et al. 2009). For example, in a
coordination game each type is tter when it interacts with other individuals of the
same type, so there is no selection pressure for trying to break the other type's marker
system. Similarly, in the Stag Hunt game stag hunters do well when paired with each
other, but a hare hunter is no tter paired with a stag hunter than paired with another
hare hunter, so again there is no pressure for selsh individuals to pair with the other
type. In general, if there are multiple ESSs then it will be in the selective interests
of a genotype to increase its frequency of co-occurrence with other genotypes that are
also present in that same ESS (Watson et al., 2009). We take assortativity in a mixed
ESS game to mean types preferentially interacting with the other types with which they
co-occur at an ESS. This co-occurrence can be between individuals of dierent species,
as in symbiosis and the egalitarian transitions.
It is important to remember that we posit social niche construction as an adaptive
process. Therefore, at each stage it must be in the immediate selective interests of
the individual to modify their population structure in a particular way. For example,
we do not suggest that one type would evolve an association with another unless it was
immediately advantageous. Thus, there must exist an adaptive gradient on a population
structure-modifying trait that can be followed by mutation and subsequent selection. For
such a gradient to exist due to social behaviour, as posited in this dissertation, three
conditions must be met:
1. Individuals that create the structure must tend to live in it more frequently than
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2. The modied structure must cause the individuals that live in it to enjoy greater
cooperation.
3. The increase in tness from this greater cooperation must outweigh any tness
loss that occurs in the new structure, for example due to ecological factors such
as the Allee eect.
When these three conditions are met, population structure will adaptively be modied
to increase cooperation, assuming that a heritable structure-modifying trait exists. We
suspect that the third of these conditions will often be the stumbling block in nature,
since other ecological pressures apart from those on social behaviour may be too strong
to be the overcome by the benets of increased cooperation. Whether or not this is the
case requires detailed ecological knowledge and needs to be veried on a case by case
basis.
7.4 Conclusion
In many of the major transitions, the population structure of individuals changed so that
such extreme forms of cooperation as a reproductive division of labour were selectively
favoured. The major transitions are therefore not just about how individuals adapt to
their current social environment, but also how that environment itself changes. Thus,
if we want to provide an adaptive explanation for the transitions then we need to also
provide an adaptive explanation for how the population structure changed to support
such a high degree of cooperation. Therefore, conventional models of social evolution
that just explain how organisms adapt their social behaviour to their current population
structure cannot tell the whole story. It is, therefore, essential to take account of the
evolution of population structure as well as social behaviour.
In this dissertation, we have argued that social behaviour can drive the evolution of
population structure. In the case of the fraternal transitions, as modelled by single ESS
games, we have argued that the modication of population structure will not take the
form of direct assortative interactions, for that would be vulnerable to cheating on any
assortative marking trait. Rather, assortativity can increase by indirect means, such as
a reduction in initial group size or migration rate. We have suggested, in agreement with
Michod and Roze (2000), that such a reduction in initial group size occurred during the
transition to multicellularity, and was selectively advantageous because it allowed selsh
mutants to be more eectively purged through stronger cell-group selection. Our model
in Chapter 6 provides a general illustration of how an adaptive gradient can exist on
initial group size that can be followed by a series of small mutations. In the case of the
egalitarian transitions, where we have argued a multi ESS game is a better model of the136 Chapter 7 Social Niche Construction and the Major Evolutionary Transitions
social interactions, then direct assortativity can be stable. Hence direct associations,
such as the evolution of linkage between single genes, can evolve.Chapter 8
Discussion and Conclusions
The question of how cooperative behaviours can evolve has troubled evolutionary biolo-
gists since Darwin (1871). We know that population structuring can make cooperation
selectively advantageous for the individual, by clustering cooperators together such that
they enjoy the benets of each others' actions. Such structuring is fundamental to the
frameworks of kin (Hamilton, 1964a; Wade, 1980; Michod, 1982), and group (Wilson,
1975a, 1980; Hamilton, 1975), selection (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1982; Michod and
Sanderson, 1985; Sober, 1992; Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009).
What has been left largely unaddressed by previous works, however, is how these popu-
lation structures are created. In particular, the typical model of the evolution of coop-
eration shows how individuals adapt their social behaviour to t the structure that they
nd themselves in. For example, if there is a certain degree of assortment of cooperators
then the model will show that cooperation is individually adaptive, otherwise it will
show that selshness is adaptive. Such models make an implicit assumption that the
population structure does not change during the course of evolution, and hence they
cannot explain the origin of a structure that supports cooperation. As a result, we have
argued that such models cannot really explain the evolutionary origin of cooperation,
for surely we need to understand how the selection pressures towards cooperation were
themselves created. If population structuring creates the selective pressures for coop-
eration, then this must involve a change in population structure. The need to explain
how a selective environment that favours cooperation is created is particularly evident
when considering an adaptive explanation for the major transitions in evolution, since
a change in selection pressures that favoured greater cooperation must have occurred.
Most models of social evolution, then, consider the equilibrium frequency of coopera-
tion in a given population structure. By contrast, we have explicitly considered the
joint equilibrium of social behaviour and population structure. We can thus explain
why organisms live in an environment that supports a particular level of cooperation,
rather than in an environment that supports more or less cooperative behaviours. This
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is a question that models which treat population structure as exogenous cannot help
to answer, unless they posit that population structure is entirely the product of phys-
ical environmental features. Some structure can sometimes be provided \for free" by
the physical environment. For example, it has been suggested (Michod, 1983) that the
rst replicators found themselves regularly washed onto a rocky shore, which created
a trait-group structure (sensu Wilson 1975a, 1980) that allowed cooperation to evolve.
However, it is also widely appreciated that individual genetic traits can modify pop-
ulation structure (e.g., Orians, 1969; Emlen and Oring, 1977; Rodman, 1981; Koenig,
1981; Johnson and Gaines, 1990). Hence, the structure can be subject to selection and
change in an adaptive manner, for individuals can create a structure that increases their
own tness. We have argued here that social behaviour can exert an indirect selection
pressure on structure-modifying traits, causing individuals to adaptively modify their
population structure to support greater cooperation (Powers et al., 2007; Powers and
Watson, 2009). Thus, we are able to provide an adaptive explanation for how the struc-
tures supporting cooperation arise, rather than having to rely on them being provided
by chance by the physical environment.
Moreover, we have argued that any selection pressure on population structure resulting
from social behaviour must be in the direction of creating a structure that increases
cooperation; that component of selection could not favour the creation of a structure
that increased selsh behaviour. This was shown by the logical argument presented in
Box 1.2. Our argument holds that linkage disequilibrium will evolve between behavioural
and structure-modifying traits, if the following premises and assumption are satised
(these are the premises and assumption to our logical argument in Box 1.2):
Premises
1. Population structure aects selection pressure on social behaviour, as proved by
Hamilton (1964a, 1975) and Price (1972).
2. Structure A selects for greater cooperation, structure B for greater selsh be-
haviour (made logically possible by premise 1).
3. Individuals have a heritable trait that produces population structure A or B.
Individuals also posses a heritable social behaviour (cooperative or selsh).
Assumption Individuals with trait A tend to nd themselves in structure A more
frequently than individuals that do not posses the trait. Likewise with trait and structure
B.
We argued that our assumption will be valid whenever the structure-modifying trait
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is that the trait causes its bearers to experience relatively more cooperation. If the
trait aects the structure of bearers, then this will occur when the new structure selects
for increased cooperation. Conversely, if the trait aects the structure of non-bearers,
then this will occur if the new structure of the non-bearers induces them to be more
selsh. On the other hand, if the trait aected the structure of all population members,
then it would be selectively neutral. In general, we would not expect a trait to modify
the structure of all population members. For example, the trait could be the amount
of extracellular matrix produced by a bacterium in a biolm (Flemming et al., 2007).
This would aect that bacterium, and its neighbours, but because a biolm is not
freely-mixed, it would not aect all individuals. Another example concerns aspects of
the mating system in sexual populations, such as a preference for inbreeding (Wade
and Breden, 1981; Breden and Wade, 1991), or monogamous relationships (Peck and
Feldman, 1988). Individuals with an allele coding for such a preference would practise
inbreeding or monogamy, whereas those without the allele would not. Thus, such traits
would dierentially aect the population structure of self. In the absence of interactions
being freely-mixed, we would suggest that most structure-modifying traits are likely
to have localised eects, and to hence create the structure dierential required for our
logical argument.
Chapters 5 to 6 investigated the second premise in detail. This premise requires there
to be a greater between-group variance in social behaviour under structure A than
under structure B. If new population structures arise by small mutations on structure-
modifying traits, then a small change in say, initial group size, needs to increase the
between-group variance. We found that where within-group selection leads to a compet-
itive exclusion of social behaviours, then any possibility for between-group variance tends
to eliminated over a large range of conditions, since one behaviour is driven to xation.
On the other hand, if there is a protected polymorphism of behaviours within groups,
then the potential remains for some between-group variance to be generated when the
groups are mixed and reformed (Powers et al., 2008). In particular, between-group vari-
ance is proportional to the least frequent behaviour in the global population (Wilson,
1980, 1983a), and under competitive exclusion dynamics, as given by directional within-
group selection, this can be zero for much of the parameter space. On the other hand, a
protected polymorphism prevents this determinant of the between-group variance from
going to zero. Such a polymorphism is provided by negative frequency-dependent se-
lection, as can be modelled by coexistence in the Lotka-Volterra competition equations
(Chapter 4), and the Snowdrift or Hawk Dove game (chapters 5 and 6). We found
that where such polymorphisms occur, some eect of group selection in increasing co-
operation could be seen over a much larger range of parameter space. Consequently, a
small change in structure can increase cooperation over a much larger range, and hence
premise 2 can be satised from a much larger range of initial conditions (Powers and
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8.1 The role of groups in evolution
The inclusive tness, or kin selection, explanations for the evolution of social behaviour
that are favoured by many evolutionary biologists do in fact make essential appeal to
group structure (Wilson, 1975a; Wade, 1980; Michod, 1982; Queller, 1992b). This is
because they require that the benets of cooperation fall preferentially on other coop-
erators, and this cannot occur in a freely-mixed population. Thus, they make appeal to
interaction-, or trait-, groups { subsets of the population in which social interactions take
place. However, this group structure is not made explicit in the models but is instead
implicit in the calculation of the relatedness term. In particular, relatedness is dened
as the deviation in the frequency of cooperation in the actor's group from the global
mean frequency of cooperation1 (Grafen, 1985; Frank, 1998). It is thus equivalent to the
concept of between-group variance (Queller, 1992b). Despite this, many authors have
sought to sideline the role of interaction groups in social evolution, regarding them as
merely the background context in which individual selection occurs, rather than as be-
ing targets of selection in their own right (Maynard Smith 1998; Gildenhuys 2003; West
et al. 2007a advocate this position, and Dugatkin and Reeve 1994, Sterelny 1996 and
Kerr and Godfrey-Smith 2002 provide a detailed philosophical justication of this view
without advocating that it always be taken). The tendency is to view purported models
of group selection as merely showing frequency-dependent selection on individual be-
haviour (Sterelny, 1996; Maynard Smith, 1998). The argument goes that cooperation is
individually advantageous when the group structure provides assortment of behaviours.
That is, cooperation has a frequency-dependent advantage if individuals with the same
behaviour tend to nd themselves in groups together. Thus cooperation evolves, on
this account, by individuals adapting their social behaviour to the group structure that
they nd themselves in. Consequently, on this understanding group structure plays the
same role in natural selection as any other characteristic of the environment: it is just
something that selection causes organisms to adapt to. This is particularly vivid in an
example that West et al. (2007a) give of the public goods game being played in groups
that compete with each other. They imply that group selection is not involved because
it is individually advantageous for an organism to share resources with group members,
if doing so increases the productivity of the group and hence in turn of the individual.
Similar arguments of cooperation as being an individual adaptation to group structure,
but with no recourse to group selection, are frequent in the literature (e.g., Nunney 1985,
1998; Grin et al. 2004; Wild et al. 2009; Bryden and Jansen 2010).
One line of argument in the literature that has tried to revive the role of groups has been
to emphasise the distinction between type 1 and type 2 group selection, as discussed in
Chapter 2. Okasha (2001, 2006) and others have stressed that the concept of type 1
group selection is that group character causally inuences individual tness. Thus, its
1In general, it is the deviation in allele frequencies at a focal locus in the actor's group compared to
the allele frequencies at that locus in the global population.Chapter 8 Discussion and Conclusions 141
explanatory target is an individual-level trait, such as cooperation, and so its results can
necessarily be accounted for in terms of individual tness (by contrast, type 2 selection
is the process by which a group-level trait increases in frequency in the metapopulation
of groups Damuth and Heisler, 1988; Okasha, 2006). However, it is argued that this is
not to deny the causal role that group structure plays in type 1 models, in particular,
that groups contribute dierent numbers of individuals into the population, and that
this is necessary for social behaviour to evolve (assuming the trait-group denition of a
group advocated by Wilson 1980; Sober and Wilson 1998 is used). Furthermore, it is
suggested that since nearly all purported models of group selection have been of type
1, even ones that individualists such as Maynard Smith would agree are group selection
(e.g., Maynard Smith 1964; Levin and Kilmer 1974), it would be strange not to view this
process as group selection (Okasha, 2001, 2006). However, this has not settled the debate
between group and individual selectionists, since a description of groups as providing the
context for frequency-dependent individual selection is still available and is apparently
just as satisfactory (Dugatkin and Reeve, 1994; Sterelny, 1996; Kerr and Godfrey-Smith,
2002). Thus, the argument that type 1 group selection really is a kind of group selection,
and that authors of models making appeal to group structure must recognise that they
are making appeal to group selection, does not wash with individualists. On the other
hand, such individualists would view type 2 models as being instances of \real" group
selection. However, we have argued that type 2 models can seem unsatisfying if we
just assert that groups should be treated like individuals. That is, such models beg the
question of how the groups came to be cohesive enough for this to be the case. Thus, to
an individualist, type 1 group selection is explained away by individual selection, and
type 2 group selection can seem mysterious if one cannot explain how the groups came
to be cohesive enough to be vehicles, sensu Dawkins.
We have argued, however, that the framework of social niche construction can remove
this impasse. This is for two reasons: rst by arguing that more than a contextual role
for groups is appropriate in type 1 selection, and second by showing how the cohesive
groups that are a prerequisite for type 2 selection can be created. Regarding the rst of
these, if the group structure can itself change, then just viewing it as part of the static
environmental context, in the way that abiotic environmental properties are viewed,
misses out a vital part of the story. In particular, viewing groups as a static part of the
environment cannot explain how they arose, or how and why the strength of selection
pressure they exert on social traits changes. Social niche construction forces a move
away from the \groups as context" paradigm, by focussing on groups as themselves
being a product of evolution, and not just a background context. This is analogous to
the argument made in the niche construction literature for why individual modication
of the abiotic environment is dierent from conventional natural selection, which focusses
on how organisms adapt to a static environment (Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Laland and
Sterelny, 2006). Like these authors, we argue that it is wrong to contextualise aspects
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Moreover, because such \environmental" factors can change adaptively, they themselves
require an evolutionary explanation for their current state. In general, we argue that
the view of type 1 group selection as individuals simply adapting to the group structure
that they nd themselves in, is limited in its explanatory power. Of course, social
niche construction, and indeed any type of group selection, must result in a change in
frequency of certain types of individual, if only because groups are made of individuals.
That groups are made of individuals, however, has no bearing on whether their role in
evolution is important.
Our second argument is that social niche construction can help to bridge the gap be-
tween type 1 and type 2 group selection. This is because it explains how individual
adaptations strengthen group selection by creating more cohesive groups. Such greater
group cohesion is moving towards the kind of groups that type 2 selection can operate
on. Thus, the two seemingly disparate types of group selection are reconciled when one
considers that type 1 could evolve into type 2 (see also Okasha 2006 and Michod 2005).
8.2 Evaluation of the methodology and further investiga-
tions in the current models
We have advanced our thesis of social niche construction through the development of a
logical argument. We have also illustrated this argument through a series of simulation
models. When developing the simulation models, we have adopted the philosophy that
a model should be no more complex than it needs to be in order to illustrate a particular
eect. Thus, we have not added extra factors into the models for the sake of a supposed
increase in realism, since the more factors that are added, the harder it is to determine
which are necessary for producing any particular eect. Moreover, adding extra factors
that we do not have a good understanding of introduces a greater possibility of artefacts
being introduced from the particular assumptions made. We have thus aimed to make
as few assumptions as possible in our models, and where we do make them, to try to
have a principled understanding of what eect they have.
For example, our logical argument did not make reference to diploidy or sexual re-
production, and so we modelled asexual reproduction of haploid genotypes. This is
a simpler case to understand, but crucially still allows us to illustrate our argument.
Similarly, we considered an aggregation and dispersal metapopulation structure, since
this has few parameters and easily elucidates the conditions under which cooperation is
selectively advantageous, as discussed in Chapter 3. For the same reasons, this model
metapopulation structure has been used by Sober and Wilson (1998) to illustrate the
factors aecting the evolution of social behaviour. Our group formation mechanism in
Chapter 6 was also chosen so as to satisfy the assumption of our logical argument that
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living in that structure more frequently than individuals that do not posses the trait. We
satised this in a simple manner, by assigning individuals to groups in order of their size
preference (Algorithm 6.2). Of course, such global sorting is not biologically realistic,
but it should be possible to devise a process that achieves the same result based only
on local interactions between organisms. Investigating such a mechanism would make
an interesting piece of future work, but was not necessary to illustrate our argument.
Concerning simulation technique, we have not used fully individual-based models. Rather,
we have used dierence equations on continuous genotype densities to model genotype
reproduction. We have thus treated each group as a single freely-mixed population,
as is standard in analytical and numerical models of group selection in the literature
(indeed, the trait-group concept of group selection denes a group as the largest subset
of the population for which interactions are freely-mixed), e.g., Wilson (1975a, 1987);
Fletcher and Zwick (2004). We have avoided the use of full individual-based models
because the extra assumptions that they make can introduce artefacts into the results
(Powers and Watson, 2007). For example, in a model where individuals occupy sites on
a lattice, one must make an assumption about how the cells making up the lattice are
updated: are they updated one at a time, or simultaneously? This innocuous-sounding
assumption can in fact have a major impact on the results of the simulation, as was
shown by Huberman and Glance (1993). They found that the coexistence of coopera-
tors and selsh individuals in a Prisoner's Dilemma game played on a lattice reported by
Nowak and May (1992) only applied when lattice sites were updated synchronously; if
the sites were instead updated asynchronously, then selsh behaviour swept to xation.
Because we did not need to use an individual-based model to illustrate our argument,
we avoided introducing such extra complications that come purely from the modelling
technique. In general, we have tried to use modelling techniques that do not introduce
any unnecessary assumptions.
However, now that we have illustrated our logical argument with minimal models, it
would be insightful to investigate other factors, one by one, that may aect the results.
One such factor that is particularly pertinent is sexual reproduction, for this can reduce
the level of linkage disequilibrium when recombination occurs between separate loci (Ri-
dley, 2003). Reduction of linkage disequilibrium between population-structuring traits
and socio-behavioural traits would reduce selection for the structuring trait. This is
because it would reduce the association between possessing a structuring trait and re-
ceiving the benets of increased cooperation. Thus, the tness advantage of individuals
with the structuring trait that comes from experiencing greater cooperation would be
reduced. We should stress, however, that we would not expect recombination to destroy
linkage disequilibrium entirely, particularly if individuals mate with others within their
structure, since the assortativity on structuring traits that is a premise of our social
niche construction argument means that mates will themselves tend to have the same
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tend to live in the same structure will aect the potential of recombination to disrupt
linkage disequilibrium. The recombination rate during sexual reproduction will also have
an eect (see Ridley 2003 for a discussion of how the recombination rate aects linkage
disequilibrium).
As hinted at above, another factor that should have qualitatively similar eects to sexual
reproduction is to reduce the probability that individuals end up living in the size of
group coded by their size preference allele. In the group formation algorithm presented
here (Algorithm 6.2), assigning individuals to groups in order of their size preference,
and then creating a new group when adding the next individual would cause group
size to exceed the mean preference of its members, means that most individuals end up
in the size of group that they prefer. We can relax this, by making group formation
based on size preference a stochastic process2. In particular, individuals could live in
a group that satises their size preference with a certain probability. Procedurally,
this could be achieved by a modied version of Algorithm 6.2 that added the next
individual in the sorted list to the current group with a certain probability, otherwise an
individual chosen from a random position in the list would be added instead. Reducing
the matching between preference and size of group lived in would reduce the linkage
disequilibrium between group size and social behaviour, since a smaller fraction of the
individuals living in smaller, more cooperative, groups would also posses the small allele
that created those groups. Thus, the benets of cooperation would fall less preferentially
on individuals with the small size allele, thereby reducing the tness advantage of the
allele that comes from social behaviour. Given the discussion of the eects of sexual
reproduction above, it would also be insightful to vary both the recombination rate and
the degree of preference matching simultaneously.
Our models consider a loose trait-group structure to be initially present in a popula-
tion. This follows from the notion that all individuals will have some tness-aecting
interactions with others. This applies even at the origin of life, for example, the rst
replicators are hypothesised to have needed the same chemicals for their reproduction
and hence to compete for those resource (Szathm ary, 1999). It is thus not reasonable
to think that organisms could ever exist in isolation, for their tness will always be
aected by biotic as well as abiotic factors. At the same time, most organisms are not
constantly well-mixed, and so these tness aects will be localised. Fitness aects from
biota therefore create a trait-group structure, as argued by Wilson (1975a, 1980). We
thus argue that it is a fundamental mistake to think that a group size of 1, representing
an organism in a vacuum, is the natural starting point of a model of the evolution of
population structure.
However, the group structure in our model is fairly rigid, in the sense that the groups
are discrete and completely isolated between the mixing stage. It would be interesting to
examine the evolution of population structure in a less rigid scenario, for example, in an
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individual-based model where individuals occupy sites on a lattice and interact with their
neighbours. In such a model, the interaction groups would be continuous rather than
discrete, and a global mixing stage every t generations could be replaced by a varying
dispersal distance of ospring from their parents. We could then examine whether a
more dened group structure, more conducive to between-group selection, could evolve.
Doing so could determine how well dened the initial population structure needs to be
in order for social niche construction to occur. Taken to the extreme, one could even
start individuals out in a completely freely-mixed state, and then give individuals a
trait that determines how much they adhere to, and hence keep on interacting with,
other individuals. This adherence trait could take, for example, the form a chemical
secretion, as in extracellular matrix production in bacterial biolms (Flemming et al.,
2007). Although we have argued that such a freely-mixed state is not really a feasible
starting point, using such a model would allow us to test the limits of our social niche
construction hypothesis. This is because it would allow us to investigate whether any
population structure at all is needed at the outset, or if social niche construction can
take a completely unstructured population into a highly structured state that supports
cooperation. Even if it cannot, it could potentially be bootstrapped by self-organisation
(see, for example, Boerlijst and Hogeweg 1991). That is, self-organisation may generate
a loose structure that natural selection can act on, and which can provide the starting
point for social niche construction.
8.3 Applying the social niche construction framework: di-
rections for future research
Our social niche construction thesis postulates that the benets of cooperative social
behaviour drive the evolution of population structure. This thesis provides an abstract
template that can be instantiated by considering the evolution of particular population-
structuring and social behavioural traits. We provided one particular instantiation in
Chapter 6 by considering the population-structuring trait of initial group size preference,
and the socio-behavioural trait of cooperation in public goods production, as modelled by
the Snowdrift and Prisoner's Dilemma games. Below, we consider some other possible
instantiations of the social niche construction framework, and how they can help to
resolve controversial issues in the group selection literature.
8.3.1 Modelling other kinds of social-niche constructing traits and
metapopulation structures
One obvious avenue for future research is to explicitly model the evolution of other kinds
of social niche-constructing traits. Our modelling work in this dissertation has focussed
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particularly relevant to the evolution of a developmental bottleneck that occurs in several
of the major transitions. However, our logical argument for social niche construction
does not rely on, or even make reference to, this particular trait, or to the particular
aggregation and dispersal metapopulation structure that we have modelled. Rather, our
argument simply requires the existence of an individual trait that can create a dierent
population structure, and that this dierent structure provides a greater assortment of
social behaviours which leads to increased cooperation being selected for.
When just considering an aggregation and dispersal metapopulation, there are at least
two other social niche-constructing traits that can be modelled; these are the number
of generations spent within groups before mixing, and the rate of migration that occurs
between groups during their growth. Both of these traits can be inuenced genetically,
in a particular, by a genetic tendency for individuals to disperse from their natal habitat.
Moreover, both of the traits directly aect between-group variance in the aggregation
and dispersal structure, and hence the assortment of social behaviours. Thus, when
evolved concurrently with social behaviour, they can provide another instantiation of
our logical argument.
A line of enquiry that appears particularly fruitful is then to consider the concurrent evo-
lution of several social niche-constructing traits simultaneously. For example, both the
number of generations spent within groups between mixing episodes, and initial group
size preference, could be evolved simultaneously alongside social behaviour. Evolution
through more than one dimension of population structure could create the conditions
for even greater levels of cooperation to evolve. It is also possible that the selective
processes on the separate social niche-constructing traits could interact with each other
in a positive feedback process. We see such positive feedback in the evolution of initial
group size and cooperation, since a smaller initial group size selects for greater coop-
eration, and through the generation of linkage disequilibrium this greater cooperation
dierentially increases the tness of individuals that create the smaller groups, leading
to selection for the small group trait. Thus, the small group trait selects for cooperation,
and cooperation selects for the small group trait (see also Breden and Wade 1991). In
a similar manner, selection on dierent social niche-constructing traits, through their
eect on social behaviour, could potentially reinforce each other.
Because our argument does not require the aggregation and dispersal metapopulation
structure, it is also worth considering social niche construction in other kinds of group
structure. One example would be the classical demic structure investigated in the models
of the early 1970s (Boorman and Levitt, 1972; Levin and Kilmer, 1974), in which there
is no global mixing stage where the groups disband, but instead groups are subject to
extinction events with a probability inversely proportional to their frequency of coopera-
tion. When extinction occurs, the now vacant site is recolonised by migrants from other
groups, where the number of migrants that a group sends out may be proportional to its
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be evolved alongside social behaviour in such a model. An adaptive gradient towards
the conditions for greater cooperation can again exist if a small decrease in say, deme
size, leads to an increase in cooperation and individual tness.
Similarly, the concurrent evolution of dispersal traits and social behaviour could be
investigated in an explicitly spatial model, such as a viscous population. It has been
proven that a purely viscous population, where there is no long-range dispersal but
instead ospring remain close to where they were born, does not favour the evolution of
cooperation. This is because increased competition within a locality resulting from no
dispersal osets the benets of helping other individuals in that locality (Taylor, 1992;
Wilson et al., 1992; West et al., 2002), as discussed at the beginning of Chapter 3. What
has not been addressed in the literature on this topic, however, is whether a population
could evolve from a purely viscous state to a structure more conducive to cooperation;
for example, a structure in which there is periodic dispersal. Avoiding competition with
relatives has long been postulated to inuence the evolution of dispersal (Hamilton and
May, 1977), but could increased cooperation rather than reduced competition per se
also be a driver? If an increased dispersal rate induces selection for greater cooperation,
then the social niche construction argument in this thesis applies.
In all of these cases, negative frequency-dependent selection on social behaviour should
logically have the same eect as in our aggregation and dispersal, initial group size,
model. That is, we would expect to see some increased selection for cooperation induced
by a small, mutational, change in population structure, from a much larger range of
initial conditions. This is because the existence of a stable polymorphism of behaviours
means that some between-group variance, or assortment of behaviours, can potentially
be generated when the groups are reformed. By contrast, under directional selection, one
behaviour tends to be driven extinct over a large range of parameter space, destroying
the possibility of any local variation in the frequency of that behaviour. This conclusion
should hold for any kind of population structure where local interaction groups are
formed, at least partly, by a stochastic sampling of the global population.
8.3.2 Evolution from loose aggregations to highly cohesive groups
One theme in the group selection controversy is a disagreement over how cohesive a group
has to be in order for us to say that it is the target of natural selection. Authors such
as Wilson and Sober (1994) view eeting single-generational associations of individuals,
as in Wilson's 1975a; 1980 trait-group concept, as the targets of selection. For others,
such as Maynard Smith (1987), the groups must have a clear boundary, presumably
be multi-generational, and reproduce in a manner such that parent groups beget whole
daughter groups similar to themselves. Social niche construction explains how the former
can evolve into the latter. For example single-generational trait-groups could evolve,
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much more clearly dened groups that stay together for many organismic generations.
Thus, loose trait-group structure could scaold the evolution of more concrete groups.
Specically, initial trait-group structure may provide the start of an adaptive gradient
on a trait that aects the frequency of global mixing, such that a small decrease in the
frequency of mixing (from every generation) could select for some increase in cooperation
and hence for social niche construction. This follows from the fact that some models
(Wilson, 1987), including some of those in this dissertation (Figure 4.2), have shown
that spending more than one generation within groups before mixing can increase the
eect of group selection (although this is not always the case, for it depends on how the
strength of between- and within-group selection changes through the generations; see
Figure 3.1). Thus, there could be a selective gradient on moving from 1 to 2 generations
between mixing, then 2 to 3, and so on, if each change yields an increase in the level of
cooperation that individuals choosing to live in such groups experience.
This process could continue further beyond the evolution of groups that stay together
for multiple generations. In particular, the mode of group reproduction could change
adaptively. For example groups may initially reproduce only in the loose sense of con-
tributing individuals to a global migrant pool after a number of generations. However,
they could evolve to reproduce by sending out a propagule that founds a new group
without any intergroup mixing. When this occurs, we can see groups as forming clear
parent-ospring lineages, and so we can start to think of groups as \units of evolution"
in their own right, sensu Maynard Smith (1987). We can also start to think of the
decoupling of group and individual tness, and hence the creation of type 2 group se-
lection. Crucially, the mode of group reproduction is certainly inuenced by individual
genetic traits, even if it is an emergent product of the interactions between the dierent
traits of the group members. Thus, social niche construction can potentially operate on
the mode of group reproduction, in a manner analogous to the way that we have illus-
trated it operating on group size. In particular, propagule reproduction may increase
between-group variance (Wade, 1978) and hence the degree of cooperation that is se-
lected for. Hence, individuals that choose to live in groups founded by propagules could
be tter than those that live in groups founded by aggregation from a global migrant
pool, creating an individual adaptive gradient towards propagule reproduction.
The impact of this is that it can explain how new, higher level, units of evolution are
created as a result of individual adaptation. That is, individuals evolve to adaptively
create groups that satisfy Maynard Smith's criteria for groups to be units of evolution.
We can therefore provide an account of the evolutionary origin of such groups, rather
than having to simply posit their existence as a matter of fact. This is essential to
providing an adaptive explanation for the major transitions, in which lower-level indi-
viduals do create higher-level evolutionary units. Social niche construction provides a
general theory for how this occurs, and one that is couched in terms of immediate indi-
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if trait-groups can bootstrap the evolution of more coherent groups, including those that
form clear parent-ospring lineages, then it is perhaps less appropriate to sideline their
role in evolution as some authors Nunney (1985); Maynard Smith (1987, 1998) seek to.
Rather, they can form the foundation of coherent entities that anyone would be happy
to call a group.
8.3.3 Weak altruism can potentially bootstrap the evolution of strong
altruism through social niche construction
Many authors have sought to demarcate a clear line between strong and weak altruism
(Nunney, 1985; West et al., 2007a). In particular, it is often argued that the former can
evolve by group selection, while the latter merely evolves by individual selection and
self-interest (Nunney, 1985, 1998)3. Weakly altruistic traits can, however, support the
evolution of group structure, as shown by the models in this dissertation. In particular,
they can lead to a group structure that provides a high degree of between-group vari-
ance, for example, by leading to a reduction in initial group size. Such a structure could
then provide sucient between-group variance for a strongly altruistic trait to evolve.
For example, the benets of weak altruism could drive randomly formed trait-groups to
evolve from being single- to multi-generational, thereby providing the positive assort-
ment necessary for strong altruism to evolve (Fletcher and Zwick, 2004). So, although
the initial population structure that the organisms lived in may not have supported
strong altruism, the evolution of social niche-constructing traits alongside weak altru-
ism could create a structure where strong altruism is then selectively advantageous.
Thus, we suggest that through social niche construction, weak altruism can lead to the
conditions that favour strong altruism. Rather than viewing weak altruism as not being
relevant to group selection, this suggests a role for such social behaviours in creating the
kind of population structure in which group selection is highly eective.
8.3.4 Social niche construction in multi-species and cultural settings
Group selection can operate in multi-species communities as well as amongst groups of
conspecics (Wilson, 1992). Similarly, it can operate in situations where the transmission
of traits is cultural rather than genetic (Boyd and Richerson, 1990; McElreath et al.,
2003). It has been suggested that both of these cases are more conducive to group
selection than single-species genetic models have suggested (Boyd and Richerson, 1990;
Wilson, 1992). One fundamental reason for this is that in both cases, there is quite likely
to be the existence of more than one ESS within a group. In the cultural setting, these
may represent dierent stable social norms, for example as modelled by a coordination
game (McElreath et al., 2003). In a multi-species community setting, they may represent
3As discussed in Chapter 2, this argument does not apply if the groups exist for multiple generations,
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dierent species compositions that are attractors of the ecological dynamics, as modelled
by the Lotka-Volterra competition equations, for example (Wilson, 1992; Penn, 2003;
Penn and Harvey, 2004). As we discussed in Chapter 5, group selection can then perform
equilibrium selection (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) amongst these ESSs, favouring those
that are payo dominant, i.e., increase the mean tness of the group members.
Social niche construction could operate in both of these settings to increase between-
group variance, such that social niche constructors would posses traits which meant that
they tended to nd themselves in groups that reached a high tness ESS. One such trait
could be a reduction in initial group size, as considered here in the case of single-species
genetic traits. Another could be the evolution of associations with particular other
species or types, since as discussed in Chapter 7, we would not expect such associations
to be vulnerable to cheating if there are multiple ESSs. Hence, the \green-beard" eect
(Hamilton, 1964b; Dawkins, 1976) should be more robust in a setting where there are
multiple ESSs.
It would also be interesting to examine how the rapid spread of cultural traits, compared
to genetic traits, inuences social niche construction. For example, if the behavioural
trait was cultural, but the population structure-modifying trait genetic, would the fast
evolution of behaviour speed up social niche construction or hinder it?
8.4 Concluding remarks
The vast majority of models of social evolution implicitly view the evolution of coop-
eration as adaptation to population structure. That is, they show how cooperation is
individually advantageous given a certain population structure. This vast line of research
then focusses on nding ever more population structures under which cooperation can
be supported. However, we have argued that such work cannot hope to provide a sat-
isfactory account of the origin of cooperation. This is because these models are silent
on the origin of the structures that support cooperation, and so they cannot provide
an account of how cooperation has come to be selectively advantageous. If we want to
really understand the evolution of cooperation, we need to understand the evolutionary
forces that create population structure.
We have shown that population structures can evolve as a result of individual adap-
tation, because they select for cooperative behaviour and hence increase the tness of
individuals in that structure. Thus, we have shown not only that population structure
drives the evolution of cooperation, as in classical theory, but also that cooperation can
itself drive the evolution of population structure, a process that we term social niche
construction. Moreover, we have developed a logical argument that any component of
selection pressure on population structure that is due to social behaviour must be in theChapter 8 Discussion and Conclusions 151
direction of increased cooperation; that component of selection cannot favour increased
selshness per se.
Our social niche construction thesis speaks directly to the group selection controversy.
There is a tendency in the social evolution literature to view apparent cases of group
selection as being merely frequency-dependent individual selection causing individuals to
adapt to the group structure that they nd themselves in. On this understanding, groups
are treated as part of the context in which ordinary individual selection occurs, that is,
they are treated as a static part of an organism's selective environment in the same way
that abiotic factors are. We have argued, however, that the origin of cooperation can only
be explained by the creation of group structure. Thus, explaining cooperation requires
that groups are treated as more than simply part of the selective background, for their
creation needs to be explained by evolutionary processes. Moreover, our logical argument
suggests that the benets of cooperation will drive the creation of group structures ever
more conducive to group selection. Thus, group selection selects for cooperation, and
cooperation selects for more group selection, in a self-reinforcing process. Sidelining the
role of group selection in social evolution, by viewing it as merely frequency-dependent
individual selection, can overlook this fundamental dynamic.
We have argued that social niche construction is fundamental to providing an adap-
tive explanation for the major transitions in evolution. Many of the transitions in-
volve not only the evolution of a high degree of cooperation, but also a change in the
pre-transitional organisms' population structure that supported such social evolution.
Rather than viewing this change as unsystematic, social niche construction provides an
individual adaptive explanation for how population structure and cooperation reinforce
each other, which in extreme cases can create the prerequisite features for a transition
to a new level of individuality, i.e., the suppression of within-group selection and the
dominance of between-group selection.
The fact that we have shown that not only does population structure drive the evolution
of cooperation, but also that cooperation can drive the evolution of population structure,
suggests that cooperation is indeed a fundamental driving force in evolution.Bibliography
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